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The aim of this thesis is to analyse the extent to which criminal law can contribute towards 
our understanding of Union citizenship and of the political community of the Union. In 
carrying out this task it adopts a particular perspective on both criminal law and Union 
citizenship. Firstly, it adopts the criminal law theory developed by RA Duff, premised on the 
notions of citizenship and community; crimes are viewed as public wrongs, committed 
against the community. Individuals are held responsible as citizens and are called to account 
before the community. Secondly, it adopts a particular account of Union citizenship based on 
a distinction between transnational dimensions and supranational dimensions. The 
transnational dimension is then broken into two sub-dimensions based on the concepts of 
social integration and autonomy or a space of free movement.  
 
The role of criminal law in these dimensions of Union Citizenship is analysed in the main 
body of the thesis. Two chapters consider the role of criminal law in social integration in the 
context of the acquisition of residence rights and the serving of sentences. Two chapters 
consider the parallels between the autonomy of Union citizens that results in a single space 
of movement, and the area of justice as it is constructed through the European Arrest Warrant 
and the operation of a transnational ne bis in idem principle. A final substantive chapter 
details the competence of the Union to adopt legislation criminalising certain conduct and 
the extent to which this can be said to contribute to the formation of a community at a 
supranational level. A conclusion brings together the findings of the thesis in relation to 
Union citizenship and considers the implications for the structure of the political community 
in the Union. It is suggested the national remains the main site for communities in the Union. 
However, transnational processes associated with Union citizenship trigger the emergence of 
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Criminal law is concerned with responsibilities. However, responsibility is a relational 
concept; we are responsible to someone for something. That relationship is found in the 
notion of citizenship; we are responsible to each other as citizens of the same political 
community. And we are responsible for our actions that offend against the norms, values and 
interests of that community. The criminal law therefore reflects aspects of citizenship and 
political community. It involves responsibilities, and indeed corresponding rights and a 
moral relationship between co-members of the community. Through the criminal law the 
community lays down the norms that govern relations between its members and expresses 
the values inherent to that particular community and through this expressive dimension it 
can be said to contribute to the formation of the identity of the community. 
 
Citizenship and community are useful as means of explaining criminal law. However, the 
converse is also true; a communitarian account of the criminal law can be a useful means of 
exploring hitherto unexamined aspects of citizenship and the community and can help 
complement and enrich our understanding of these concepts. This is precisely the approach 
adopted in this thesis concerning Union citizenship. An examination of Union citizenship in 
light of a communitarian account of the criminal law can, it is suggested, provide important 
insights concerning Union citizenship and the political community of the Union.  
 
This chapter serves as a general introduction to the subjects of this thesis, EU criminal law, 
Union citizenship and the theory of RA Duff that links the concepts of citizenship and 
criminal law and which provides the methodological framework for the remainder of this 




wrongs and as reflecting responsibilities by individuals to other individuals qua citizens 
under the common values and norms of their particular community. The second part briefly 
introduces the role of the EU in criminal law. The third part provides a history of Union 
citizenship while outlining some of its main features. A conclusion provides an outline of the 
remainder of the thesis.  
 
Citizenship, Crime and Community 
The Theory of RA Duff 
 
Crimes as Public Wrongs 
 
The criminal law prohibits certain conduct. Through it the state claims authority to declare 
certain norms of conduct and to insist on their respect. More than any other area of law the 
criminal law carries the implication of “‘ought not to do’ and enforces these prohibitions 
through the use of physical force. It is the censure contained in the criminal law and the 
exercise of physical force to enforce it that marks out its special social significance’
1
 and 
calls for heightened justification. These simple statements immediately raise a number of 
questions of the criminal law and in particular the legitimacy of the polity to declare and 
enforce such norms on supposedly free individuals. To put the question another way: what 
conduct can the community legitimately require individuals to refrain from?
2
 A classic 
utilitarian perspective, rooted in the rationalism of the Enlightenment and particularly 
influential in Anglo-American criminal law,
3
 would justify the imposition of criminal 
liability according to the harm principle, most famously articulated by Mill according to 
which ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’
4
 Feinberg has provided 
the most comprehensive restatement of such a liberal conception of the criminal law through 
                                                 
1
 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (2 edn, Claredon Press 1995) 1.  
2
 There are of course some crimes of omission, requiring not that an individual refrain from a particular action 
but take positive steps. However, this category is relatively minor, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition, 
and only operates under certain circumstances, normally when a pre-existing relationship of a certain quality 
exists establishing a particular duty to act. See Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction 
to Criminal Law (1 edn, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1993) ch 6.  
3
 Ibid ch 1. 
4
 John Stewart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (first published 1859 OUP 1991) 15. For a discussion of 
Mill’s, but also other versions of the harm principle, see RA Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsability and 
Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 123 ff. For a modern restatement of Mill’s harm principle see Joel 




a detailed elaboration of the harm principle based around the concept of a ‘setback to 
interests’.
5
 This he has supplemented with an ‘offense principle’, with very limited 
application,
6
 and a rejection of both legal paternalism
7
 and legal moralism as incompatible 




However, while the harm principle can be a useful starting point for determining which 
actions are to be labelled crimes it is not sufficient in itself to capture what are commonly 
understood to be crimes. Instead, RA Duff, amongst others, has proposed applying a moral 




Duff has pointed out that the harm principle is both under and over inclusive. It is under-
inclusive in that it fails to capture the moral, in addition to the material or physical, nature of 
a criminal attack.
10
 Thus, the violation of personal privacy and space, in addition to simply 
deprivation of material goods, occasioned by burglary is not captured by all but the most 
wide ranging harm principle. Equally we consider rape to be criminal not simply by virtue of 
the physical and emotional harm caused to the victim but also by its blatant disregard for the 
respect due him or her as a morally autonomous individual. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
reconcile the harm principle with situations where individuals willingly submit to what 
might otherwise be considered a harmful situation such as polygamy and or 
sadomasochism.
11
 The criminal law reserves the right to criminalise conduct regardless of 
whether the ‘victim’ considers it harmful. It is true that these situations might be captured by 
a sufficiently broad definition of ‘harm’, however to do so would stretch the underlying 
concept of the harm principle and ultimately perhaps leave it so broad as to be 
                                                 
5
 Feinberg (n 4). 
6
 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Offense to Others, vol II (OUP 1985). 
7
 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self, vol III (OUP 1986). 
8
 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing, vol IV (OUP 1988). 
9
 Most famously articulated by Lord Devlin in response to the Wolfenden report advocating the 
decriminalisation of homosexual acts in the UK amongst other issues. For an account and HLA Hart’s response 
see HLA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (OUP 1962). For one of the more prominent moral theories of 
criminalization see Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (OUP 1997). 
10
 Although it should be noted that Feinberg’s formulation of the harm principle only prohibits wrongful harms 
ie harms that violate an individual’s rights. However, it is unlikely that Feinberg’s notion of a violation of a right 
properly articulates Duff’s conception of a moral wrong. That conception is closer to the more clearly moralist 
position of Moore, based on emotions and sense of violation. See Moore (n 9). 
11
 Duff gives the example of the famous UK House of Lords decision of R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 involving 






 It would certainly fail in its stated purpose of providing clear guidance on 
what may or may not be criminalised by the state. 
 
The principle is also over inclusive in two ways. Firstly, it would criminalise harm that we 
would normally consider private and outside the purview of the criminal law, such as 
emotional or even financial harm caused by the breakdown of a relationship. Secondly, a 
proper application of the harm principle requires not simply the criminalisation of  directly 
harmful conduct, but criminalisation of conduct that poses a mere risk of harm, such as 
reckless driving or failure to follow safety rules in a high risk industry. Therefore for this 
reason also ‘it is hard to see how [the harm principle] can set tight or determinate limits on 




Instead of a justification based on the harm principle, Duff proposes a broader moral basis 
for the criminal law; crimes as wrongs.
14
 Unlike torts, the remedy of which is to undo the 
harm caused, crimes are wrongs and conviction of a crime involves punishment and 
condemnation.
15
 It involves a retributive element independent from deterrence or restoration. 
The harm principle can still play a role in identifying at least some, if not all, of those 
criminal wrongs, particularly as a constraint on a liberal criminal law. However, even if harm 
is used as a criterion for identifying a wrong, in the eyes of the criminal law it cannot be 
disassociated from its wrongful character.
16
 It should be noted that defining crimes as 
wrongs necessarily abandons the pursuit of any master principle capable of identifying the 
content of the criminal law once and for all. The concept of a wrong is not a closed or fixed 
category and there is no ‘single concept or value that will capture the essence of crime, or 
the essential characteristic in virtue of which crimes are properly punished…[R]ather we 
should resist this desire in favour of a pluralism that recognises a diversity of reasons for 
                                                 
12
 With the further result that it would cease ‘to set substantial independent constraints on the scope of criminal 
law’, Duff (n 4) 135. 
13
 Ibid 137.  
14
 It should be pointed out that Feinberg also considers the criminal law to contain a moral element, in his 
version of the harm principle it is wrongful harms (ie those setbacks to interest that violate another persons 
rights) that constitute by far the largest categories of acts that can be legitimately criminalised. See Feinberg, 
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (n 4) ch 3. 
15
 RA Duff, Theories of Criminal Law (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition)). 
There are significant overlaps between tort and criminal law and in recent years their proper boundaries have 
become somewhat blurred but the conceptual distinction of torts as private harms and crimes as public wrongs 
remains. See also Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ (1965) 49 The Monist 397, who 
considers the condemnatory aspect the defining characteristic of punishment.  
16
 ‘A moralised version of the Harm Principle does not aim to identify harms independently of the wrongs that 




criminalisation, matching the diversity of kinds of wrong which can legitimately be the 
criminal law’s business. (emphasis in original)’
17
 The criminal law and the wrongs it 
embodies can therefore vary from time to time and from place to place depending on the 
prevailing moral consensus of a particular society or community. 
 
However, this is not to say that there are no limits on the criminal law. As mentioned above, 
in a liberal polity the harm principle can play some role in limiting the extent of the criminal 
law. Similarly, criminal law should be seen as a last resort or ultima ratio. Furthermore, there 
is an inherent limitation in the criminal law conceived as reflecting the values of a 
community. Crimes are not only wrongs, they are public wrongs and individuals can only be 
punished for wrongs that concern the broader community in a sufficiently serious manner to 
warrant retribution and condemnation. In the words of Blackstone, crimes ‘are breach and 
violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as 
community, in its social aggregate capacity…[B]esides the injury done to individuals, 
[crimes] strike at the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist, where actions of 
[that] sort  are suffered to escape with impunity. In all cases the crime includes an injury: 
every public offence is also a private wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the individual 
and it likewise affects the community.’
18
 This is not to say that criminal law should confine 
itself to acts that directly affect the public space or institutions such as public order offences 
or terrorism. Nor should we attempt to construe crimes against individuals as crimes directed 
against the social order per se. Duff rightly points out that to do so would ‘distract us from 
the wrong done to the direct victims of such crimes, which surely should be central to our 
understanding of their criminal character.’
19
 Rather than being wrongs done directly to the 
community, crimes are wrongs that concern the community for reasons of their seriousness 
and their affront to deeply held normative values of the community. They are wrongs in 




A number of characteristics of the criminal law and in particular the criminal procedure 
underline its public quality. Criminal prosecution is brought by a public body, a prosecutor 
or judge, in the name of the state, or even more tellingly ‘the people’. Unlike in civil claims, 
                                                 
17
 Ibid 139. See also Anthony Duff, ‘Theorizing Criminal Law: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 OJLS 353.  
18
 As quoted in Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsability and Liability in the Criminal Law (n 4) 52.  
19
 RA Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP 2003) 61.  
20
 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsability and Liability in the Criminal Law (n 4) 52. See also RA Duff and 




the individual victim has a minimal role in both initiating and conducting the action. These 
procedural aspects reflect the underlying characteristic of the crime as a public wrong. It 
involves ‘an authoritative, communal declaration of…wrongs’ that, through the criminal 
trial, merit ‘a public, communal response.’
21
 The criminal trial is a means of publically 
calling the transgressing member of society to account for his actions, that he or she may 
possibly justify or excuse. Similarly, punishment can be seen, not simply or even primarily, 
as a means of deterrence, but in combining deterrence with a retributive and rehabilitative 




We therefore move away from a simple Austinian ‘command and control’ conception of the 
criminal law based on a relationship between sovereign and subjects to one in which 
individuals as members of a community have a relationship of responsibility to each other 
and the broader community by virtue of their membership. It is an inherently community 
based account of the criminal law. In the criminal trial the individual is called to account for 
his or her actions before the community. He or she is required to answer for his or her 
conduct deemed wrongful. The criminal law is a set of responsibilities on the basis of which 
we can be called to give an account. However, calling to account implies a relationship 
between the caller and the called that pre-exists the calling.
23
 Responsibility, and therefore 
criminal law itself, is a relational concept. A is responsible to B for C. Moreover, the content 
of the responsibility of A to B depends on the type of relationship that exists between A and 
B. Given the public character of criminal law, it is in our capacities as citizens that we owe 
responsibilities to each other under the criminal law and may be called to account in the 
context of the community. ‘As citizens who are both bound and protected by the values of 
our polity, we have both rights and responsibilities: we are answerable to each other for our 
conduct as citizens.’
24
 Furthermore both the status of the offender and the victim as citizens 
explains and justifies the interest the community as a whole takes in the wrong; it renders a 
private wrong public and hence criminal. Even those wrongs that are directed at individuals 
‘count as “our” wrongs because they violate our public values and because we share them 
with the victim: our concern for the victim as our fellow citizen makes them our business. So 
                                                 
21
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (n 19) 61.  
22
 Ibid ch 3.  
23
 RA Duff, ‘Responsability, Citizenship and Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and Stuart P Green (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 132.  
24




does our recognition of the wrongdoer as a fellow citizen: what is done by one of us, when it 




Basing criminal law on citizenship raises two questions: firstly the position of non-citizens
26
 
and secondly the effect that criminal activity, particularly persistent and egregious, on the 
citizenship status of offenders.
27
 Citizenship is an exclusive status whereas the criminal law 
both protects victims of crime and condemns offenders regardless of citizenship.
28
 While this 
may seem problematic it can be explained by conceiving of non-citizens as visitors to the 
polity who enjoy the status of guests. As guests they enjoy the protection but must also 
respect the normative values of the host society as expressed in its criminal law and must 
conduct themselves accordingly.
29
 With some consideration for the position of ‘guests’, 
Duff’s theory can therefore accommodate non-citizens on the territory of the state. However, 
national criminal law sometimes claims jurisdiction beyond the territory of the state based 
on the nationality of the offender or victim. For Duff, such instances of extra-territorial claim 
only serve to highlight the essentially communitarian account of the criminal law he 
provides; we as a political community may claim an interest in both the wrongs our fellow 




A separate issue is the impact of serious breaches of the criminal law may have on the 
membership status of convicted citizens. Do such individuals by persistent and particularly 
serious transgressions of the normative values of the community, or even by direct attack on 
the interests or institutions of the state, forfeit either some of their rights of membership or 
indeed the status entirely? Recent controversy in the UK regarding the right to vote for 




A crime is therefore a wrong that properly concerns the community as a whole rather than 
simply the individual victim(s). It is an act that the community has recognised as wrongful in 
                                                 
25
 Duff, ‘Responsability, Citizenship and Criminal Law’ (n 23) 139.  
26
 For an alternative view to Duff’s see Alejandro Chehtman, ‘Citizenshp v Territory: Explaining the Scope of 
the Criminal Law’ (2010) 13 New Crim L Rev 427. 
27
 Duff, ‘Responsability, Citizenship and Criminal Law’ (n 23) 141 ff.  
28
 There are a small number of crimes that are citizenship specific, such as voter fraud or treason. 
29
 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsability and Liability in the Criminal Law (n 4) 142. 
30
 Ibid 53-54. Note that Duff does not take a position on propriety of such a claim in any particular instance. His 
only point is that it is explainable in light of a community based account of the criminal law. 
31
 Duff, ‘Responsability, Citizenship and Criminal Law’ (n 23) 143. See the ECHR judgment in Hirst v United 




light of its shared values. The precise content of the criminal law will therefore necessarily 
vary between communities depending on their particular understandings of wrongfulness 
and the proper scope of matters of public concern.
32
 The criminal law declares or recognises 
certain wrongs deemed wrongful in light of the shared values and normative understandings 
of that community and prescribes the appropriate public reaction. It is therefore expressive 
or declarative: it declares certain actions to be wrongs, and attaches formal censure and 
condemnation to them.
33
 In a sense it is the ‘common law’ par excellence, which is not 
‘imposed on a people by a sovereign, which they must receive and obey as subjects. Rather 
it is the law of the community itself. It embodies the shared values and normative 
understandings of the community. It flows not from the will of a separate sovereign but from 




Such a vision of criminal law, as a declaring certain acts to be wrongful in the eyes of the 
community and to be of concern to the community, presupposes a group of individuals 
sufficiently bound by ties of affection or affiliation and sharing a collective identity and 
political life in common. This is not to say that such a criminal law requires a community 
based on a thick, ethno-cultural identity. And while it does presuppose some element of 
community, it does not necessarily require a heavily communitarian perspective of the state, 
emphasising the needs of the community and the commonly defined ‘good’ over the interests 
of individuals. Indeed, the fundamental principles and tenets of modern criminal law 
developed out of a major period of reform originating in Enlightenment thinking and 
characterised by a radical liberalism.
35
 Duff proposes a liberal community as the context 




For the most part this communitarian element of criminal law is unproblematic. Criminal 
law has developed principally in the context of the nation-state, a relatively homogenous unit 
                                                 
32
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (n 19) 63.  
33
 Either by virtue of some pre-legal wrongfulness or by virtue of the place they occupy in a wider system of 
regulation necessary to maintain certain goods. Thus ‘mala in se’, such as murder, rape, assault or physical 
endangerment, are wrongful by their very nature and are deemed to be wrongful independent of regulation.  
They are ‘wrongful harms’. On the other hand ‘mala prohibitata’ such as driving on the wrong side of the road 
or various financial crimes, are wrong by operation of the law rather than some pre-legal wrongfulness. 
Nonetheless once a system is established to coordinate conduct and deviation from which undermines the 
system and gives rise to harm or the danger of harm, that in turn generates a wrong. In contrast to mala in se, 
mala prohibita are harmful wrongs. See Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsability and Liability in the 
Criminal Law (n 4) 153 ff.  
34
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (n 19) 59. 
35
 Norrie (n 2) ch 2. 
36




combining the strong, historically founded affective ties of ‘the imagined community’
37
 with 
the powerful institutions of the modern state and its monopoly over the use of force. In such 
a context, where individuals are presumed to identify as equal members of the wider 
community and share the basic values of that community, the criminal law as representing 
ties of civic responsibilities between citizens and a minimum shared normative 
understanding, the criminal law can be rationalised and justified. This purely national picture 
of criminal law has begun to change somewhat. One development that lies outside the scope 
of this thesis is the growth and increasing institutionalisation of international criminal law. 
Whether this represents a proto-cosmopolitan community encompassing all of humanity to 
which all persons are potentially accountable is open to question.
38
 The power to legislate on 
criminal matters also exists at a sub-state level and can be rationalised as shifts in the 
understanding of community within a federal context. Nonetheless, it remains the case that 
both citizenship and criminal law are typically considered within the context of a national 
community.  
 
The European Union is not a national community but does possess both a meaningful 
citizenship status and a substantial body of criminal law. And yet both citizenship and 
criminal law are inherently community based concepts. This does not however exclude the 
possibility of applying Duff’s theory to criminal law within the European Union. In fact, 
given the ambiguities surrounding the exact nature of the Union as a political community 
and the novel nature of its citizenship in a post-national setting, an analysis of Union 
citizenship in the light of criminal law may reveal important features concerning both the 
status of Union citizenship and the broader community to which it relates. However, before 
we embark on such a task the remainder of this chapter will provide a brief introduction to 
both criminal law and citizenship in the European Union. 
 
The Role of the EU in Criminal Law 
 
The European Union affects criminal law in three main ways. Firstly, European Union law, 
as a law that enjoys primacy over national law requiring any conflicting national law be set 
aside, has in certain circumstances prevented Member States from either criminalising 
certain conduct or applying certain sanctions. Even when Member States are permitted to 
                                                 
37
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (2nd edn, Verso 2006). 
38




use criminal law within the scope of Union law, national criminal law remains subject to 
Union law principles of fundamental rights and proportionality. Secondly, European Union 
law must be implemented by Member States and must be done so in an effective manner. In 
a pair of cases the Court of Justice has recognised a general competence on the part of the 
Union to oblige Member States to adopt criminal sanctions in order to more effectively 
implement Union law. Both of these situations – where EU law affects national law 
negatively, by proscribing the use of criminal law, and positively, by prescribing the use of 
criminal law, were developed in what was known as the European Community. The third, 
final area where the EU affects criminal law was initially located in the ex-Third Pillar of the 
TEU, known as Justice and Home Affairs and allowed for approximation of national 
criminal law, judicial and police cooperation and the establishment of a number of criminal 
law enforcement agencies. 
 
Firstly, the EU can affect national criminal law in a negative sense, preventing its 
application. As with all reserved national competences, national criminal law must be 
exercised in conformity with Union law. In practice this means that national criminal law 
may be set aside in the event that it conflicts with Union law.
39
 Given the far reaching 
potential impact of free movement provisions in the internal market, it is this area that has 
perhaps been the clearest in setting aside national criminal law. Union law might operate as 
outright defence, setting aside the prohibition contained in national criminal law.
40
 Similarly, 
Union law and in particular the operation of the principle of proportionality can call into 
question the application of criminal sanctions where a fundamental freedom is at stake.
41
 
Thus, even when national criminal law that frustrates a fundamental freedom is permitted 
under Union law, its exercise is conditioned by the general principles of Union law, 
including fundamental rights and proportionality. One of the most extensive areas in which 
national criminal law interacts with Union law is in the free movement of persons, where 
national criminal law can be used to justify the expulsion of Union citizens but only under 
certain conditions. The treatment of this residual power of the Member States is dealt with in 
further detail in chapter 4. 
                                                 
39
 See Estella Baker, ‘Taking European Criminal Law Seriously’ (1998) Crim LR 361. 
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Union law has also impacted on national criminal law in a more positive sense; obliging 
Member States to enact criminal legislation to ensure to effective implementation of Union 
law.
42
 Based on a duty of sincere cooperation and the general principle of effectiveness of 
Union law, the Union has long obliged Member States to ensure the effective 
implementation of Union law.
43
 In Greek Maize the Court of Justice established an 
obligation to impose sanctions for the breach of Union law under conditions that were 
effective and equivalent to similar national breaches.
44
 In a controversial set of judgments 
and following much inter-institutional wrangling, this was later developed into a fully-
fledged doctrine permitting the Union to oblige Member States to adopt criminal sanctions 
for the effective implementation of Union law.
45
 Since the Treaty of Lisbon this competence 
has been formalised in Article 83(2) TFEU, allowing the Union to adopt measures requiring 





Both of the above instances where Union law affect criminal law, both negatively and 
positively, flow from the fact that in these instances Member States are acting within the 
field of Union law, either by breaching rights of free movement or in implementing Union 
law. Both were implicit in the old Community competence and both are ancillary to other 
Union law policies. The Union has also adopted a more autonomous criminal law policy, 
generally focused around the issue of cross-border crime and criminal law enforcement.
47
 
Initially, established as an system of quasi-international law under the Treaty of Maastricht 
under a separate pillar of the European Union it was partially ‘communitarised’ under the 
Treaty of Amsterdam before being incorporated within the main body of EU law under the 
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 Following the Treaty of Lisbon the EU can now be said to exercise 




Firstly, the Union can adopt approximation measures to effectively harmonise national 
criminal legislation in a number of key areas, mostly linked with cross-border crime.
50
 The 
harmonisation or approximation must be of a minimum nature and is limited in scope to a 
closed list but nonetheless reflects a real, independent normative presence in the field. Under 
the institutional regime operating following the Treaty of Amsterdam the Union adopted a 
number of such approximating instruments (then known as Framework Decisions) in fields 
such as terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, computer crime and organised crime, 
amongst others.
51
 This substantive criminal law competence of the Union in cross-border 
crimes, known as ‘Euro-crimes’, now sits alongside the competence of the Union described 





Secondly, the Union enjoys a competence to facilitate judicial cooperation and in particular 
the mutual recognition of various judgments and orders adopted by national authorities 
including courts, prosecutors and other judicial bodies.
53
 This ‘mutual recognition’ 
competence was implicit in the pre-Lisbon framework but has since been elevated to a 
specific legal basis
54
 and given priority by political institutions.
55
 Mutual recognition is now 
the main tool in the Union’s criminal law policy and in the creation of what has been termed 
an area of justice and a whole range of mutual recognition instruments, most notably the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD),
56
 have been adopted by the 
Union.
57
 Mutual recognition is to be based on what has been termed ‘mutual trust’ between 
                                                 
48
 For an institutional history of justice and home affairs in the EU see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 
(n 46) ch 2. 
49
 Albeit subject to specific institutional constraints see Jorg Monar, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ in Jurgen Bast and Armin von Bogdandy (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2 edn, Hart, 
Verlag CH Beck 2010) and Stephen Coutts, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
as an Area of Legal Integration ’ (2011) 7 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 69.  
50
 Art 83(1) TFEU. 
51
 For a comprehensive account see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 783 ff. 
52
 Now contained in Article 83(2) TFEU.  
53
 Article 82(1) TFEU.  
54
 Art 83(1) TFEU.  
55
 See The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens [2010] OJ C 
115/01.  
56
 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States (EAW FD) [2002] OJ L 190/1.  
57




national authorities. In an effort to provide some basis for such trust the Union has also been 
entrusted with a competence to adopt harmonising instruments in the area of procedural 
rights. Since the Treaty of Lisbon an incremental approach has been taken in this field with 
the adoption of a number of specific instruments
58





Finally, a number of Union agencies and information systems exist to facilitate cross-border 
cooperation in criminal law enforcement.
60
 Europol is an agency established under Union 
law and provides an institutional basis for information sharing and analysis and a framework 
for joint investigations through joint investigation teams. Europol is assisted in its task by 
the Europol Information System.
61
 Eurojust consists of national prosecutors, judges and 
senior police officers tasked with criminal investigations and prosecutions. Its role is to 
facilitate information exchange and cooperation between national agencies in situations of 
cross-border crimes. The Treaty of Lisbon also provides for the establishment of a European 
Public Prosecutors Office (EPPO).
62
 Initially to be tasked with prosecuting crimes against 
the Union’s financial interests, its scope may be extended by Member States. An initial 
proposal by the Commission has met with serious national resistance, in particular amongst 
national parliaments, who have issued a ‘yellow card’ under the Early Warning System, 





Finally, a word should be said regarding the Schengen Agreement signed between a select 
number Member States in 1984 and now extended to cover most, but not all of the Union 
and some, non-Union states such as Norway and Iceland.
64
 Those states, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, which remain outside the main body of the agreement, may nonetheless 
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opt-in on a case-by-case basis to specific measures.
65
 The Schengen Agreement was an 
agreement to abolish border controls and primarily concerns borders, visas and immigration 
control. Nonetheless, there are implications for criminal law and a number of elements 
concerned criminal law enforcement and recognition of judgments in a borderless area. 
There also exists a Schengen Information System containing details of criminal offences of 
third country nationals seeking entry to the Union. Of particular concern to any study of 
Union citizenship and criminal law is Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (CISA) preventing an individual from being prosecuted in more than 
one Member State for the same act. The Schengen Agreement was incorporated within the 
European Union in the Treaty of Amsterdam and involved a complex process of dividing it 
between its criminal law and immigration, borders and asylum components when allocating 




Citizenship in the Union - A Short History 
 
European citizenship appeared on the political agenda in the early 1970s. A legal form of 
citizenship was long considered implicit in the free movement of persons while a ‘political’ 
vision of citizenship, closely tied to the notion of identity formation and loyalty was explicit 
in a number of political statements and policies throughout the 1970s and 1980s. European 
Council meetings in Paris and Copenhagen in the early 1970s called for reports on a 
‘European Union’ resulting in the Tindermanns Report of 1976 that in turn contained a 
chapter on a ‘Citizens’ Europe’. At the same time the European Parliament became directly 
elected, laying the foundations for a pan-European democratic citizenship. From the 
perspective of identity and symbolism various measures were adopted such as a uniform 
passport, an anthem and flag. The Adonnoino reports in 1984 continued this work, stressing 
in particular possible voting rights in other Member States and presenting free movement as 




Alongside the political, identity-based, discourse, legal commentators noted the potential for 
a rights-based European citizenship rooted in European law. The rights accorded to 
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economically active individuals under the rules of the internal market were identified by 
Plender as an incipient form of European citizenship as early as 1976.
68
 This conclusion was 
only strengthened by the subsequent expansive jurisprudence of the Court of Justice granting 
directly enforceable rights of free movement and non-discrimination to individuals, 
interpreting both the material and personal scope of such rights expansively.
69
 Furthermore, 
while lawyers are prone to pay close attention to the actions of Courts, it would be negligent 
to ignore the important role of the European legislature in developing free movement rights 
for individuals.
70
 Legislation adopted on the free movement of workers and the self-
employed contained not only expansive economic rights of employment but were also 
careful to include a social and human dimension with equal treatment in social benefits and 
strong rights of family reunification. Indeed, a stated goal of the legislation was to promote 
the social integration of Community nationals. Finally, three directives, adopted at the 
beginning of the 1990s, extended some of these rights, particularly rights of residence, to 




The citizenship that politically remained a discourse and was legally only implicit was 
rendered explicit in the Treaty of Maastricht. In response to Spanish demands in particular, 
in 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht inserted a new Part Two on Citizenship of the Union into 
the revised Treaty establishing a European Community.
72
 Citizenship of the Union was to be 
conferred on nationals of the Member States who were to ‘enjoy the rights conferred by this 
Treaty and …be subject to the duties imposed thereby.’
73
 Citizens were granted rights to free 
movement and residence ‘subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in [the] Treaty 
and the measures adopted to give it effect’. Citizens also had the right to consular protection 
of another Member State in a third country where his or her own Member State was not 
represented. Article 8(c) granted a right to petition the ombudsperson. Finally, Citizens of the 
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Union were granted active and passive voting rights in relation to local and European 
elections in other Member States. 
 
The initial reaction to this potentially bold development was a mixture of disappointment 
and hope. Most of the legal rights, particularly those of free movement and residence, were 
either already in existence and/or subject to further measures and especially limitations 
contained in the treaty, implying a simple repackaging of existing rights spread across the 
internal market and residence directives under the guise of ‘citizenship’. While voting rights 
for Union citizens in second Member States, allowing non-nationals to participate for the 
first time in the democratic life of the nation, was a significant step for some Member States 
and required constitutional amendment,
74
 its failure to cover the most meaningful elections, 
namely national elections, significantly reduced its impact both from a symbolic and 
practical point of view. The failure of the new Union to develop a clear bill of fundamental 
rights and to associate this to the new status of citizenship was also seen as a failure.
75
 Other 
commentators were more hopeful and pointed to the potential of European citizenship.
76
 In 
their view it could provide the language and legal basis on which a meaningful status could 
be developed either by judicial interpretation or legislative action. At a conceptual level the 
introduction of Citizenship of the Union was therefore potentially significant not only from 
the point of view of the European Union in equipping it with a core concept of political 





While in the short term it seemed the pessimists may have been correct, after a short few 
years the Court of Justice appeared to confirm the basic hope of the optimists. Initially the 
Court of Justice made few references to citizenship and continued to decide cases on the free 
movement of persons provisions contained in the internal market. However, in Sala the 
Court relied directly on then Article 6 TEC to establish a right of non-discrimination, 
independent of the internal market through a combined reading of citizenship of the Union 
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and the general prohibition on grounds of nationality found in Article 6 TEC (now Article 18 
TFEU).
78
 This combined reading of the citizenship provisions and non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality was later used to considerable effect in extending the duties of 
solidarity owed by Member States to Union citizens.
79
 In Grzelczyk the extent of this equal 
treatment and solidarity was emphatically underlined with the Court famously declaring that 
‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment 
in law irrespective of their nationality’.
80
 In Baumbast the Court went a step further and 
established a free standing right to residence, directly effective and against which restrictive 
Member State measures were to be reviewed according to the principle of proportionality.
81
 
In Bidar the principle on non-discrimination was combined with a proportionality analysis to 
produce the concept of a progressively strengthened status based on a migrant’s level of 
integration. The Court of Justice held that when limiting the right to equal treatment to social 
benefits, a Member State must take into account the degree of integration an individual 
enjoyed in the host society. The more integrated a Union citizen, the stronger his claim to 
equal treatment. Finally, after some hesitation, a free standing right to free movement and in 




By the beginning of the century, the basic contours of Union Citizenship had already been 
established in what Níc Shuibhne has described as the second age of citizenship.
83
 Through a 
combination of the residence directives, as sometimes radically supplemented or altered by 
the by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
84
 interpreting the Treaty articles on 
citizenship, Union Citizens were entitled to extensive and relatively unrestricted free 
movement and residence rights on the one hand and rights to non-discrimination, most 
clearly in the field of social benefits, on the other hand. If a Union citizen engaged in an 
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economic activity, most particularly employment, then he or she fell within the scope of the 
free movement provisions of the internal market and enjoyed more rights, particularly in 
fields relevant to employment, and was subject to fewer restrictions. However, even in this 




However, it would be a mistake to view the development of Union citizenship as exclusively 
the handiwork of the Court of Justice.
86
 The legislature has also played a role, at times in 
tension, but mostly complementary to the Court. The thicket of legislative measures on the 
free movement of persons, some recent, some with a more vintage quality, and caselaw of 
the Court of Justice on citizenship was synthesised, simplified, codified and complemented 
by the passing of Directive 2004/38/EC or the ‘Citizenship Directive’.
87
 The Citizenship 
Directive codified and reformed the law of the free movement of persons. It brought the 
disparate statuses of worker, self-employed, self-sufficient and student under the rubric of 
‘citizenship’ and applied common administrative procedures and rights of family 
reunification. Nonetheless, while ostensibly under the same status of ‘citizen’ within the text 
important differences of substance remained. The exact range of rights enjoyed by and the 
limitations those rights could be subject to were differentiated according to the type of 
activity in which an individual was engaged. The concept of a progressively strengthened 
status, visible in Bidar, was also reflected in the structure of the Directive. Not only were 
rights differentiated according to the activity of the migrant worker but also according to his 
length of residence. The longer a migrant was resident, a period that reflected his level of 
integration, the greater his right to equal treatment, the less conditions could be applied to 
his right of residence and the greater his protection from expulsion. 
 
Since the passage and implementation of the Citizenship Directive, in addition to continuing 
to specify the contours of transnational solidarity,
88
 the case law of the Court has on 
interpreting and elaborating certain provisions of the directive and in particular details 
                                                 
85
 Francis Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union - A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 ELJ 591, 593-595.  
86
 Níc Shuibhne (n 70) claiming that the development has been ‘Court fuelled but legislature led’ (p. 334). For a 
more recent analysis of the interaction between the Court and the legislature in the area of citizenship see 
Michael Dougan, ‘The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy of the Case Law on the Free Movement of 
Union Citizens’ in Maurice Adams and others (eds), Judging Europe's Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case law 
of the European Court of Justice (Hart 2013). 
87
 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States (Citizenship Directive) [2004] OJ L 158/77 (Citizenship 
Directive).  
88
 For example Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Athanasios Vatsouras, Josif Koupatantze v 




around the acquisition and enjoyment of the right to permanent residence.
89
 It has also 
revisited the question of equal treatment and social rights and in some cases adapted its 
stance in light of the Directive. In particular, the Court appears to be increasingly willing to 
take its cue from the Directive in relation to the period of time that may indicate a sufficient 
degree of integration in the host society allowing the five year period indicated for the 
acquisition of permanent residence to be used as an indication of an individual’s degree of 
integration. Thus in the case of Förster, the Court upheld a Dutch condition of five years 
residence before students could access social assistance as appropriate in light of Article 
24(2) Directive 2004/38/EC.
90
 Similarly, in the case of Wolzenburg the Court allowed a five 
year period to be used to delimit the scope of equal treatment in sentencing matters, in 
particular the right to serve a sentence in the host member state.
91
 The law on Union 
citizenship has therefore been the story of a close dialogue between the Court of Justice and 





This collaboration has been called into question more recently by a recent line of case law 
developed by the Court of Justice on the basis not of the rights outlined in Article 21 TFEU 
and elaborated upon in legislation but rather the status of Union citizenship contained in 
Article 20 TFEU. In a short and cryptic decision of 2011 the Court of Justice ruled that 
Member States cannot take measures that would deprive citizens of the Union of the 
‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as 
citizens of the Union.’
93
 Strikingly, this right was enforceable against the Member State of 
nationality or one’s ‘own’ Member State, implying that the status of Union citizenship was 
somehow independent and the protection offered by that status could be exercised vis-à-vis 
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national authorities even of the state of nationality. However, the short seven paragraphs
94
 
perhaps reflected a lack of consensus on the part of the Court and of a clear concept of what 
such a status might entail. It is therefore of no surprise that the follow up to this ground 
breaking decision was distinctly hesitant, seemingly limiting its application to the very 
exceptional situations where a Union citizenship was either deprived entirely of his status as 
citizen
95
 or where he would be forced to leave the territory of the Union entirely.
96
 While the 
potential for the further development of Union citizenship as an independent status carrying 





While most of the developments of Union citizenship have taken place on a legal level, 
focused on the rights of free movement, residence and non-discrimination of individuals, 
particularly (although not exclusively) in cross-border situations, there have also been 
moves, particularly in the Treaty of Lisbon to inject a democratic element into the status of 
Union citizenship. As mentioned above, the European Parliament has been directly elected 
since 1979,
98
 although the exact link between European Parliament voting rights and Union 
citizenship remains ambiguous.
99
 The right to vote and to stand as a candidate in a second 
Member State in European Parliament and local elections were explicitly rights of Union 
citizenship and introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht. These were later elaborated upon in a 
set of Directives providing for the conditions under which migrant citizens could vote in 
European
100
 and local elections
101
 and harmonising to some extent the modalities of 
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 Finally, in the Treaty of Lisbon there has been a 
concerted effort to broaden the range of political participation and introduce forms of 
participatory democracy, through representative institutions and civil society,
103
 and direct 
democracy through the innovative ‘citizenship initiative’, requiring the Commission to 
respond to a request by a minimum of one million citizens from a number of member states 
to legislate on a particular matter.
104
 This innovative measure has been introduced along with 
more traditional means of increasing democratic input such as increasing the powers and 





At this stage the basic shape and role of Union citizenship in the EU can be discerned. Union 
citizenship is a status that is dependent on national citizenship – it is derivative in nature. 
Moreover it is exercised primarily (although not exclusively) vis-à-vis other Member States 
in the Union, it is primarily concerned with the situation of cross-border movement. Arising 
out of the internal market, it provides the holder with a series of rights, primarily of free 
movement and non-discrimination when travelling to other Member States. Political rights 
include the right to participate in local and European elections in a second Member State. 
Union citizenship is less important as a status vis-à-vis the Union itself, either directly at a 
Union level, or as a supranational guarantee or protection against national abuses. If 
citizenship is a relational concept, linking an individual to a political community, then Union 
citizenship is a multi-layered status, establishing links with various political units within the 
broader structure of the Union and is strongest in establishing horizontal relations with other 
Member States, and distinctly less developed in establishing vertical relations with the 
Union. This basic structure of a multi-levelled, inter-state citizenship is elaborated in more 
detail in chapter two and is used as a framework for an analysis of the effect of criminal law 
on Union citizenship in the rest of this thesis. 
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Method and Framework of Analysis 
 
The goal of this thesis is to determine what the operation of criminal law in the Union can 
reveal about Union citizenship and the political community of the Union more generally. It 
is therefore primarily a thesis about Union citizenship and how it is affected by Union law, 
rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive explanatory or justificatory account of 
EU criminal law. Certainly, certain aspects of citizenship and of how it interacts with 
criminal law can contribute to a better explanation of the cause and in particular the structure 
of EU criminal law and may provide a framework for legitimacy for some of the more 
controversial aspects of EU criminal law, such as mutual recognition. To the extent that this 
thesis touches on these issues they are noted. However, that is not the perspective or 
ambition of this thesis. This thesis is concerned with the potential impact of criminal law and 
the treatment of criminal law by the Court and the Union legislature on Union citizenship 
and the political community of the Union. 
 
To that end this thesis adopts the criminal law theory of RA Duff based on the links between 
citizenship, crime and community. This is an explanatory and a justificatory theory for 
criminal law through an examination of the structure of responsibility that lies behind the 
criminal law. Other analytical and normative theories of criminal law attempt to synthesis 
and explain the criminal law or alternatively lay down criteria for justifying punishment or 
identifying what acts are properly the subject of criminalisation.
106
 While at times drawing 
on other criminal law theorists, this thesis relies principally on Duff’s theory, primarily for 
its methodological suitability; it is centred on the concept of citizenship and provides a 
framework for understanding the many dimensions of the criminal justice system – the 
crime, the trial, punishment and the victim – in terms of citizenship and community. 
 
Duff’s theory uses the concept of citizenship and community to explain and justify criminal 
law. This thesis adopts the reverse approach, using the concept of criminal law, seen in a 
communitarian light and based on the notion of membership and citizenship, to explain 
certain aspects of citizenship and the political community in a particular polity; the European 
Union. The criminal law is thus presented as a set of wrongs, based in the particular values 
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of a community and criminal responsibility is seen as being founded on the concept of 
membership or citizenship. The criminal law has an expressive quality and punishment has a 
communicative purpose. Finally, being prosecuted, tried and punished involves a process of 
being called to account for ones actions before the community in a public dialogue involving 
accusation, justification, excuse and condemnation. 
 
This thesis looks specifically at the possible links between the status of Union citizenship 
and criminal law. In order to provide a framework for this analysis Chapter Two breaks 
Union citizenship into separate components, namely a transnational dimension and a 
supranational dimension. The transnational dimension is subsequently divided into two sub-
dimensions, social integration and autonomy, that can be discerned as two, at times opposing 
and at times complementary, principles that drive much of the legal practice in Union 
citizenship. The supranational dimension of Union citizenship, while present, is less well-
developed than transnational citizenship. However, while presented as distinct, the two 
transnational dimensions and the supranational dimension can be said to be connected and to 
mutually influence each other. Through a combination of the right to social integration in 
other Member States and a right to move freely throughout the Union, Union citizenship 
gives rise to a single area of movement to which a certain supranational reference for Union 
citizenship can be said to emerge. Thus Union citizenship and the political community it 
represents is a complex interaction of national, transnational and supranational that 
combined form a multi-levelled, composite political community. 
 
Chapters three and four together consider the impact of criminal law in the context of the 
social integration dimension of Union citizenship. A brief section introduces these two 
chapters and relates the concept of social integration in criminal law to Union citizenship. In 
criminal law social integration arises in two instances. Firstly, social integration is seen as a 
goal of punishment namely the social rehabilitation of the offender. This use of social 
integration is analysed in chapter three. Secondly, criminal activity is said to constitute a 
rejection of the norms of society and a failure to integrate into society; this aspect of social 
integration is analysed in chapter four. The Court has used both of these criminological 
understandings of social integration and has integrated them within the social integration 
dimension of Union citizenship, altering it and leading to both the greater inclusion and 





Chapter five and chapter six consider the construction of an Area of Justice through two 
instruments in particular, the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD) and 
Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). A brief section 
introduces these two chapters and considers the links between an area of movement 
associated with the autonomy dimension of citizenship and the Area of Justice. Chapter five 
characterises the European Arrest Warrant as a system of shared enforcement of national 
criminal law. Chapter six details how the Court of Justice has constructed a single status for 
individuals in a single area through a free movement driven interpretation of the ne bis in 
idem principle contained in Article 54 CISA. 
 
Chapter seven considers the possibility of a community at a supranational level arising 
from the adoption of substantive criminal law by the Union itself. It is seen that the Union’s 
ability to directly bind individuals and identify supranational wrongs is limited, mirroring 
the weaker supranational dimension of Union citizenship. Nonetheless, in certain areas it 
does appear to be capable of expressing supranational values or identifying supranational 
public goods capable of engaging the Union’s interest as a whole. However, the most 
important role of supranational criminal law is perhaps not to provide an autonomous 
expression of supranational values at a Union level but rather to frame national criminal law 
and facilitate transnational legal processes involving criminal law. There is therefore an 
interaction between the supranational and national through transnational processes. A 
normative community does emerge at a supranational level but arising from various 
interacting national communities. 
 
A conclusion draws the different elements of the thesis together and discusses the 
consequences for our understanding of Union citizenship and the political community of the 
Union. The ways in which a communitarian analysis of the criminal law can complement our 
understanding of citizenship are outlined. Finally, the main conclusion of this thesis is that it 






Between Transnational and Supranational 
 
Introduction 
To recall, according to Duff criminal law governs the relations between the individual and 
the community or more accurately the relations between individuals in their capacity as 
members of the community. It regulates behaviour according to the core values and norms of 
the community, which in contemporary liberal democracies include first and foremost, but 
not exclusively, individual freedom. Following the premise that core individual interests 
must be protected from undue interference in the interests of maximising liberty for all, the 
harm principle provides a basic but not a comprehensive principle for the criminal law. It 
forms the basis of many, if not most, wrongs but is supplemented by other wrongs done 
either to the community as a whole or other individuals as members of that community. The 
result is a moral and contextualised account of the criminal law based on the particular 
community in which it is applied and where the exact content of the criminal law varies from 
time to time and from place to place. The responsibilities contained in the criminal law flow 
from the relationship between individuals in the civic community ie as co-citizens. We are 
called to account as citizens by the political community for wrongs done to other citizens. 
From this brief sketch of Duff’s theory emerges the broad outline of a criminal justice 
system that is based on the idea of public wrongs, defined according to the prevailing norms 
and values of a particular community and justified by ties of responsibility between 




The question arises of what this model of a citizen-centred account (both normative and 
descriptive) of criminal law can reveal concerning the links between Union citizenship and 
criminal law. Before we can answer that question we must look at the specificities of the 
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European Union as a political community and the particular form and structures of its 
membership status, namely Union citizenship. 
 
This chapter explores the rights of Union citizenship with an eye to describing the nature of 
the links established by that status between individuals and Member States and between 
individuals and the Union as a whole. The relationship between Union citizens and Member 
States is analysed first. This relationship is governed by two principles, autonomy and 
integration, that combined create a transnational status allowing individuals to enjoy the 
opportunities offered by a broader geographical space spread over a number of national 
communities. The relationship between individuals and the Union itself is less developed. 
Following a series of cases in recent years the existence of this ‘supranational’ dimension to 
Union citizenship is now beyond doubt. However, while the status is clearly established, its 
content in terms of rights and duties remains ill-defined and insubstantial. The resulting 
picture is of a nested membership status establishing links primarily with a set of national 
communities on the basis of social integration and autonomy and the presence of a 
discernable but weaker overarching community at a supranational level. 
 
The argument of this chapter is not that the shaping of Union citizenship into these separate 
elements has been by conscious design or that it reflects distinct lines of caselaw or legal 
practice adopted explicitly by either the Court of Justice or the Union legislature. The history 
of Union citizenship is a status that grew out of the internal market in a relatively organic 
fashion,
2
 instituted as a political stratagem in the Treaty of Maastricht
3
 and gradually 
shedding its economic legacy through incremental steps taken by the Court of Justice,
4
 
complemented by legislative activity.
5
 Union citizenship, like citizenship generally, can be 
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viewed from a variety of perspectives
6
 and a number of political and legal forces, not always 
acting in harmony, have contributed to its fashioning.
7
 The purpose of this chapter is to 
deconstruct and reconstruct the caselaw and legislative practice of citizenship in order to 
provide some rationality to the multiple strands of legal practice
8
 and to provide a 
framework for the rest of this thesis. The vision of Union citizenship presented here serves a 
methodological purpose; to break Union citizenship into component parts to provide a 
framework for an analysis of its interaction with criminal law. The choice of specific 
components serves an additional methodological purpose related to both Union citizenship 
and Duff’s theory. Duff’s theory is specifically community based, describing and justifying 
the criminal law as an expression of a particular community. Another goal of this thesis is to 
demonstrate how the treatment of criminal law in the Union, can contribute to our 
understanding of the structure of the Union as a political community. Thus the dimensions of 
social integration, autonomy and supranational are selected with an eye to the different links 
that Union citizenship forges with different component parts – national and supranational – 
of the Union’s political community and hence to indirectly characterise that political 
community. 
 
The Transnational Dimension of Union Citizenship 
 
Union citizenship arose from the internal market and in particular the free movement of the 
economically active, principally workers and the self-employed, and the economically self-
sufficient. The market origins of Union citizenship attracted the particular criticism of 
Everson, who denounced the instrumentalist and instrumentalised individual that arose from 
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such a historical context.
9
 It is arguable whether Union citizenship has evolved beyond its 
market origins. Commentators have pointed out that in one of the first meaningful 
citizenship cases, Sala, the Court of Justice divorced free movement from the condition of 
economic activity, to eventually give rise to a ‘fifth fundamental freedom’.
10
 However, more 
recently O’Brien has pointed out the differentiated nature of Union citizenship and the 
various ‘rights cliffs’ that arise from the continued importance of economic activity in 
claiming rights under Union law.
11
 Regardless of the role economic activity per se plays in 
activating and sustaining Union citizenship rights, what is undeniable is the structural legacy 
that the internal market has bestowed on Union citizenship. Níc Shuibhne is particularly 
clear in pointing out the enduring transnational and cross-border nature of Union 
citizenship.
12
 While this is presented as the continuing importance of ‘market citizenship’, 
many of the case-studies provided by Níc Shuibhne point not to the economic importance of 
Union citizenship as an individual status in a constitutionalised market, but rather the 
transnational character of Union citizenship,
13
 a character that clearly originates in the nature 




The core rights of Union citizenship remain free movement and non-discrimination. These 
two principles combine in different ways to form two distinct features of Union citizenship 
as a transnational status: autonomy and integration. An emphasis on free movement tends to 
privilege autonomy and non-discrimination social integration, however this is not to say that 
non-discrimination is irrelevant to autonomy or that free movement is irrelevant to 
integration. Both principles interact and reinforce each other; it is the manner of their 
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combination that reveals an emphasis on autonomy or social integration. The two concepts 
of autonomy and integration infuse the case law on Union citizenship. 
 
In many ways they are largely complementary; the autonomy that Union citizenship grants 
individuals to enjoy a wider space of movement and opportunity facilitates precisely the 
integration in other Member States. However, on a more abstract level and if pushed to 
extremes they reveal two visions of Union citizenship and of the Union citizen that can be in 
tension, if not downright opposition that can crudely be categorised as a 
communitarian/liberal divide. On the one hand an emphasis on autonomy may be said to 
lead to a particularly individualistic notion of Union citizenship, independent of communal 
ties of affection, cultural and solidarity.
15
 On the other hand an emphasis on integration 
might justify the imposition of a duty of assimilation into the host society and an acceptance 
of its social, economic and political values. At the very least it implies the adoption of a new 
social identity and the preservation of national ties of identity albeit with the important 
proviso that they are open to other Union citizens. 
Transnational Citizenship as Autonomy 
 
As the name suggests, free movement can easily be understood as liberating for individuals. 
In its legal operation it is largely concerned with the removal of barriers that individuals 
face, not simply in moving but in participating in a whole host of activities with a cross-
border impact. Indeed, the condition of cross-border effect is so easily met that in the 
internal market the rights of free movement can be convincingly presented as a freedom 
from unwarranted interference with the exercise of an economic activity.
16
 Thus free 
movement can be seen as providing a supranational guarantee of freedom or choice for 
individuals. While initially limited to non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, 
Union citizenship, as with other freedoms, gradually included a right to be free from 
unjustified barriers to free movement.
17
 In the context of Union citizenship the principle 
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takes on a more expansive role, being linked to the various and virtually unlimited facets of 
an individual’s personal and social life. To simplify somewhat, free movement in the context 
of Union citizenship has been deployed to protect an individual’s right to pursue a life in 
various Member States. Member States must facilitate and recognise the right to move 
between various national communities within the Union. Legally this implies a right to carry 
rights and civil status acquired in one Member State throughout the Union. While initial 
cases tended to somewhat awkwardly fit this right into a discriminatory analysis 
(‘discrimination against movers’) later cases properly recognised the free movement basis 
for this right. This tendency can be seen in two areas in particular, names and family life. In 
both areas not only must host Member States facilitate migrants but also home Member 
States. This has been mirrored by legislation, particularly in the field of private international 
law, which emphasis the free movement of individuals and the portability of a civil status.
18
 
When migrants move, Member States must recognise and facilitate the rights acquired under 
the law of other Member States. It is not therefore a right of integration, to move to and 
settle permanently in another Member State, but rather a right of migration back and forth, to 
build one’s life on the basis of that migration and to enjoy the broader range of possibilities 
that Union citizenship offers. The result is a wider space of free movement, choice and 
autonomy. 
 
Names and Civil Status 
 
In Garcia Avello Belgium was required to recognise the double barrel name of a dual 
national Belgian-Spaniard, despite the fact that Belgian naming rules required children to be 
named after their father alone.
19
 Mr Garcia-Avello was not asking that his children be treated 
the same as other Belgians, on the contrary he was asking to be treated differently. The Court 
granted this wish by employing a somewhat tortuous discrimination analysis that in the end 
was nonetheless based on a movement rationale. According to the Court of Justice, the 
Garcia-Avello children, as dual nationals of Spanish and Belgian nationality, were not in the 
same position as ‘single national’ Belgian children. In later life they may move to Spain and 
would there encounter various professional, educational and personal difficulties due to the 
discrepancy between their Belgian registered name and their Spanish registered name. The 
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principle of non-discrimination required that like situations be treated similarly and that 
unlike situations be treated differently. As the Garcia-Avello family were unlike other 
Belgian children it would be discriminatory to treat them in the same way when it came to 
naming rules. The Belgian practice therefore constituted a breach of then Article 12 TEC 
(now Article 18 TFEU). However, while on the face of it the case was an exercise in the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination, it was because of potential future 
movement, and the barriers to that movement that might arise as a consequence of their 
names, that they constituted a different class and accordingly faced discrimination. Through 
a creative construction of the comparator the Court was able to shoe-horn what was 
essentially a free movement analysis into a non-discriminatory framework. The ethos behind 
the case was that the Garcia-Avello family, and children in particular, should not be 
disadvantaged by the possibility of them building transnational life with links to both 
countries and to some extent autonomous of at least one of their home states. 
 
The free movement rationale and the implications for transnational autonomy were rendered 
explicit in the case of Grunkin Paul.
20
 Leonard Matthias was born of German parents in 
Denmark who gave him a double-barrelled surname, as was permitted under Danish law. 
Upon return to Germany however the relevant authorities refused to register the name 
Grunkin-Paul, the use of double barrelled names being generally prohibited in Germany. In 
contrast to Garcia Avello, the Court found that there was no discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality; both parents and the child were German and sought to register the child’s name 
in Germany and objected to the application of German rules. Instead of an analysis based on 
discrimination the Court focused on free movement. A difference in an individual’s name on 
various official documents could represent a serious inconvenience for Leonard Matthias in 
later life. In particular the Court was concerned to facilitate his life in both his state of 
residence and his state of nationality, recognising the cross-border and transnational nature 
of his life.
21
 Member States in short would have to adapt their regulations, even those that 
were not discriminatory, to take into account the transnational life choices made by Union 
citizens. Union citizenship facilitates not simply movement to another Member State and 
integration into a new host society, but a right to participate to varying extents in different 
national communities and to be free from restrictions in pursuing such a transnational life. 
The key point to take from Grunkin Paul is the obligation on the part of the ‘home’ Member 
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State to recognise the rights and personal situation acquired by the Union citizen under the 
law of another Member State. 
 
However, this right of autonomy of individual is not absolute. It can, in specific 
circumstances, be opposed by the particular interests, needs and indeed constitutional values 
of a particular Member State. In Sayn-Wittgenstein the Austrian applicant sought to retain a 
title of Princess (Fürstin) acquired in Germany following her adoption by a German Prince 
and that she had held and operated a business under selling castles and other stately homes 
for a period of 15 years.
22
 The Court noted that her situation was comparable with Grunkin-
Paul. In fact given her professional life and the use to which she put her title, the 
inconveniences presented by a change in name would be even more direct and apparent in 
her case.
23
 Where Sayn-Wittgenstein differed from Grunkin-Paul was in the justification 
presented by the Member State. The abolition of titles of nobility represented a key feature 
of the establishment of the Austrian Republic. It had constitutional status and was linked to 
the political identity of the state, an identity that could be understood in terms of public 
policy
24
 and that was respected in EU law by virtue of Article 4(2) TEU.
25
 The law 
abolishing titles and therefore the measure disallowing Ms Sayn-Wittgenstien from using 
Fürstin in her official documents, was a justified restriction on her right of free movement 
and proportionate to the goal of preserving the constitutional identity of the Federal Republic 
of Austria. 
 
Finally, in the case of Vardyn, while leaving the ultimate determination to the national court, 
the Court of Justice accepted the possibility that a discrepancy between the spelling of a 
husband’s surname and the part of his wife’s double barrelled surname arising from the 
application of national spelling rules could cause serious inconveniences and constitute a 
restriction on their rights under Article 21 TFEU.
26
 It also accepted that such a restriction 
could be justified in light of the need to protect the official national language in order to 
‘safeguard national unity and preserve social cohesion.’ Moreover the national language in 
question, Lithuanian, was claimed to constitute ‘a constitutional asset which preserves the 
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nation’s identity, contributes to the integration of citizens and ensures the expression of 
national sovereignty, the indivisibility of the State and the proper functioning of the services 
of the State.’
27
 Ultimately it left the question of whether the restriction was in fact 




The overall message arising from the name cases is that Union citizenship facilitates choice 
and autonomy of individuals to pursue a transnational life, an autonomy that Member States 
must recognise and facilitate up to certain limits. Those limits relate not to administrative 
convenience or the needs of social assimilation but a desire to protect the linguistic and 
constitutional identity of the state.
29
 They demonstrate that the particular situations of cross-
border individuals and families must be accommodated, both in a host member state, as in 
the case in Garcia Avello and upon movement to another Member State, including the state 
of nationality as in Grunkin Paul. While the judgements are phrased in terms of the 
transportability of civil status acquired in a particular Member State and the elimination of 
obstacles, the question of cultural identity also lies in the background, of both the individuals 
and of host community. If Garcia-Avello simply concerned the issue of national 
discrepancies in an individual’s official name, an alternative would simply have been to 
oblige Spain to adapt its laws. Indeed, this would have arguably been a more appropriate 
solution given the reality of the children’s actual lives in Belgium rather than the 
hypothetical of their future life in Spain. Instead the solution chosen by the Court privileges 
the parent’s right to make a choice regarding the cultural identity of their children, 
emphasising their transnational roots in opposition to the local culture. Interestingly, a 
justification raised by both the Belgian and Danish governments in Garcia Avello was that an 
obligation to conform to the national regulations would in fact facilitate integration – a clear 
indication of a preference for assimilation and a rejection of multi-culturalism as a social 
policy for dealing with migration.
30
 This policy choice was undermined by the Court, who 
read in Union citizenship precisely a right to be treated differently rather than the same. If 
anything Grunkin Paul is also striking in upholding the choice of the individual, this time 
employing a technique that bears striking resemblance to a mutual recognition framework. 
Mutual recognition as a technique is designed to preserve Member State autonomy while at 
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the same time facilitating the creation of a single legal space with multiple inter-operable 
legal systems. Thus being decided on a free movement rationale and portability of an official 
name and civil status, Grunkin Paul obliges the home Member State to accept the 
consequences of the Union citizens’ transnational lives and to recognize the rights they have 
acquired under the laws of other Member States. The motif of mutual recognition is even 
more apparent in the area of family reunification rights.  
 
However, if the desire of a state to ensure social integration and assimilation is insufficient to 
trump an individual’s or a family’s right to maintain the rights they enjoy as transnational 
citizens, upholding the state’s political identity framed in linguistic or constitutional terms,
31
 
does appear to be a legitimate goal that can be opposed to an individual’s right to ‘passport’ 
his or her status and identity. Thus the Court does not deny the continued importance of 
Member States as national communities, indeed it notes that their identities are protected 
under Union law, but endorses only certain manifestations of that community, namely 




Family reunification has been the subject of much litigation in the area of Union citizenship 
and for the question of reverse discrimination in particular. Two factors explain this large 
volume of litigation. On the one hand family life is of fundamental importance for an 
individual and migration has the potential to cause significant disruption to family life. On 
the other hand there is a significant gap between the sometimes restrictive national law in 
relation to family reunification and the generous Union law on the matter. The combination 
of these two circumstances create a very real incentive for an individual to place himself 
within the scope of Union law when seeking to be joined by non-national family member. 
Given the sometimes restrictive national practices, this incentive applies both in a host 
Member State but also in the citizen’s ‘home’ Member State. 
 
The generous family reunification provisions in Union law arise from an early recognition of 
human side of migration and the social importance of the family to an individual who may 
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wish to move on the one hand and the importance of family life for the integration of an 
individual into a host society on the other.
32
 Regulation 1612/68/EEC established a virtually 
automatic right for mobile Community workers to be joined by their immediate family in a 
Member State to which they move and moreover, granted extensive rights of residence, 
education and access to benefits to these family members. Moreover, in addition to family 
members who were Community nationals, the family reunification provisions of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC also covered non-Community nationals or third country nationals (TCNs). 





 that retain and expand rights of family members and of family 
reunification. 
 
The interpretation of these provisions by the Court of Justice reduced significantly the 
discretion that Member States enjoyed in relation to migration matters in the sphere of 
family members of Community nationals. In MRAX the Court of Justice underlined the 
limitations on Member State’s competence to control such immigration, finding that the right 
to family reunification stemmed directly from Community law.
35
 Community law laid down 
the conditions for enjoying those rights and Member States could not impose further 
conditions and requirements of proof. In Akrich however the Court appeared to backtrack on 
its position and shield Member States’ competence in immigration matters, particularly with 
regard to ‘first entry’ into the Union (rather than secondary movement within the Union).
36
 
Akrich permitted Member States to impose a condition of prior lawful residence on family 
reunification. Member States could require that a TCN family member was lawfully resident 
in the Union before granting a right to join the mobile Community national. Perhaps 
influenced by the competences arguments advanced by the Advocate General,
37
 the Court 
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reasoned according to a limited vision of the right of free movement based on a narrow 
deterrence logic. Family reunification rights were granted under Union law to remove 
obstacles to free movement and in particular the deterrent that might arise if an individual 
was to be separated from his or her family upon movement to another Member State.
38
 If, 
however, that Union citizen did not enjoy the company of his or her family before moving so 
the logic went, then there could be no deterrence if his or her family was not allowed entry 




While no doubt welcomed by national administrations, Akrich attracted considerable 
academic criticism.
40
 The case left certain questions open, such as the problematic definition 
of ‘prior lawful residence’ and made a strange and out of place reference to Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Furthermore, its treatment of the question 
of competences, presenting national immigration competences as something reserved to 
Member States and insulated entirely from the scope of Union law, did not appear to 
correspond with the traditional view of reserved national competences, according to which 





These matters were addressed in Metock
42
 in which in an unusual move, the Court of Justice 
explicitly reversed its position.
43
 Metock concerned Irish regulations adopted following the 
Court’s judgment in Akrich, requiring TCN family members to have prior lawful residence 
in the Union before they would be granted a right of residence under Union law. In reversing 
Akrich the Court corrected its approach to national immigration competences and, more 
importantly for present purposes, broadened its understanding of free movement. Rather 
than a particularly narrow deterrence based logic deployed in Akrich focusing on the notion 
of less favourable treatment, in Metock the Court employed a far broader vision of what free 
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movement entails, in particular the right of the citizen to install him or herself in the Member 
State of his or her choosing and to provide the appropriate conditions, including ‘a normal 
family life’, under which this could occur.
44
 In particular the Court focused on how 
discrepancies between national immigration rules could impact on the choice of a citizen to 
install him/herself in a particular Member State.
45
 This element of choice was even more 
explicit in the opinion of the Advocate General who found that ‘the fact that Union citizens 
established in Ireland are unable to have their spouses join them from outside the 
Community is such as to undermine their free choice to reside in that Member State since it 
will tend to induce them to leave Ireland and to go to a State, whether a Member State or 
not, where they will be able to live together with their spouse’ (emphasis added).
46
 Union 
citizenship therefore creates the optimal conditions under which an individual can exercise 
his right of mobility and moreover exercise that right in the fullest possible degree of choice. 
Those conditions include the right to lead a ‘normal family life’. It is important to point out 
that this is not a question of discrimination.
47
 The Union citizens involved in Metock were 
not seeking equal treatment with Irish nationals, instead they were asking the Court to 
provide a special Union law regime, facilitating their choice and autonomy to move within 
the Union unhindered by restrictive national regulations on family reunification. It was this 
aspect of Union citizenship, based on free movement and choice, that founded a right for the 
Union to harmonise rules on family reunification for Union citizens resident in other 
Member States. 
 
An additional reason for Member States’ concern in this matter was the possibility of 
exercising this right not only in a host Member State but vis-à-vis their home Member State 
upon returning. This possibility arose following the case of Singh in which the Court held 
that a returning Community worker must enjoy ‘at least the same rights of entry and 
residence as would be granted to him or her under Community law if his or her spouse chose 
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to enter and reside in another Member State.’
48
 Member States were concerned of an erosion 
of their immigration competence not only in relation to Union citizens from other Member 
States but indeed in relation to their own nationals who could, by temporarily exercising 
their right of free movement, sidestep restrictive national regulations on family reunification. 
Indeed, this is exactly the situation that occurred in Akrich. Mrs Akrich had moved to Ireland 
from the United Kingdom with the stated intention of being joined by her husband and 
returning to the UK, carrying with her a right to be accompanied by her husband and 
circumventing more restrictive UK provisions.  
 
It may be argued, as it was by the Court in Akrich, that the Union national is not in fact 
disadvantaged if he is not granted the right to be accompanied by his spouse upon return to 
the home Member State; he cannot lose a right he never enjoyed in the first place. However, 
what is protected in the case of returning migrants is the right of the Union citizen to 
maintain the rights he or she gains in a second Member State and not to be faced with the 
uncertainty of not knowing whether particular rights and situations acquired and developed 
in the host Member State can be retained upon return to the home Member State. To provide 
otherwise would introduce an element of instability and uncertainty that would undoubtedly 
deter individuals from exercising their freedom of movement. This reasoning was made 
especially clear in the case of Eind in which a Dutch man was joined by his Surinamese 
daughter while working in the UK.
49
 He then returned to the Netherlands and the Court 
found he was entitled to be accompanied by his daughter. The logic of the Court was clear – 
Mr Eind must be allowed to retain rights he acquired in another Member State and if 
necessary exercise them against his own Member State. His choice to pursue a cross-border 
life and the social situation that might arise from living in various Member States must be 
protected from undue interference in both host and the home Member State. Indeed it could 
be argued that the same logic would protect his family life in any Member State. 
 
This line of case law has been confirmed and expanded by the Court of Justice in the cases 
of O & B and S & G.
50
 Both O & B and S & G concerned the third country spouses of Dutch 
nationals seeking residence in the Netherlands. In O & B two Dutch nationals had resided 
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temporarily (for a couple of months in the case of O) and sporadically (at weekends in the 
case of B) in other Member States with their third country national spouses. They returned to 
their home Member State after a limited period of time abroad and sought to bring their 
spouses with them. In S & G the Dutch nationals resided in the Netherlands but worked and 
performed services in another Member State. They were variations on the ‘frontier worker’; 
one a frontier worker as commonly understood, living in the Netherlands but working for a 
Belgian company in Belgium; the other a part-time cross-border service provider, living and 
employed in the Netherlands but spending approximately thirty per cent of his working time 
in Belgium as part of his job. Thus while all four were Dutch nationals living in the 
Netherlands, all claimed some cross-border connection through either temporary stays 
abroad or through exercising a cross-border economic activity. 
 
In O & B the Court restated its position that free movement includes the freedom to return to 
the host Member State.
51
 It was firm in upholding its findings in Singh and Eind and in 
extending this reasoning to the situation of non-economically active Union citizens relying 
on Article 21(1) TFEU. In particular it emphasised the need to guarantee that a Union citizen 
will be able to ‘continue the family life which he created or strengthened in the host Member 
State’.
52
 However, this only referred to family life that was created or strengthened in the 
context of ‘genuine’, ‘settled’ residence in the second Member State to be determined by 
analogy to the categories of residence found in Directive 2004/38/EC.
 53
 The Court therefore 
excluded the possibility of a family life being created or strengthened on the basis of mere 
temporary residence. In S & G the Court confirmed the possibility that cross-border 
economic activity could entail certain rights of family reunification, while at the same time 
indicated that this would only arise in limited circumstances. Furthermore, given the facts of 
the case, it felt able to limit its reasoning to workers under Article 45 TFEU and declined to 
rule on the impact of Union citizenship under Article 21 TFEU. Restrictions on a Union 
citizen worker’s family life must be such as to discourage ‘the worker from effectively 
exercising his rights’.
54
 However, the desirability of a particular familial arrangement, such 
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O & B and S & G represent the reality of modern migration as a circulatory phenomenon 
whereby individuals move back and forth between Member States over the course of their 
lives, or even during the course of their working day, as in the case of frontier workers. It 
presents Union citizenship as a status facilitating this form of migration and the choice to 
pursue lives across various borders at different stages of life, not simply in migrating from 
one state to another but in enjoying a broader choice across the territory of the Union, 
unhindered by national differences in laws. This implies not only the right to move from one 
state to another, but back again and indeed the positive choice and freedom of where to live. 
The right of the Union citizen to pursue his life in the Member State of his choosing was 
even more explicit in the joint Opinion AG Sharpston delivered for both cases. She pointed 
out on a number of occasions that a right to freedom of movement entailed a right to remain 
in the home Member State. Echoing the Court’s finding in Metock that citizens have a 
general freedom of movement that implies a choice. ‘[I]t might be said that such a measure 
results in more movement. However, whilst facilitating free movement may well be an 
objective of Article 21(1) TFEU, imposing free movement is not. Rather, EU citizens are 
guaranteed the right to move and reside freely within the European Union. If a measure is 
likely to affect the EU citizen’s free choice to exercise that right, then it is a restriction 




As with the ‘name’ cases, the family reunification cases also clearly demonstrate that free 
movement is not simply a question of a right to move to and settle definitively in another 
Member State, but also implies a general right, spread over the course of a life time, to move 
around the territory of the Union and to avail of the expanded possibilities offered in various 
Member States. Firstly, as Metock demonstrates it is a choice that is offered to the Union 
citizen as an inherent part of that status and that choice must be facilitated by the creation of 
optimal conditions, especially conditions of ‘normal family life’. Note that this is only 
partially, and secondarily, an integration or non-discrimination based logic. The reasoning of 
the Court in Metock is based almost entirely on free movement. It is the choice contained in 
Union citizenship that grants Union law the competence to regulate family reunification, 
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even instances of so called ‘first entry’. Secondly, Singh, Eind and O & B provide that those 
situations that arise in one Member State must be accommodated in other Member States, 
including and especially the Member State of origin. As with a name or civil status, a family 
life ‘strengthened or created’ in one Member State must be portable. Family reunification for 
Union citizens is not a mutual recognition regime as we traditionally understand it, indeed 
that is exactly what was at stake in Akrich and Metock, in the sense that it is based not on 
national rights or national laws but on Union rights created on foot of the harmonisation 
contained in the Treaty articles on free movement and implemented in Directive 
2004/38/EC. Nonetheless, the result of Eind and O, in obliging Member States to accept that 
the ‘vested rights’
57
 (albeit this time Union rights) acquired by virtue of free movement must 
be recognised in the host Member State. The result points towards a vision of Union 
citizenship presented by Preuß in 1995: 
 
‘by creating the opportunity for the citizens of the Member States of the European Union to 
engage in manifold economic, social, cultural, scholarly and even political activities 
irrespective of the traditional territorial boundaries of the European nation-states, European 
citizenship helps to abolish the hierarchy between the different loyalties…and to allow the 
individuals a multiplicity of associative relations without binding them to a specific 
nationality. In this sense, European citizenship is more an amplified bundle of options within 





It will be noted however O & B was not so clear-cut so as to permit uninhibited movement 
based on a rootless and continual movement. Rather, only family life that was formed on the 
basis of residence in the host Member State in conformity with conditions of economic 
activity or self-sufficiency: ‘evidence of settling there’ counts.
59
 The Court therefore 
excluded stays of less than three months and subjected stays of longer than three months to 
the conditions contained in Directive 2004/38/EC. In other words only family life created or 
strengthened on the basis of settled or ‘genuine’ residence could be retained upon return to 
the host Member State. Applying this extra condition to family reunification in the home 
state points to the other aspect of Union citizenship as a transnational status that is at times 
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in tension with the autonomy of Union citizens: citizenship as a status of integration in the 
society of the host Member State. 
 
Transnational Citizenship as a Status of Integration 
 
Union citizenship offers individuals the right to move around and enjoy the opportunities 
presented by a variety of economies and cultures. However, perhaps more importantly it 
offers Union citizens the right become part of, to integrate into, the society of other Member 
States. This dimension of Union citizenship is intimately bound up with the principle of non-
discrimination but is facilitated by free movement. Equal treatment is both the catalyst or the 
means by which integration takes place and also the consequence of this process. In terms of 
a legal status this feature of Union citizenship has been developed by both the Court of 
Justice and by the Union legislature in a largely collaborative endeavour over the past two 
decades. While for the most part this principle has operated in favour of immigrant Union 
citizens in the host Member State, it has also been used in limited circumstances for 
strengthening the rights of emigrant Union citizens vis-à-vis their home Member State. In 
the concept of social integration the Court of Justice and the Union legislature have 
elaborated a criteria, in addition to that of nationality, for attaching individuals to particular 
national communities with the European Union and for allocating responsibilities amongst 
states for those individuals. The result has been the establishment of an additional principle 
of belonging in the context of changing social and economic ties between individuals and 
societies in a set of political communities. 
 
Union Citizenship as a Status of Integration and the Court of Justice 
 
Union Citizenship as integration is closely tied to the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality now found in Article 18 TFEU. While the principle is of general 
application across the Treaty and arises in a more specific application in the provisions on 
the free movement of persons in the internal market
60
 it emerged as a defining component of 
Union citizenship in the case of Martiníz Sala.
61
 The relationship between the principle of 
non-discrimination and Union citizenship is symbiotic. Non-discrimination on the grounds 
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of nationality soon formed the core of Union citizenship and gave rise to the first series of 
cases that put ‘flesh on the bones’ of a status whose importance had until then been 
considered limited.
62
 At the same time, the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality, in theory limited to the scope of the Treaty, was broadened 
considerably with the advent of Union citizenship. The personal scope of the principle was 
especially widened to include all lawfully resident Union citizens in another Member State.
63
 
Furthermore, given the expansive range of Union law, it was possible to find some exercise 
of Union competence in a particular area with increasing ease, thereby bringing the situation 





The impact of the principle was felt particularly in the field of social benefits, which were 
subject to a variety of qualifying conditions determining the personal limits of financial 
solidarity, generally mapped onto the national community.
65
 In a series of cases in the late 
1990s and early 2000s the Court began to redraw these boundaries of solidarity based on the 
concept of Union citizenship and the principle of equal treatment. In time the extent to which 
an individual had a ‘real link’ with the society of a particular Member State became the 
governing principle for determining the extent of equal treatment a citizen was entitled to 
and hence the extent of the financial solidarity owed that citizen by host Member States. 
 
Martínez Sala established the principle that all Union citizens lawfully resident in another 
Member State were entitled to equal treatment in all matters that fell within the scope of 
Union law.
66
 Mrs Martinez Sala was seeking a child-rearing allowance and was refused on 
the grounds that she did not hold a valid residence permit. She was however lawfully 
resident in Germany on the basis of an international agreement. As a Union citizen lawfully 
resident in another Member State she fell within the personal scope of Article 18 TFEU (then 
Article 6 EC). Child rearing allowance was a social benefit within Article 7 of Regulation 
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1612/68/EEC and fell within the material scope of Article 18 TFEU. As German nationals 
did not need to satisfy the condition of holding a valid residence permit, it was considered a 
discriminatory practice on grounds of nationality and as it fell within the material and 
personal scope of Article 18 TFEU, was considered unlawful. 
 
If Martínez Sala established the legal principle, Grzelczyk provided the language and 
rhetoric with which that principle could be developed and given further meaning. Mr 
Grzelczyk, a French national, was seeking a minimum subsistence allowance in Belgium 
(the ‘minimex’) after a number of years supporting himself as a student. He was refused on 
the basis that he did not fall within the scope of Regulation 1612/68/EEC. A Belgian in a 
similar situation would have been entitled to the minimex. The Court reiterated its findings 
from Martinéz Sala that all lawfully resident Union citizens were entitled to rely on Article 
18 TFEU (then Article 6 TEC). The minimex fell within the scope of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC and hence Union law. Accordingly the refusal to grant the minimex to Mr 
Grzelczyk was discriminatory and contrary to a combined reading of the principle of non-
discrimination and Union citizenship. Perhaps as important as the finding itself was the 
language the court used and how it revealed its vision for Union citizenship. In the now 
ubiquitous phrase the Court declared that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in 
the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject 
to such exceptions as are expressly provided for’.
67
 Furthermore, the fact that Union 
citizenship had given a new dimension to the principle of non-discrimination appeared to be 
confirmed by the Court’s statement that ‘Article 6 must be read in conjunction with the 
provisions of the Treaty concerning citizenship of the Union in order to determine its sphere 
of application.’
68
 Moreover, by providing that students must not become an unreasonable 
burden, the legislature had in fact accepted ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity between 




Martínez Sala established that the principle of equal treatment was in theory applicable to all 
Union citizens lawfully resident in other Member States. Grzelczyk, coined the prophetic 
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phrase that Union citizenship was ‘destined to become the fundamental status of nationals of 
the Member States’ and tied this to ‘the same treatment in law irrespective of their 
nationality’ thereby tightening the link between the principle of non-discrimination and the 
status of Union citizenship and found that Member States had accepted a certain degree of 
solidarity with nationals of other Member States, aka Union citizens.
70
 The exact extent of 
this solidarity was outlined in the case of Bidar
71
 in which a French student in the UK was 
found to be discriminated against by a system for awarding subsidised loans for student fees. 
While excluded from the scope of secondary legislation, Mr Bidar was able to rely directly 
on the Treaty. The Court accepted that some conditions on the award of such assistance 
could be justified by the need to limit it ‘to students who have demonstrated a certain degree 
of integration into the society of [the host] State.’
72
 However that link was specifically a 
social one, with the Court excluding the possibility of requiring an economic link or one 
with the employment market.
73
 The application of the conditions necessary to ensure such a 
link had to be conducted in a proportionate manner, in other words such conditions needed 
to be both necessary to achieve the objective of ensuring a genuine link with the society of 
the host Member State and not to go beyond what was necessary. A certain period of 
residence was indicative of a certain degree of integration but a system, such as that in the 
case of Bidar, whereby it was impossible for a non-UK national to achieve settled status 




On the basis of the principle of non-discrimination, the status of Union citizenship, the 
principle of proportionality and the concept of a ‘real link’ to the society of the host Member 
State, the Court has engineered a transnational status based on the concept of integration. 
Solidarity between individuals is determined by their ‘real link’ manifested by social 
connections to a particular Member State. The degree of social integration therefore 
determines the duties owed by a Member State to a particular individual. This in effect opens 
up national social welfare systems to sufficiently integrated nationals of other Member 
States. It strikes a balance between enlarging the potential scope of solidarity or community 
and the need to respect the natural limits of a system of solidarity that still operates, and is 
legitimised at the level of national communities. The solution is the creation of a status that 
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can trigger a process of integration on the basis of which equal treatment and solidarity is 
extended to Union citizens with ‘real links’. Communities of solidarity remain essentially 
national in scope, what Union citizenship has achieved is a reconfiguration of the boundaries 
of those national communities to take into account the status of Union citizenship. 
 
The process of social integration is generally seen as placing obligations and responsibilities 
on the host Member State, to facilitate integration and grant an ever-increasing right to equal 
treatment. Recent cases have tended to call this unidirectional process that emphasises the 
role of the state rather than the individual in the integration process into question. On the one 
hand, the court has increasingly viewed the economic conditions for residence contained in 
Directive 2004/38/EC as reflecting ‘qualitative’ elements to the integration process, to be 
met by the individual Union citizen.
75
 Recent caselaw of the Court of Justice, in particular 
Dano, has placed the issue of economic activity or contribution even more squarely on the 
agenda.
76
 This turn towards imposing ‘qualitative’ conditions on integration and placing 
more emphasis on the role of the individual in that process is found not only in the area of 
welfare benefits but perhaps even more starkly in the exercise of the public policy exception 
by Member States where, using the language of criminal law, it takes a more normative and 
value-laden tone, a matter explored in chapter 4. 
 
The use of the ‘real link’ and the concept of social integration also operates to a lesser extent 
in the other direction, enabling individuals to ‘export’ benefits to other Member States to the 





 the Court found that Union citizenship allowed individuals to 
retain benefits owed them by virtue of their past association with a particular Member State 
when moving to another Member State, based on the particular characteristics of the benefits 
in question and the links of those individuals with the home Member State. The result is an 
example of the complementarity of the principles of autonomy and integration. Just as 
family reunification, is used to facilitate social integration, the concept of social integration 
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is here used to facilitated further autonomy. Union citizenship therefore not only disrupted 
the personal boundaries of national welfare systems by allowing non-nationals to gain equal 
treatment in host Member States but also the territorial boundaries by allowing individuals 
who retain sufficient links with Member States to maintain rights. The net result is a system 
whereby individuals are increasingly associated with a particular state and community based 
not only on ties of nationality but also social connections. This tendency to use the concept 
of ‘social integration’, alongside nationality, to allocate responsibility for particular 
individuals to particular Member States, is also found in the area of sentencing, where it is 
reinforced by the penological principle of rehabilitation, as explored further in chapter 3. 
 
Union Citizenship and as a Status of Integration and the Legislature 
 
This vision of Union citizenship as a status of integration was taken up by the Union 
legislature and made the leitmotif of the Citizenship Directive. Indeed, the development of 
the concept of a ‘real link’ by the Court of Justice occurred in parallel with the elaboration of 
the Citizenship Directive.
79
 While on one level a unifying instrument, applying a single 
instrument and certain common principles to all Union citizens in another Member State, the 
Directive still categorises citizens according to the activity they undertake and the length of 
time they spend in a host Member State. The major innovation of the Directive is the status 
of ‘permanent resident’, which is intended to be ‘a genuine vehicle for integration into the 
society of the host Member State in which the Union citizen resides’.
80
 This is achieved by 
presenting Union citizenship as a progressively strengthened status. Short stays attract a 
minimum of rights. Initial stays of up to five years are subject to conditions but nonetheless 
include an extensive right to equal treatment.
81
 Stays of more than five years entitle the 
Union citizen and his family to ‘permanent residence’. A permanent resident enjoys almost 
complete equal treatment and is no longer subject to conditions of residence, such as paid 
employment or sufficient resources. This picture of protection and rights increasing in 
parallel over time is also found in the provisions relating to expulsion. In Article 28 of the 
Directive the level of threat that needs to be established in order to justify the expulsion of a 
Union citizen increases with the length of his residence.
82
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The purpose of the Directive is to create a supranationally guaranteed and generous status of 
immigration, with wide ranging rights of employment, equal treatment, residence and family 
reunification explicitly based on the concept of social integration. Integration in immigration 
law is normally considered a condition to be applied to those individuals who may be 
granted a right to stay on a more permanent basis. However, the entire Directive is organised 
along a trajectory of increasing links and rights of the Union citizen with the ultimate goal of 
the Union citizen’s status approaching that of a national and becoming a quasi-member of 
the community.
83
 If it is an immigration status, it is one that is orientated from the very 
beginning towards virtually full membership of the immigrant over time. This view of the 
Directive as being organised towards the acquisition of permanent residence, intended to be 
a ‘genuine vehicle of integration in the society of the host Member State’, has been endorsed 




In its interpretation of the Directive, the Court has engaged actively with its underlying 
philosophy, reading it in light of its telos of integration and has drawn on its provisions to 
inform its own jurisprudence. The Court has consistently interpreted provisions relating to 
permanent residence in light of its goal of both facilitating and being the result of a process 
of integration. In Lassal this underlying objective of Article 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC was 
used as an argument, amongst others, to apply the five year qualifying period retrospectively, 
in that case to allow a French woman to count periods of residence that occurred prior to 
transposition of the directive when acquiring the right of permanent residence.
85
 More 
harmful for the position of the individual but still based on the concept of integration, in 
Onuekwere the Court went even further and excluded periods spent in prison from the 
calculation of the five year period on the basis that such periods could not be considered 
periods in which the individual was engaged in a process of integration with the host 
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 Indeed, the Court of Justice has not only interpreted the award of permanent 
residence as a form of reward for properly integrated Union citizens, but has also interpreted 
the residence conditions of the Directive as those that ensure or provide for integration. In 
Ziolkowsi the Court of Justice accepted that while ‘legal residence’ need not necessarily be 
residence explicitly based on the Directive, it must comply with the substantive conditions of 
the Directive, in particular those found in Article 7(1).
87
 More recently in O & B the Court 
was even more explicit in characterising the conditions contained in the Directive for periods 
of more than three months as those under which a Union citizen becomes ‘settled’ and 
enjoys ‘genuine residence’.
88
 Not only does the Directive aim towards the integration of the 
Union citizen, but it provides the conditions under which such integration can take place. 
 
Union Citizenship as a Transnational Status Between Autonomy and 
Integration 
  
The defining feature of Union Citizenship as a legal status is therefore the ability of 
individual Union citizens to enjoy the expanded range of opportunities offered by a wider 
geographical space containing a plurality of legal systems and political communities. Two 
features in particular can be discerned in the case law and the legislation. On the one hand 
individual autonomy is strengthened by an emphasis on free movement in particular. 
Individuals may move to another Member State, there establish a life, avail of the legal, 
economic and social advantages available in other Member States and acquire rights in those 
States. Union citizenship allows these rights and personal situations and civil statuses 
acquired in one Member State to be carried or, in the words of AG Sharpston, ‘passported’ to 
other Member States.
89
 In many instances the analogy with mutual recognition is striking 
and while normally we understand mutual recognition to mean the recognition of national 
regulations in the case of the internal market or judgments in the case of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice,
90
 in this field it is the mutual recognition of duly acquired 
rights based on both national and Union law. The result is that bundles of rights and personal 
situations developed by Union citizens by leading transnational lives must be able to follow 
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them across borders. In this picture the sphere of operation of Union citizenship is the 
territory of the Union as a whole, albeit composed of various individual national territories 
amongst which the Union citizen can effectively pick and chose depending on his personal 




Another distinct characteristic of Union citizenship and one that has been more prevalent in 
the case law and especially in legislative activity is Union citizenship as a status of 
integration in another Member State. The emphasis in this vision is not a footloose, 
cosmopolitan individual toing and froing throughout the Union disregarding national 
regulations and provisions that may hinder him. This Union citizen is a more familiar image 
in the history of migration, an individual that moves to another Member State with the 
intention of settling there. In this capacity he enjoys a series of rights and a status 
progressively strengthened along an axis of social integration. In this field the Court of 
Justice and the Union legislature have entered into a fruitful and close collaboration. The 
central concept of a ‘real link’ was elaborated almost simultaneously by both institutions and 
in subsequent developments the Court has borrowed and exported elements of the Directive 
to add detail to rights derived directly from the Treaty. Similarly, the notion of social 
integration has driven its interpretation of key concepts in the Directive, in particular the 
definition of residence and the acquisition of permanent residence status. The concept of 
social integration and its use within the context of Union citizenship has established a new 
principle, alongside the traditional principle of nationality, for allocating individuals to 
particular political communities. This has been most striking in the field of social benefits 
but has lately been exported to other areas, including as we shall see the field of criminal law 
and in particular imprisonment. 
 
The two aspects of Union citizenship are intermingled at various points in the law and at 
times tend to support and reinforce each other. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
and in certain circumstances they can be considered complementary, particularly in today’s 
world of increased mobility and more changeable life circumstances. Sometimes aspects of 
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the principle of autonomy, such as the right to carry a family life across borders, is used to 
strengthen integration; at other times the concept of social integration is used to advance the 
autonomy of Union citizens by allowing them to export benefits. O & B and S & G, perhaps 
represent within the same set of judgments the balance between autonomy and integration. 
Autonomy here is used to facilitate potential integration, rights of return for family members 
are granted so as not to deter initial free movement to a host Member State for the purposes 
of settling there, or at least spending more than a nominal period of time. 
 
Yet, fundamentally the principles of autonomy and integration are in tension and offer 
competing visions of the Union citizen and his or her relationship with the societies of 
Member States; one representing a liberal cosmopolitan philosophy, the other a rooted 
communitarian image. They represent competing visions of both the Union citizen and the 
notion of community in the Union. At the level of the individual, Union citizenship as social 
integration tends to promote a rooted, socially constituted individual, living within and as 
part of particular society. Union citizenship as autonomy promotes a looser, more 
individualised character; self-determining and not bound to a particular society, a quasi (and 
regionally bounded) cosmopolitan citizenship.
92
 Individuals are not required, and indeed are 
protected from, a requirement to choose one particular Member State in which to live their 
lives and to integrate within the society of that state. On the level of community the concept 
of social integration privileges the national. National communities are understood as being 
the primary location for the development and existence of social life between individuals 
and moreover, they are deemed to be quasi-exclusive; one integrates into another particular 
Member State’s society and becomes part of that society, enjoying its rights and cultural 
space. Union citizenship as autonomy tends to privilege a Union-wide existence, in which 
individuals are ‘offered’ a broader space of different opportunities and to pick and choose the 
different components of their life from amongst those opportunities – a kind of eclectic, á la 
carte political space. Though the operation of autonomy, a certain supranational space 
emerges that individuals occupy as autonomous and self-constituting. 
 
At times, the tensions between these two visions erupt in the caselaw. In Garcia-Avello there 
was a direct tension between treating the Garcia-Avello children as quasi-Belgian or as 
cosmopolitan Europeans; between the choice of the parents as a transnational family and the 
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equal treatment of the children vis-à-vis Belgian society and between the Union as a 
collection of individual national communities or as a broader space of movement.
93
 In O & 
B, while the Court tended to strike a balance between integration and free movement or 
autonomy, it was an awkward balance. There is no logical, necessary link between an 
individual having ‘genuine settled’ residence of a certain period of time and acquiring rights 
capable of being passported and enjoyed throughout the Union. What imposing such a 
requirement does achieve is to compromise the autonomy of Union citizens in leading 
transnational lives in the interests of buttressing social coherence in the context of Member 
States. 
 
Both do however enable the Union citizen to live across borders, either across multiple and 
changing borders in the case of citizenship as autonomy or across a single border and entry 
into the society of another Member State in the case of citizenship as integration. Combined 
they reflect Union citizenship as a transnational status. It establishes rights for the individual 
who moves across borders and enjoys the fruits of multiple national communities and is 
principally exercised against other Member States and to a limited extent against the 
Member State of nationality where this is necessary to secure the reality of the transnational 
life. It is the ability to both move throughout and around the Union and to have the option to 
settle in other Member States that together make-up Union citizenship as a transnational 
status. In order to be fully achieved it entails both the right to move to, settle and eventually 
receive equal treatment as a virtually full member of the host society and the right to carry 
an ensemble of rights and a civil status throughout the territory of the Union. 
 
Union Citizenship as a Supranational Status 
 
Union citizenship is primarily a transnational status. It entails a right to enjoy the various 
fruits and opportunities offered by an expanded economic, social and political space, 
including the right to settle and integrate into another society of a Member State. It is a 
supranational guarantee of rights exercised at a national level, placing Union citizens in 
privileged positions vis-à-vis Member States, primarily other Member States, but also in 
limited circumstances their ‘home’ Member State. It alters the relationship between 
individuals and Member States and the political communities they represent by obliging 
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Member States to open their borders and societies to include other Union citizens and to 
adapt their administrative practices and regulations to facilitate cross-border movement. I 
have termed these two aspects of transnational citizenship as representing principles of 
‘integration’ and ‘autonomy’ respectively, principles that are distinct but complementary and 
inter-locking. For the most part Union citizenship does not establish direct legal relations 
between the individual and the Union as a whole. Until recently it did not establish relations 
between Union citizens directly nor did it reflect a ‘European’ community of citizens at a 
supranational level independent of national membership.
94
 However, recent developments in 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice have questioned this picture of the purely 
transnational nature of Union citizenship. In a series of cases the Court of Justice has 
established the autonomous character of Union citizenship, emphasising not a relationship 
between Member States and individuals but a direct legal relationship between individuals 
and the supranational legal order by virtue of the status of Union citizenship. However, 
while asserting the existence of such an autonomous legal status, the Court has, as of yet, 
been reluctant to specify the precise content and implications of such a status in terms of 
rights and duties. 
The Establishment of an autonomous Supranational Status: Rottmann and Zambrano. 
 
In a pair of cases in 2010 and 2011 the Court of Justice outlined a theory of Union 
citizenship that included an autonomous status, linking the individual directly with the 
Union legal order. This was based not on Article 21 TFEU and the rights of free movement 
and residence but directly on Article 20(1) TFEU establishing Union citizenship. 
 
Union citizenship is a derived status. It is acquired through holding the nationality of a 
Member State, the acquisition of which is determined solely by that Member State.
95
 
Nationality laws, defining who is and who is not a member of the national political 
community and hence indirectly the community itself, can be said to lie at the heart of 
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 The derived nature of Union citizenship is beyond doubt, as is the 
exclusive competence of Member States in awarding nationality. However, in Rottmann the 
Court of Justice found that when withdrawing nationality from an individual, Member States 
were required to apply general principles of Union law and in particular undertake a 
proportionality assessment. This involved taking into account the impact on the individual of 
the loss of his rights under Union law and the legitimate interests the Member State may 
have in depriving him of those rights.
97
 It arrived at this conclusion by reading Union 
citizenship as an autonomous status under Union law that generates its own rights. The 
decision of a Member State to withdraw it must therefore be subject to review under the 




Union citizenship, while linked with nationality in terms of possession, in fact constitutes a 
separate and parallel status established under Union law and subject to its requirements. It 
establishes a relationship between Europeans, constituting a new community that builds on 
national communities, at a supranational level. Nationality and Union citizenship ‘are both 
inextricably linked and independent’.
99
 This vision of Union citizenship and its relationship 
with nationality is eloquently put in the Opinion of AG Maduro. Nationality and Union 
citizenship are linked in their mode of acquisition and indeed loss and as a consequence in 
the nature of the forms of membership they represent. Indeed it is the ‘miracle of Union 
citizenship’ that ‘it strengthens the ties between us and our States (in so far as we are 
European citizens precisely because we are nationals of our States) and, at the same time, it 
emancipates us from them (in so far as we are now citizens beyond our States). Access to 
European citizenship is gained through nationality of a Member State, which is regulated by 
national law, but like any form of citizenship, it forms the basis of a new political area from 
which rights and duties emerge, which are laid down by Community law and do not depend 
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 It is through nationality that one becomes a Union citizen and accordingly it 
is through membership of a national community of a Member State that one becomes a 
member of a supranational European community. Yet once one has become such a member, 
it is an autonomous and independent status. 
 
The implications of Rottmann became clearly apparent in the case of Zambrano.
101
 
Zambrano is noted for founding a right of residence for Union citizens and certain members 
of their families even in their home state under certain (unclear) circumstances. In modifying 
the so called ‘purely internal rule’ and the question of reverse discrimination
102
 it can be 
added to the long list of decisions protecting the family life of Union citizens and 
transforming family members into ‘quasi-citizens’.
103
 However, for present purposes the real 
interest in the decision lies in the hermeneutic technique used by the Court and in particular 
its reliance on the independent status of Union citizenship to justify its decision.
104
 Quickly 
finding that the rights of free movement and residence found in Article 21 TFEU and the 
relevant secondary legislation (Directive 2004/38/EC) did not apply, the Court moved on to 
consider the case under Article 20 TFEU and found that Member States could not adopt 
measures that would ‘have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the 
Union.’
105
 Such deprivation would occur if a Union citizen was obliged to leave the territory 
of the Union. In the present case refusal to grant Mr Ruis Zamrano, the father of minor 
Union citizens entirely dependent upon him, a right of residence and a right to work in the 
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While much criticised for the brevity and opacity of its reasoning,
107
 Zambrano is clear in 
providing a new paradigm for understanding Union citizenship. Zambrano is not concerned 
with the wording of the Treaty or the rights of Union citizenship, but develops an 
autonomous concept of Union citizenship as a status linking individual holders of that status 
to the Union legal order.
108
 It is this supranational status and the Zambrano children’s 
membership of the broader European community that brings the issue within the scope of 
Union law. Note the important symbolic reference not to the territories of the Member States 
but the ‘territory of the Union’, described by Azoulai as a normative as well as geographical 
reference, implying a common space occupied together by Union citizens in accordance with 
a set of common rights and values, protected by Union law.
109
 Moreover, the reference to the 
territory of the Union echoes to a large extent the outcome of emphasising the logic of 
autonomy in the transnational dimension of Union citizenship in creating a single, broader 
space of movement. In supplementing the rights contained in Article 21 TFEU and Directive 
2004/38/EC with a protection based on Article 20 TFEU and the status of Union citizenship, 
the Court of Justice is in effect supplementing a set of transnational rights with a 





An ill-defined and insubstantial substance 
 
The ruling in Zambrano has been confirmed by the Court of Justice on a number of 
occasions, as has the new ‘genuine enjoyment’ test based on the supranational status of 
Union citizenship. However, in no other case has an applicant been successful in invoking 
the protection offered by that status or in adding to situations where ‘the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights’ conferred by Union citizenship is at stake. Subsequent cases 
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Firstly the Court has made it clear that individual citizens must be obliged to leave the 
territory of the Union. If they enjoy rights of residence (that can be enjoyed in practice) 
under national law, for example by virtue of nationality, they cannot invoke the protection 
offered by Article 20 TFEU. This applies both if the Union citizen holds the nationality of 
the Member State of origin
112
 or if he holds the nationality of another Member State to 
which he can move if necessary.
113
 Moreover, the threshold for this test is high. ‘Forced’ to 
leave the territory of the Union means precisely that; the mere desirability of maintaining 
family life in a particular state is not a sufficient grounds to find that an individual is being 




Secondly, and related to the above point, whether a Union citizen will be ‘forced to leave the 
territory of the Union’ on foot of a decision by a Member State (typically to deport a third 
country national family member) very much depends on the nature of that relationship of 
dependence between the Union citizen and the TCN family member. The dependence must 
be of a strictly material nature. It would seem that emotional or personal dependence is not 
sufficient, being merely ‘desirable’. Furthermore, it is the Union citizen that must be 
dependent on the third country national family member rather than the reverse.
 115
 This 
dependence does not exist if the Union citizen can be reliant on another family member such 




Thirdly, fundamental rights do not appear to be included in the ‘substance of the rights’ 
conferred by Union citizenship. While Member State’s must have regard to their obligations 
under the ECHR and under the CFR in situations that fall within the scope of Union law, 
breach of a fundamental right, such as the right to family and private life, does not in and of 
itself amount to a denial of the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of a right conferred by Union 
citizenship. The result is a clear refusal, at this stage of the Union’s development, to create a 
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 Case C-87/12 Ymeraga v Minstre du Travail, de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration EU:C:2013:291. Leading to the 
paradoxical situation noted by AG Mengozzi in Derici (n 114) that having a Union citizen parent works to the 




federal type system of fundamental rights protection founded on the status of Union 
citizenship akin to that constructed on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.
117
 In other words membership of the supranational community of the 
Union is not in and of itself sufficient grounds to invoke the protection of fundamental rights 
offered by the Union. We have not yet reached the stage where an individual is entitled to 





The result is a clear and dramatic narrowing of the application of any test under Article 20 
TFEU. The exceptional nature of such an application has been highlighted by Court, noting 
in both Alopka and Ymeraga that it applies only in ‘very specific situations’.
119
 In these two 
cases the language and justification of the Court has also shifted somewhat, claiming that the 
rights derived from Article 20 TFEU have an ‘intrinsic connection with the freedom of 
movement of a Union citizen’
120
 and has employed the language of ‘effectiveness’ when 
describing the test under Article 20 TFEU. While the concept of effectiveness has been used 
to promote the application of EU law in other areas,
121
 it does tend to characterise Article 20 
TFEU in instrumental terms rather than the inherent protection of the individual as a 
European conferred by the ‘fundamental status’ of Union citizenship. 
 
The result of McCarthy, Derici, Iida, Ymeraga and Alopka is that while it is clear what the 
‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights’ conferred by Union citizenship is not, what is 
less clear is what it in fact is.
122
 In particular it is not clear under what circumstances Article 
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20 TFEU and the supranational status of Union citizenship will apply, beyond the very 
denial of such a status either in law, as in Rottmann or in fact, as in Zambrano. The result is 
the perhaps intermediary situation where the existence of a supranational dimension to 
Union citizenship is beyond doubt. Rottmann and Zambrano are based on the understanding 
of Union citizenship as an autonomous status, operating independently of other 
considerations of Union law (in particular cross-border movement) that can be invoked 
against a Member State of origin where the very existence, or substance of that status is 
threatened. Union citizenship therefore reflects the existence of a civic community between 
Europeans located at a supranational level. However, beyond its bare existence the precise 
content of this status, in terms of rights and obligations, and the characteristics of this 
community, in terms of values or principles, remain unclear. In a series of judgments the 
Court while confirming the essence of the status, has shied away from any moves to put 




In the area of criminal law, this direct link between the Union and individual Union citizens 
is similarly poorly developed. As is explored further in Chapter 7 the Union’s competence to 
criminalise behaviour and directly impose obligations on individuals is limited and moreover 
is necessarily mediated by national law. The Union similarly lacks a capacity to call 
individuals to account communicate the moral judgment of the community, so central to 
Duff’s community-based account of criminal law, to individuals. There would not appear to 
be a particularly well-defined community at a supranational level and expressed through 
supranational institutions and legislation to which individuals are ‘called to account’ for their 
wrongful conduct. There does appear to be a certain capacity of the Union to articulate 
certain supranational public wrongs but the most immediate function of this is not to directly 





This chapter is an attempt to disaggregate the various dimensions of Union citizenship in 
order to facilitate further enquiry into the interaction between Union citizenship and criminal 
law. It does not exclude other perspectives on Union citizenship, particularly those 
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concentrating on the political nature of Union citizenship and its practice in a more 
participative fashion,
124
 or its broader constitutional significance for the Union as a whole.
125
 
It divides Union citizenship into elements; social integration, autonomy and a supranational 
community, to provide headings in order to better investigate the interaction of Union 
citizenship and criminal law. These elements interact and combine in different ways; any 
isolated consideration is likely to be somewhat artificial and to miss an important point 
regarding the whole that is more than these component parts. In particular social integration 
and autonomy together offer individual Union citizens a broader space of movement; the 
Union territory as composed of Member States that in turn is linked to the supranational 
status of citizenship and in particular the right to the Union territory as echoed in the 
Zambrano line of caselaw. There is therefore an interaction between the transnational and 
the supranational, in which certain supranational phenomenon emerge from transnational 
processes and transnational processes are framed, justified and facilitated by supranational 
phenomena. This interaction between the transnational and the supranational is echoed 
throughout the rest of this thesis.  
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Social Integration and Crime 
 
Inclusion and Exclusion - Transnational and Supranational 
 
The Social Integration Paradigm 
 
EU citizenship is principally, if not exclusively, a status of social integration.
1
 In practice this 
transnational status enables EU citizens to move to and become part of another society in the 
European Union. It is a right to acquire rights in another Member State and to gain a status 
that approaches (if never quite equals) national citizenship. The borders of national 
communities are not eliminated but become more porous, open to other nationals of 




Acquiring these rights is not however automatic and instantaneous but involves an on-going 
process. The main principal developed by the Court of Justice
3
 and taken up by the 
legislature
4
 is that of social integration. The relationship between rights and integration is 
seen as a continuously mutually reinforcing process: rights and the protections offered by 
rights are seen as a means of enabling the integration of the EU citizen. Further integration 
in turn leads to more secure rights to residence and equal treatment in particular. The result is 
a framework for the development of the relationship between the host Member State and the 
individual, a relationship that develops along an axis of social integration. Focusing on the 
transnational dimension, the concept of social integration establishes a framework for a 
relationship between the host society and the individual migrant Union citizen. However, it 
is a relationship that is curiously lopsided, with most duties, including duties of equal 
treatment and financial and social solidarity flowing from the Member State. Beyond certain 
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economic ‘conditions’ attached to residence,
5
 there appears to be little in the way of explicit 
requirements on the part of the individual. 
 
The Relationship with the Host Society - Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
Developed principally in the field equal treatment for social benefits, the principle of social 
integration has been extended to regulate the status of migrant Union citizens in other areas,
6
 
including in the area of criminal law. Four areas in particular have developed: Article 4(6) of 
the European Arrest Warrant Framework Directive (EAW FD)
7
 on the right to remain in a 
state to serve a sentence; the Transfer of Custodial Sentences Framework Decision; 
expulsion decisions under Article 28 of the Directive 2004/38/EC (Citizenship Directive)
8
 
and the question of imprisonment and the calculation of periods of residence under the same 
Directive. 
 
In all four areas dealing with the rights of criminal migrant Union citizens and in particular 
their relationship with the host Member State is regulated by the concept of social 
integration. It is a clear extension of the principle from the area of social solidarity and equal 
treatment to welfare rights to a different area, indicating that the concept of social integration 
is set to become the key operative principle in regulating the relationship of the Union 
citizen to the host Member State. However, social integration, once extended to such diverse 
fields necessarily engages different concerns that in turn can alter the nature of the social 
integration paradigm and feedback into our understanding of Union citizenship. This is 
precisely what has occurred in the field of criminal law with two issues, particular to the 
criminal justice system, being incorporated into the social integration test. 
 
Chapter 3 details the caselaw relating to Article 4(6) EAW FD and the Transfer of Sentences 
Framework Decision. These two instruments and the Court’s case law have focused on the 
need to rehabilitate the offender as a widely accepted goal of the criminal justice system. 
This has been incorporated into the social integration test as reinforcing the ‘right’ of the 
migrant Union citizen, who is sufficiently integrated, to remain in the host Member State in 
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order to serve his sentence.
9
 Rehabilitation concerns the reintegration of the individual into 
society, a reintegration that is said to be facilitated by remaining close to family and a social 
network and being in a familiar environment. Thus while operating within the very different 
field of penology and criminal justice, the concept of rehabilitation dovetails with the EU 
law concept of social integration and reinforces the inclusion of the Union citizen in the 
society of the host Member State. The obligations of the host Member State are therefore 
extended or reinforced through the use of the concept of rehabilitation. In terms of its 
operation this is a relatively straightforward application of the principle of social integration: 
the greater the degree of social integration, the greater the rights of the migrant citizen and 
the greater his legal inclusion and level of protection. The only difference is that 
rehabilitation reinforces the traditional operation of the principle of social integration. 
  
Starkly different in effect is the conception of criminal law employed in the second two 
areas, the expulsion cases and the cases dealing with periods of imprisonment dealt with in 
Chapter 4. In these cases a view of the criminal law as wrong-doing emerges. Moreover it is 
wrong-doing against society as a whole, the values and norms of which are reflected in the 
criminal law. Unlike rehabilitation which is complementary, crime as wrong-doing is 
inimical to the process of social integration and implicitly justifies the expulsion of the 
criminal Union citizen. Residence rights, be they permanent residence or enhanced 
protection against expulsion, are the result of a process of social integration. Criminal acts 
that result in imprisonment rupture that process of integration resulting in a loss or a failure 
to acquire rights relating to Union citizenship. This concept of crime has therefore has 
resulted in a degree of exclusion for the offending Union citizen. 
 
Between Transnational and Supranational 
 
The use of criminal law concepts in these series of cases and legislation analysed in these 
two chapters has tended to alter the relationship between the individual and the host society, 
leading to both greater inclusion and exclusion. What is similar to both however is that it is 
the national community that remains the social unit and it is the relationship between the 
migrant Union citizen and the national community that is at stake. These are primarily 
transnational processes. However, in both rehabilitation and crime as wrong-doing, their 
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inclusion in the social integration paradigm appears to give rise to certain supranational 
elements. In cases dealing with the rehabilitation of offenders, there does appear to be a 
Union-wide interest in their reintegration into society, an interest and responsibility that is 
shared amongst Member States depending on the criteria of nationality on the one hand and 
social integration on the other. More clear is the supranational element contained in the case 
of crime as wrong-doing and its interaction with national and transnational processes. Here, 
while on its face the duty in question may appear negative and national it in fact reveals 
positive and supranational dimensions. On the one hand there appears to be a clear 
implication that the individual migrant citizen should adopt a particular attitude of respect 
towards the host society. On the other hand, while the content of the duty arises from 
national criminal law, in its nature and consequences it is in fact supranational. It is a duty 
imposed by Union law and entails the loss of rights of Union citizenship, in addition to 
whatever consequences may flow from national law. This appears to be confirmed by a 
certain validation by which national values justifying expulsion are endorsed by Union 
instruments. What appears to emerge is a duty of respect towards the values of the host 
society peculiar to Union citizenship reflecting both a re-balancing of the relationship of 
integration between the host-society and the individual - placing more emphasis on the role 
of the individual - and also a shift in the quality of that integration from an economic to a 





Social Integration I 
Rehabilitation and Inclusion 
 
Introduction:  
Rehabilitation and Social Integration 
 
From the external perspective citizenship, and or rather its international law corollary, 
nationality, was developed as a means of allocating individuals to particular political units or 
states.
1
 International law aims at a complete and discrete system whereby all individuals are 
allocated to a state, and only one state.
2
 At this stage of the development of Union 
citizenship it is evident that within the European Union an additional criteria is used to 
establish a bond and a defining link between an individual and a particular state, that of 
social integration. Social integration is usually thought of in terms of rights, the rights of the 
individual. But rights correlate with duties or responsibilities
3
 and from the point of view of 
Member States the concept of social integration is a supplementary means of allocating 
responsibility between different states for particular individuals. Union citizens from other 
Member States who are sufficiently integrated into the host society are entitled to a certain 
degree of solidarity. Similarly, in the converse situation, so long as a degree of social 
integration persists, Member States are obliged to continue to extend certain, non- 
territorially linked, benefits to their own nationals who seek to travel to another Member 
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 In short, the obligations and responsibilities that Member States hold towards 
individuals waxes and wanes with their degree of social integration. 
 
In the context of criminal law the concept of social integration plays a different role. From a 
traditional sociological perspective, first presented by Durkheim and echoed by legal 
moralists such as Lord Devlin, the purpose of the criminal law was to express a certain form 
of social solidarity.
5
 Breach of the criminal law emerged from a state of anomie or 
normlessness, in which certain section of society individuals found themselves.
6
 Put bluntly, 
the criminal law, and in particular punishment, was society striking back at an action that 
damaged the normative bonds of society, thereby reasserting its values and coherence.
7
 A 
related concept of social (re)integration exists in the area of penology as one (and at times 
the principal) purpose of punishment. Starting from the same premise that criminal activity 
is a symptom of a social alienation on the part of the individual and a lack of integration in 
the social, economic and perhaps cultural structures of society, the goal of the treatment of 
offenders should therefore be to ‘reintegrate’ the individual into society – to rehabilitate him, 




The two meanings of the concept – in EU law as the means of determining the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals vis-à-vis particular states and in criminal law as a symptom of 
social alienation and rehabilitation as a goal of the penal process– have been integrated by 
the Court of Justice and by the Union legislature in a series of cases and legislation dealing 
with where an individual may serve his or her sentence. The result of importing the logic of 
rehabilitation within the social integration framework of Union citizenship has been the 
reinforcement of the inclusion of the migrant Union in the society of the host Member State. 
It has altered the traditional concepts of allocating responsibility for criminal (troublesome) 
Union citizens, expanding and altering the concept of the national community for these 
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purposes, while at the same time raising the possibility of a pan-European interest in the 
rehabilitation of the offender and a collective responsibility for communicating the 
wrongfulness of the conduct. Two areas – the ‘nationality exception’ in the European Arrest 
Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD) and the Framework Decision on the Transfer of 
Sentences - highlight this change. 
 
The Transformation of the Nationality Exception 
 
A staple of extradition law is the so-called nationality exemption.
9
 Under this rule, common 
in continental legal systems but less so in the common law tradition, individuals who hold 
the nationality of the particular state are shielded from unconsented extradition to another 
state for the purposes of placing them on trial or for serving a sentence. The rationale for the 
exemption has been linked to a mistrust of other criminal justice systems and the particular 





In an effort to secure a more effective system of transfer and a single area of justice,
11
 the 
European Arrest Warrant sought to eliminate this ‘exception’ in extradition law. While an 
abolition was proposed by the Commission with its replacement by a principle on 
integration,
12
 the final text contained a modified ‘nationality exemption’ in Articles 4(6) and 
5(3) of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision.
13
 Article 4(6) EAW FD is an 
optional provision, allowing Member States to refuse to surrender their nationals or persons 
‘resident or staying in’ that Member State for the purposes of serving a sentence if they 
undertake to allow the individual to serve the sentence in that Member State. Similarly, 
Article 5(3) EAW FD allows Member States to impose a guarantee on the surrender of 
nationals or residents in cases concerning individuals standing for trial, such that the 
individual concerned will be able to return to the executing Member State to serve his or her 
sentence in the event that a custodial sentence is imposed. Thus individuals could serve their 
sentence in a particular Member State with which they had ‘special bonds’, including 
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nationality, while at the same time remaining subject to the criminal law of other Member 
States. 
 
It will be noted that unlike the nationality exemption as traditionally applied, Articles 4(6) 
and 5(3) EAW FD are designed to ensure that the individual concerned does in fact face trial 
and/or serve her sentence; she is not entitled to escape justice. Moreover, she must face trial 
before the courts of the issuing Member State.
14
 Articles 4(6) and 5(3) EAW FD only ensure 
that she can serve her sentence closer to home and in particular in her ‘home’ Member State. 
The consequences of this abolition of the nationality exemption and the obligation to serve a 
sentence imposed by another Member State on the relationship between the nationals of a 
particular Member State and other Member States in the construction of a single area of 
justice is analysed in further detail in chapter 5. This chapter is concerned with the separate 
matter of the relationship between Union citizens who are not nationals of the executing 
Member State and the extent to which the Court in particular has used the concept of social 
integration to reinforce their inclusion in the host society. 
 
While billed as the replacement to the ‘nationality exemption’ the rules contained in Articles 
4(6) and 5(3) EAW FD, as they have been interpreted by the Court of Justice, are of a 
fundamentally different nature. Beyond ensuring that the individual concerned does have to 
stand trial and suffer punishment, two differences in particular stand out - the subject of the 
exception and the justification for the exception. The exception is now to be applied not just 
to nationals but to residents and, in the case of Article 4(6) EAW FD, also those ‘staying in’ a 
Member State. Similarly, in its interpretation of those particular terms the Court of Justice 
has justified the exception not on some essential and traditional bond between an individual 
and his sovereign but rather on the more modern, and more flexible, concept of 
rehabilitation. Both changes have been driven by an interpretation based on Union 
citizenship. 
 
Subject of the Exception; from nationals to Union citizens 
 
The EAW FD itself clearly indicates that the new ‘exception’ is to apply to both nationals 
and other individuals sufficiently connected with or integrated into the host society. In 
                                                 
14
 Under extradition treaties states sometimes would undertake to surrender or prosecute. See Plachta (n 9). The 




addition to nationals, Article 4(6) EAW FD applies to persons staying in or resident in the 
host society, whereas Article 5(3) EAW FD applies to residents. 
 
In interpreting these terms the Court has drawn explicitly on Union citizenship, and in 
particular that part termed in chapter 2 the social integration dimension, in order to 
determine the precise contours of these new groups of persons who can benefit from Articles 
4(6) and 5(3). In Kozłowski, in interpreting the notion of ‘staying in’, the Court defined the 
category in terms of ‘connections’ with the host society and in particular an ‘overall 
assessment of various objective factors characterising the situation of that person which 
include…the length, nature and conditions of his presence and the family and economic 




Whereas in Kozłowski the link with Union citizenship was implicit, in Wolzenburg, it is 
rendered explicit. The Dutch provision in question, requiring a five year period of residence 
and a formal residence permit before non-nationals could benefit from the exemption, was 
deemed to be discriminatory and contrary to Article 20 TFEU, in the light of the provisions 
of Union citizenship and Article 18 TFEU in particular.
16
 When justifying such 
discrimination the Member State was entitled to raise the prospect of reserving the exception 
for individuals with a sufficiently close links to the host society, to be assessed according to 




Finally, in da Silva, the obligations on the Member States to expand the group of persons 
who may benefit from Article 4(6) EAW FD (and presumably by implication Article 5(3) 
EAW FD) was brought full circle. If Member States opt to implement Article 4(6) in relation 
to their own nationals, they cannot automatically and categorically exclude nationals of other 
Member States.
18
 In its rejection of the French government’s argument that international 
obligations only allowed it to refuse surrender for its own nationals, the Court, relying on the 
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Commission’s submissions, points out that for the purposes of those obligations, a state may 
define the term ‘national’ to include those resident in that state, an option that has been 
exercised by a number of states.
19
 In effect, the Court implied that a Member State may be 
required under Union law and more particularly the duty of conform interpretation in 
combination with Union citizenship, to define, under certain international instruments, as its 
own nationals Union citizens that are sufficiently integrated. 
 
Both the legislation and the Court allowed Member States to retain the category of 
nationality when operating Article 4(6) and 5(3) EAW. In Wolzenburg, the Court highlighted 
the ability of Member States to privilege their own nationals in matters of surrender, finding 
that the Dutch provision automatically preventing the surrender of Netherlands nationals 
‘does not appear excessive’ in light of their presumed strong connections to Dutch society.
20
 
AG Bot, who was of the opinion that one of the main goals of the Framework Decision was 
to abolish the nationality exemption, proposed a reading of Article 4(6) EAW FD that would 
require Member States to assess on a case-by-case basis an individual’s chances of 
rehabilitation in the executing state.
21
 The Court of Justice implicitly rejected that view by 
allowing Member States to maintain a blanket ban by asserting the perhaps overly simplistic 
view that nationals will necessarily be able to reintegrate in their ‘own’ Member State.
22
 
Thus under the EAW FD Member States are permitted to retain the nation and nationality as 
a framework for the community but this is complemented by those with sufficient social 
connections to the host Member State. Thus, while ensuring that nationality remains a 
relevant criterion in the operation of the provisions, it has reinterpreted it in light of social 
links and connections rather than through some pre-social, ethno-cultural notion of 
belonging or some idealized link between the sovereign and its subjects. Nationals are 
presumed to have sufficiently strong connections with the society of the host society that 
justifies the automatic application of Article 4(6) EAW FD. Nationality here is not some 
form of traditional, quasi-mystical ethno-cultural bond but rather a proxy (albeit perhaps in 
some cases a rather tenuous one) for the social connections an individual enjoys with a 
particular Member State. 
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Justification: From nationality to rehabilitation 
 
The reason why social connections were deemed relevant for the operation of the exemption 
is linked to the criminological understanding of social integration identified above. It is not 
the affective tie to the sovereign or distrust of other legal systems that justifies Articles 4(6) 
and 5(3) EAW FD but the more prosaic concept of rehabilitation and social reintegration. 
The Court first identified rehabilitation and reintegration as one of the goals of the EAW FD 
in Kozlowski. Article 4(6) EAW FD has ‘the objective of enabling the executing judicial 
authority to give particular weight to the possibility of increasing the requested person’s 
chances of reintegrating into society when the sentence imposed on him expires.’
23
 This goal 
of the Framework Decision is also raised in Wolzenburg (albeit in tension with the other goal 
of the Framework Decision to create an effective system of surrender)
24
 and fused with the 
concept of social integration that regulates the equal treatment of migrant Union citizens. 
 
The use of the Union citizenship concept of social integration and the concept of 
rehabilitation are complementary. It is precisely because Article 4(6) EAW FD seeks to 
promote reintegration and rehabilitation that it is particularly appropriate to use the language 
and the test of social integration in assessing which individuals may benefit from the 
provision. Those Union citizens that are sufficiently integrated are entitled to equal 
treatment, including in their chances of rehabilitation in their now ‘home’ society. Moreover, 
their chances of rehabilitation are greater in that society because they are deemed to be 
integrated. The combined logic of equal treatment, Union citizenship, social integration and 
rehabilitation, therefore serves to reinforce the inclusion (of sufficiently integrated) Union 
citizens in the host society. 
 
The result of these three cases and the interpretation of Article 4(6) of the EAW Framework 
Decision is striking. Rather than renounce the continued importance of national communities 
and nationality and abolish altogether the possibility of employing the nationality exemption, 
the Court has allowed Member States remarkable discretion in retaining automatic refusals 
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to surrender their own nationals.
25
 However, it is not true that following Wolzenburg, and 
even more so da Silva ‘European citizenship is not yet the basic paradigm for the condition 
of the individual confronted with a Member State’s public power within the EU’s AFSJ.’
26
 
Such a view ignores the progressive nature of Union citizenship based on social integration, 
one that is strengthened and deepened over time as a greater degree of integration is reached. 
What these cases have underlined is the importance that Member States, when operating 
their ‘nationality exception’, leave open the possibility that other Union citizens, those 
sufficiently integrated, may benefit from it, in effect rendering the borders of national 
communities for the purposes of determining the responsibility placed on a state with respect 
of enforcing sentences more porous and open to nationals of other Member States. While 
one may agree or disagree with the discretion afforded Member States in applying this rule, 
in particular the application of a blanket five year residence requirement, it does fit with the 
concept of Union citizenship as a status that is strengthened as a result of social integration.
27
 
Furthermore, nor is it without interest that this has been achieved by placing the ‘nationality’ 
exemption in a more social setting, stressing the importance of social ties to the community 
and softening the otherwise exclusionary nature of a more traditional ethno-cultural view of 
the national community. While retaining the importance of the national community, Article 
4(6) has rendered it less exclusionary and based more on the societal and legal realities 
inherent in Union citizenship. It has done this by employing the concept of genuine links to 
the host society and social integration familiar in other areas of Union citizenship law and 
reinforcing it with the principle of rehabilitation. 
 
Complementing rather than replacing the logic based on a special political bond between 
national and state with a social bond based on integration and the responsibility of 
rehabilitation appears to be confirmed by the legislative history of the Framework Decision. 
In its original proposal the Commission emphasised the importance attached to the principle 
of integration in the application of the European Arrest Warrant system. Recital 13 of the 
proposal emphasises that due consideration should be given for the reintegration of criminals 
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and that fact should be reflected in the place in which they serve their sentence.
28
 
Furthermore under Article 33 of the proposal, entitled ‘The Principle of Integration’, the 
Commission proposed an optional ground of refusal, refusing surrender and imposing the 
sentence in the executing state, to take into account the possible ‘better possibilities of 
integration’ in the executing state.
29
 A comparison with the final version reveals the 
replacement of this article on the ‘Principle of Integration’ with more traditional provisions, 
retaining the category of national but extending it to other persons, namely those ‘staying in’ 
or ‘resident’ deemed to have a particular relationship with the executing state. The express 
inclusion of nationality as a ground for refusal, while extending it to other sufficiently 
connected individuals does not imply a rejection of the principle of integration. Indeed, the 
Court has subsequently upheld its view in a number of other cases, not directly related to 
Article 4(6) that the Framework Decision is informed by the concept of social 
rehabilitation.
30
 However, it has accommodated the concept of nationality within the 
principle of social rehabilitation by implicitly accepting that nationals enjoy a particular 
relationship to their ‘home society’ that facilitates reintegration. This pattern is repeated in 
another complementary piece of legislation, namely the Framework Decision on the Transfer 
of Sentences, to which we now turn. 
 
The Framework Decision on the Transfer of Sentences 
 
Articles 4(6) and 5(3) of the EAW FD have been complemented by a Framework Decision 
on the Transfer of Sentences that applies the principle reflected in those articles: that 
individuals should serve their sentence in the state with which they enjoy the closest 
connection and in particular that in which they would enjoy the best chances of 
reintegration. As with Articles 4(6) and 5(3) the principle of nationality is supplemented by 
taking into account those with a particular connection to a particular society. 
 
The guiding principle of the Framework Decision on the Transfer of Sentences is that of 
social rehabilitation and reintegration.
31
 Accordingly, the core of the Framework Decision is 
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contained in Article 4 that outlines those circumstances under which a Member State must, 
or is encouraged to, execute a custodial sentence. As with Article 4(6) and 5(3) EAW FD an 
assessment of a sentenced person’s chances of rehabilitation is to be made taking into 
account his integration in the executing state and as with Articles 4(6) and 5(3) the relevant 
criteria for determining this are nationality on the one hand, and residence with sufficient 
social connections on the other. 
 
Under the Framework Decision on the Transfer of Sentences a Member State (the issuing 
Member State), where it considers a person’s rehabilitation would be best served by a 
transfer, may forward a judgement to a second Member State (the executing Member State) 
where, after consultation with the executing Member State and the individual concerned, it is 
thought rehabilitation would best be served. In principle, decisions to transfer the sentence 
are automatically recognised and the executing Member State shall take the necessary 
measures to enforce it,
32
 in accordance with its own laws.
33
 The usual grounds for non-
recognition of judgements apply, including cases involving minors, statute barred cases, ne 
bis in idem
34




As with the Court’s interpretation of the relevant provisions of the EAW FD, responsibility 
for sentenced persons is allocated based on a mixture of nationality and the social 
connections a person might have with a particular society. Sentenced persons are divided 
into three categories for the purposes of the Framework Decision: nationals of the executing 
state who live in that state; nationals of the executing state who will be deported to that state 
upon release and, finally, other individuals. Member States are obliged to accept persons 
who fall into the first two categories, i.e. nationals who either live in the executing state or 
will be deported there upon release. Furthermore, the consent of the sentenced person is not 
required in these cases. The consent of the executing Member State and the sentenced person 
is required for the final, residual, category. However, it does not appear that Member States 
may categorically refuse to accept the transfer of persons falling within the final category. 
Member States are instead obliged to adopt legislation outlining the criteria to be used when 
deciding whether to accept individuals under the final, residual, category taking into account 
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the goal of social rehabilitation.
36
 Furthermore, they are encouraged, through reciprocal 
notification, to automatically accept all nationals not covered by the first two categories and 




In relation to Union citizens, it is arguable that the principle of non-discrimination would 
apply to the Framework Decision on the Transfer of Sentences in a similar fashion as in the 
case of Article 4(6) of the EAW FD. Following the logic of Wolzenburg and da Silva, 
Member States could legitimately privilege their own nationals, who can be assumed under 
those cases to already have the requisite social connections with the ‘home state’. However, 
they would not be entitled to exclude automatically and categorically all non-national Union 
citizens from the application of the Framework Decision. Rather, they would be obliged to 
adopt legislation to enable the relevant authorities ‘to assess whether there is a legitimate 
interest which would justify the sentence imposed in the issuing Member State being 




Aside from the usual ground of effectiveness that drives much of the EU criminal law 
agenda, one of the main motivations for adopting the Framework Decision was that the 
international law instruments it replaced only allowed the transfer of nationals.
39
 The 
Framework Decision therefore establishes a scheme, guided by the principle of social 
rehabilitation, allocating responsibility to particular Member States for particular 
individuals. In doing so it extends this responsibility beyond the traditional criteria of 
nationality to include non-nationals deemed to have a particular relationship with that state. 
This relationship is be determined by the person’s social ties to the host society and may be 
assumed in the case of long-term or permanent residents. In making decisions under the 
Framework Decision states should take into account ‘the person’s attachment to the 
executing State, whether he or she considers it the place of family, linguistic, cultural or 
economic and other links to the executing state.’
40
 This connection is also deemed to be 
established through secure residence. Member States may exercise an option to 
automatically accept permanent residents. If they do so it is envisaged that ‘permanent 
residence’ for the purposes of the Framework Decision refers to residence on the basis of 
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either the status of Union citizen or long term resident
41
 - a form of ‘subsidiary’ Union 





National Responsibility for a Supranational Interest 
 
The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and the Framework Decision on the 
Transfer of Sentences establish a system for allocating responsibility between Member 
States for the imprisonment and ultimately social rehabilitation of individuals. In this sense it 
resembles and reflects one of the traditional functions of citizenship, namely the allocation 
of responsibility for particular individuals to a particular state. Under the system established 
under Union law the traditional criteria of nationality is not replaced. In fact, it is confirmed 
by the obligation on Member States to take back those of their nationals who face 
deportation.
43
 However, it is complemented by an additional criteria of membership or 
belonging based on the social ties an individual holds with a particular society. This has been 
achieved in light of the application of the rules of Union citizenship and in particular the 
principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality and reflects the general model 
of Union citizenship as a status of integration that alters the configuration of national 
communities and the relationship between Member States and nationals of other Member 
States. 
 
It will however be noted that there are limits to this assimilation hinted at in the Framework 
Decision on the Transfer of Sentences; individuals may only ‘benefit’ from the Framework 
Decision if they maintain a right to remain a resident of a state, a fact that has been echoed 
in the application of Articles 4(6) and 5(3) of the EAW FD.
44
 Both nationality and social 
integration operate in tandem to determine the appropriate state of responsibility for an 
individual. Originally, for the majority of Union citizens, it would be nationality, then after a 
sufficient period of time and process of integration in another Member State it would be the 
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criteria of social integration. However, as we shall see in the expulsion cases, treated in the 
next chapter, and in the residual provisions in the Transfer of Sentences Framework 
Decision, nationality can resurface as the allocating criterion in situations of particularly 
serious crimes that undo the process of integration and warrant expulsion. 
 
While it is clear that the shape of the national community has been altered, it remains the 
national, rather than supranational community that is responsible for the rehabilitation of the 
offender; it is the national social context in which that rehabilitation takes place and it is the 
national community to which the individual seeks membership. Clearly, nationality still 
remains a defining criteria for identifying individuals, a criteria that only makes sense if the 
relevant unit into which an individual is to be reintegrated is in fact the national community. 
Similarly, the entire logic of both the line of caselaw dealing with Article 4(6) EAW FD and 
the Transfer of Sentences FD is premised on the fact that it is the national community, or at 
least a local part of it, that the individual enjoys certain connections. The economic, social, 
cultural and perhaps even linguistic connections and efforts at integration are directed at the 
host (ie national) society. As with the operation of the social integration dimension of Union 
citizenship generally, its operation in this context serves to preserve and highlight the role of 
national communities as the site of social existence, while at the same time altering their 
exclusive character and rendering their borders more porous. 
 
At the same time, there are some indications that there is at least a Union-wide interest in the 
reintegration of Union citizens, making the Union as a whole a more socially cohesive and, 
by implication, a safer place. Rehabilitation tout court is cited as a goal of the EAW FD and 
indeed the Transfer of Sentences FD, not rehabilitation in the host society. It is simply that 
an individual is in a better position to be rehabilitated in a place closer geographically to his 
family connections and one with which he is culturally familiar. It is the individual interest, 
reflected and facilitated by Union law, that is at stake. Furthermore, the Court itself and 
Advocate General Bot have stressed in the context of expulsion cases that there is indeed a 
Union wide interest in the rehabilitation of offenders. In Tsakouridis the Court pointed out 
that Member States when deciding whether to expel an individual must be cognizant of ‘the 




his interest but also in that of the European Union in general.’
45
 The Advocate General on 
whose assessment the finding is based, highlighted the existence of freedom of movement;  a 
circumstance that rendered the ‘problem’ of the offender and the ‘solution’ of his 
rehabilitation of concern not just to the host Member State and/or the state of nationality, but 




Finally, we should not ignore the fact that in the operation of both of these instruments a 
Member State different to that which passes judgment carries out the sentence. While the 
calling to account for the wrong is done by the issuing Member State, it is the executing 
Member State that carries out the sentence. In effect the executing Member State is acting 
for the issuing Member State. For Duff punishment is essentially a communicative 
enterprise, in which the community expresses its disapproval of the wrongful conduct and 
attempts to enter into a processes of moral education of the offender.
47
 By delegating the 
carrying out of the sentence to the executing Member State, the issuing Member State 
delegates the communicative task of punishment to the executing Member State. The result 
is that the Member States collectively call to account and punish the individual concerned. 
The implication is that not only is there a collective, Union-wide interest in the rehabilitation 
of the offender but that there is a collective, Union-wide process of communicating 
disapproval. 
 
It is not therefore simply a national matter, but rather a supranational question. It is through 
transnational processes, free movement and social integration, that render a criminal a 
supranational concern, that give rise to the possibility of a Union interest and goal in the 
rehabilitation of individuals and a collective Union-wide exercise in communication of 
disapproval for wrongful conduct. Responsibility for that rehabilitation is shared amongst 
the national communities of the Member States according to criteria linking an individual to 
a particular community; both nationality and social integration. The concept of 
rehabilitation, combined with the logic of social integration, has reshaped and reordered the 
traditional system of allocating responsibility for individuals to particular states, has 
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rendered the borders of national communities more porous and has operated to reinforce the 
inclusion of a certain group of migrant Union citizens. At the same time it has also, 
indirectly, given rise to a shared goal amongst the Member States for the rehabilitation of 
individuals, both for their own interest and in the interest of the Union as a whole and a 





Social Integration II  
Wrongdoing and a Supranational Duty of Respect 
 
Introduction 
Integration, Rights and Duties 
 
Citizenship of the Union is first and foremost a transnational status of social integration. The 
most important rights of Union citizenship, arising from the internal market, of free 
movement and non-discrimination, can be seen as reflecting a broader right to move to and 
become a member of another society within the European Union. It empowers individuals, 
from a migration status within the discretion of sovereign national law, to a transnational 
citizenship status guaranteed by autonomous supranational law. Individual Union citizens 
now stand in a different relation to the other Member States of the Union. The institution of 
Union citizenship renders the borders of national communities more porous and flexible and 




The operational principle behind this process is that of social integration.
2
 The concept of 
social integration determines the relationship between the host Member State and the citizen. 
The rights of Union citizenship are intended to facilitate integration, in turn the more 
integrated an individual becomes the more rights he or she is entitled to. The goal is to 
firmly root an individual as a member in the society of another Member State. The operation 
of an exceptionally broad principle of non-discrimination in particular is intended to 
facilitate integration,
3
 but other aspects of Union citizenship including free movement based 
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rights, such as family reunification, are concerned with facilitating the social inclusion of an 
individual.
4
 This occurs in a material sense in allowing individuals to participate fully in the 
economic, social and even political life of the host society.
5
 It also operates in a symbolic 
fashion, by reducing instances where difference manifests between Union citizens and 
nationals.
6
 Social integration, in conjunction with the operation of a principle of 
proportionality and the principle of non-discrimination, has become the axis along which the 
extent of an individual’s membership in the host society and hence the responsibilities of that 




The relationship between rights and social integration is typically mutually reinforcing and 
progressive. Rights of free movement, residence and non-discrimination, access to the labour 
market and family reunification are granted to individuals in order to allow them to move to 
and engage in a process of integration into the host society. Union citizenship and in 
particular the status of permanent residence, is therefore intended to be ‘a genuine vehicle 
for integration into the society of the host Member State.’
8
 In turn the more integrated an 
individual becomes, the more rights he or she is entitled to. Or to put it more accurately, the 
less ability a Member State will have to legitimately discriminate against him or her in 
increasing areas of economic and social life. As well as being reinforcing, the relationship 
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has, until recently, been seen as operating exclusively in a progressive manner; rights and 
integration increase with each other. Union citizenship can therefore be seen as the basis of 
an impressive set of transnational rights vis-à-vis other Member States; national rights 
guaranteed by supranational law
9
 and operating according to a logic of integration. Like 
other forms of citizenship, it is a membership status complete with rights but it is one that 
operates within a unique political entity and one that functions primarily on a transnational 
basis.  
 
Union citizenship therefore determines a set of rights and responsibilities between Union 
citizens and the host Member State. However, that relationship is curiously lop-sided with 
rights held primarily by the Union citizen and the responsibilities in turn held by the 
Member State. What Union citizenship conspicuously appears to lack is a set of duties. 
While the Treaty proudly declares that ‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be 
subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties’
10
 the subsequent list contains no duties and 
commentators have struggled to find any other set of Union citizenship specific duties.
11
 The 
decline of citizenship duties is also apparent at a national level but at a Union level it is even 
more striking. Duties that may be considered ‘citizenship-type’ at a national level such as 





However, perhaps attempting to locate the duties of Union citizenship at a supranational 
level is misguided. Union citizenship is a transnational status and it is through transnational 
processes that duties are most likely to be created. A series of cases dealing with the effect of 
criminal activity on Union rights have challenged both assumptions regarding Union 
citizenship: the progressive relationship between rights and integration and in turn the 
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absence of duties on the part of Union citizens. Two areas in particular have been 
instrumental in this development: the interpretation of the new concept of ‘imperative reason 
of public security’ in expulsion cases and the effect of imprisonment on qualifying periods 
for residence rights under the Citizenship Directive. In assessing the effect of criminal 
activities on the integration process of particular individuals and the impact this may have on 
their rights under the Citizenship Directive the Court has fashioned a general duty of respect 
for the host society of the Member State. Social integration is therefore maintained as the 
principle by which the relationship between the individual the host Member State is 
regulated but, combined with a particular reading of criminal law, is used to rebalance it and 
impose obligations on Union citizens. While in appearance a duty under national law, this is 
in fact a distinct supranational duty, imposed by Union law and with consequences in Union 
law for the rights of Union citizenship; it is a supranational duty of respect for national 
communities.  
 
Crime as Wrong-Doing: Expulsion 
 
In two cases in particular, interpreting a new provision in the Citizenship Directive intending 
to provide additional protection for Union citizenship resident in other Member States for 
over ten years, the Court has in fact re-orientated the interpretation of the public policy and 
public security exception towards a normative perspective. This is even more apparent given 
the clear wording and expectations attached to Article 28(3) of the Citizenship Directive that 
spoke of threats to public security only.  
The Traditional View: Public Policy as Risk Minimisation 
 
Member States have always had the ability to expel Union citizens
13
 for having committed 
sufficiently serious crimes. The residual and exceptional power on the part of Member States 
to expel unwanted individuals was based on a catch-all public policy and public security 
derogation. For the most part considered synonymous, the terms are best understood as 
corresponding to the French term ‘ordre public’ - public order or more accurately public 
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 The criminal law, as a set of imperative rules designed to security the rights and 
freedoms of individuals,
15
 is necessarily a part of public policy.
16
 All criminal laws are 
therefore rules of public policy,
17
 even if not all public policy rules are necessarily reflected 
in criminal law.
18
 Criminal law is a subset of public policy rules, but a significant subset. 
That the public policy and public security derogation contained in Union citizenship covers 
criminal acts is beyond doubt.
19
 Most of the instances of expulsion are based precisely on 
criminal conduct of individuals. As the Commission pithily puts it: the Citizenship Directive 




While a prerogative of the Member States and a residue of the traditionally unlimited 
discretionary powers of the sovereign in this area,
21
 this power has always been 
circumscribed Union law. In particular, the principle of proportionality, in combination with 
the concept of social integration, has come to play an important role in its operation.
22
 The 
more integrated an individual, the more his or her interests would be harmed by expulsion 
and a greater risk would be required in order to expel him or her.
23
 The use of the 
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proportionality principle in this fashion draws explicitly and extensively from the caselaw of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right to respect for family and private 
life found in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
24
 It is also 
coherent with the general view of Union citizenship based on social integration and the 
mutually reinforcing and progressive relationship between social integration and rights of an 
individual migrant; the more integrated, the more links, familial, social, economic etc, one 
has established with the society of the host Member State, the more disproportionate an 
expulsion decision would be and the greater protection one enjoys from expulsion. The use 
of proportionality in this context therefore neatly dovetails with the overall operation of 
Union citizenship as a transnational status of social integration.  
 
It is important to note that in this view criminal law and in particular breaches of the 
criminal law are seen primarily as risks to public policy or public order; it is a harm based 
and future orientated assessment. Criminal activity is seen as disturbing public order and the 
security and safety of citizens. Sufficiently serious breaches of the criminal law are seen as 
manifesting threats on the part of the individual concerned to public policy and public 
security. It is the present threat posed (threat being a future and probability orientated 
assessment), rather than the past conduct that is important. The previous criminal 
convictions of an individual are relevant, but only insofar as they indicate a propensity to 
commit crimes in the future.
25
 The Court speaks of the ‘danger which the person 
represents’.
26
 Under this version of the proportionality assessment the social integration and 
the risk posed by the individual are balanced against each other as competing interests. To 
borrow from the ECrHR’s jurisprudence on which the Court of Justice draws: ‘[t]he Court’s 
task consists in ascertaining whether in the circumstances the refusal to renew the applicant’s 
residence permit struck a fair balance between the relevant interests, namely the applicant’s 
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right to respect for his family life, on the one hand, and the prevention of disorder or crime, 
on the other.’
27
 Social integration, and in particular the bonds created between the migrant 
individual and the host society be they familial, social or economic, are not undone or 
negated by the criminal act or the perceived threat to public policy and public security. 
Rather the threat or harm to one outweighs the harm to the other; it is simply a balancing 
exercise. 
 
The operation of public policy and in particular the executive discretion associated with it, is 
one of the main areas in which nationals differ from aliens.
28
 One could therefore be 
forgiven for thinking that with the advent of Union citizenship, in theory a legally reinforced 
and politically symbolic membership status different in kind from alienship, the discretion 
afforded Member States with respect to Union citizens would be further restricted and 
circumscribed.
29
 This was the Commission’s perspective, even before the adoption of the 
new Citizenship Directive,
30
 who in a Communication of 1999 noted that ‘[t]he new concept 
of citizenship of the Union should play a role in the overall assessment of the position of a 
Union citizen in case national authorities consider his/her expulsion or non-admission for 
reasons of public order, public security or public health. Article 18 of the EC Treaty [now 
Article 21 TFEU] should be accorded its full weight by national authorities when they 
contemplate the application of Directive 64/221/EEC to a Union citizen.’
31
 Indeed, in its 
comparison with third country nationals and in particular Turkish nationals, the Court did 
appear to recognise a new paradigm in expulsion cases instituted by the introduction of the 
concept of Union citizenship
32
 and in one case immediately before the transposition of the 
Citizenship Directive it invoked the oft-repeated formula of Union citizenship as the 
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This new, increased protection by virtue of the nature of Union citizenship, appeared to be 
also reflected in legislative developments with the Citizenship Directive introducing a new, 
graduated and improved system of protection for Union citizens and in particular those of 
longer residence in the host society. This new system reflected the principle of 
proportionality and its application in light of the concept of social integration.
34
 Three 
groups of Union citizens were established: a general category could be expelled for reasons 
of public policy and public security;
35
 a second category that held permanent residence could 
be expelled only for ‘serious reasons of public policy and public security’
36
 and a final 
category consisting of Union citizens resident for 10 years or more and minors could be 
expelled only for ‘imperative reasons of public security’.
37
 It will be noted that for the final 
category the Union legislature differentiated both in terms of degree and kind; the threat was 
to be more serious (‘imperative’) and it was also to be restricted to threats to public security, 
excluding reasons of public policy. The Commission for its part emphasised this distinction 
in its guidance on the implementation of the Directive stressing that ‘[i]t is crucial that 
Member States define clearly the protected interests of society, and make a clear distinction 
between public policy and public security. The latter cannot be extended to measures that 
should be covered by the former. Public security is general interpreted to cover both 
internal and external security along the lines of preserving the integrity of the territory of the 
Member State and its institutions. Public Policy is generally interpreted along the lines of 
preventing disturbance of social order.’ (emphasis in original)
38
 Thus while public policy 
might, in certain circumstances, refer to the public morality of a Member State,
39
 it would 
appear that public security would not. However, in its interpretation of the provision, the 
Court of Justice has taken a remarkably different approach.  
 
Public Security as Values 
 
In a pair of cases, dealing with the question of the expulsion of two Union citizens from 
Germany, the Court of Justice has interpreted Article 28(3) of the Citizenship Directive in a 
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strikingly different manner to that suggested by the Commission or a plain reading of the 
text.
40
 In a nutshell, it has interpreted pubic security in normative terms, allowing it to be 
defined as reflecting the fundamental interests of the society of a Member State based on its 
particular values and has allowed a moral assessment of the individual’s conduct to be used 
as a basis for his or her expulsion. In Tsakouridis the individual in question had been resident 
in Germany since birth with the exception of two brief periods during which he returned to 
Greece, the country of his nationality. After a number of convictions for petty crimes he was 
convicted for six years for drug possession and membership of a criminal organisation.
41
 In 
PI, an expulsion order was made following Mr I’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of 
his young step-daughter over a seven year period.
42
 In both cases what was at stake was the 
interpretation of new formula ‘imperative reasons of public security’ as distinct from simply 
‘public policy and public security’. Though its judgments, and in particular in a number of 
shifts between Tsakouridis and PI, the Court of Justice has interpreted imperative reasons of 
public security in terms of the host society’s values: it has focused not on potential harm to 
the integrity of the Member State and its institutions or its territorial integrity but rather on 
the wrongness and blameworthiness of the individual’s actions. 
 
Three shifts between Tsakouridis and PI contribute to this new understanding of ‘public 
security’; the collapse of any distinction between the concepts of public security and public 
policy and the consequential extension of the definition of public policy to cover public 
security; the definition of seriousness in terms of the blameworthiness of the act rather than 
any threatened harm and finally the individualised rather than systemic nature of the threat, a 
harm and wrong that while directly experienced by the individual is nonetheless shared by 
the host society. Together they point to a reorientation of the understanding of the expulsion 
power of Member States from a security measure aimed at future harms to a technique for 
imposing a general duty of respect for the host society’s values. 
 
Firstly, in PI the Court abandons any attempt to make a conceptual distinction between the 
notions of public policy and public security, instead defining both as reflecting the 
‘fundamental interests of society’ as arising from the particular values of the Member State 
in question. As noted above, Article 28(3) of the Citizenship Directive appears to make a 
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distinction in both degree and kind between public policy and public security on the one 
hand and imperative reasons of public security on the other. In Tsakouridis, the Court 
appears to endorse this difference in kind noting that public security specifically refers to 
‘the functioning of institutions and essential public services and the survival of the 
population’.
43
 However, in its application to the threat in question - drug trafficking - the 
Court gives it particularly wide scope, noting the systemic economic and social threats that 
drug trafficking (along with organised crime) poses to the ‘population as a whole or a large 
part of it’.
44
 In PI however the Court abandons any attempt to maintain a definitional 
distinction between its previous definition of public policy and public security and public 
security simpliciter. An imperative threat to public security is simply one that threatens a 
fundamental interest of society and the calm and physical security of the population (note 
how the caveat ‘as a whole or a large part’ is dropped).
45
 A threat to a ‘fundamental interest 
of society’ is the classic formula employed by the Court over decades in the context of 
expulsions for reasons of public policy.
46
 One would have expected a ground for expulsion 
based on public security alone to be different. The result is that ‘public security’ is to be 
defined according to the particular values of the host society. The only difference is that in 
order to invoke Article 28(3) of the Citizenship Directive, a Member State must establish ‘a 
particularly serious’ threat, something flowing from the imperative quality of such a reason. 
 
That seriousness however appears to be defined in terms of the moral blameworthiness of 
the individual and his act rather than the degree of harm or threat he may pose. An ambiguity 
existed in Tsakouridis on this point; on the one hand the Court noted that ‘drug addiction 
represents a serious evil for the individual’.
47
 On the other hand there was a concerted effort 
on the part of the Court to present drug trafficking (again linked to organised crime) as an 
activity that presented serious harms both to individuals and society at large.
48
 That 
ambiguity diminishes significantly in PI. The conduct of the individual in question is 
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regarded as particularly serious for a variety of reasons that stem more from the abhorrent 
and wrongful nature of the crime rather than the physical harm or certainly the future threat 
posed. The sexual exploitation of children is noted as a serious violation of the rights of 
children, as was the fact that it was committed against a minor and the fact that the 
perpetrator of the crime was in a position of responsibility.
49
 In its description of the case, 
relying on the referral from the national court, the Court of Justice notes the continuous 
suffering endured, the brutal nature of the crime and the perpetrator’s apparent lack of 
remorse.
50
 Some of these factors may be construed as elements pointing to the potential 
threat that Mr I continues to pose to the safety of other young girls and women. However, 
they are principally used to determine the blameworthiness of the crime in terms of past 
harm caused and moral culpability. There is an undeniable moralistic undertone in the 
Court’s consideration of Mr I’s conduct throughout the judgment. The seriousness appears to 
be related to the blameworthiness of Mr I’s actions - his mental state and culpability - rather 
than to any propensity for future harm. The suffering of the victim was indeed great and the 
culpability of Mr I clear. These point to the seriousness of the act certainly, but in terms of 
blameworthiness, rather than potential harm to the broader population. 
 
Indeed, the third shift from Tsakouridis  to PI is the individualised nature of the threat; the 
threat only impacted on a single individual rather than society as a whole.
51
 It would appear 
that Mr I was not part of a broader network, nor is there any evidence to suggest that he 
committed similar crimes outside the confines of the family home. The implication is that 
Mr I did not, nor would not, pose any threat outside that rather narrow context.
52
 In 
Tsakouridis the Court appears at pains to stress the systemic nature of drug trafficking as a 
crime, one with wide-ranging economic and social consequences beyond the immediate 
victims, a ‘diffuse crime’.
53
 In PI on the other hand, as noted by AG Bot, the crime did not 
present similar characteristics. Mr I was not part of a broader network, it was not an instance 
of the sexual abuse of children linked to the broader phenomenon of human trafficking, nor 
was it related to child pornography and its wider dissemination. There was no indication that 
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this was part of a broader threat to ‘the population as a whole’ as in Tsakouridis, rather the 
harm done and the supposed threat posed was to an individual. 
 
However, while targeted against an individual victim, it is important to note the social and 
public dimension of this wrong. The direct harm and suffering is borne by the individual in 
question, however it is framed by the Court in terms of an assault on the ‘fundamental 
interests of the society’ in question based on ‘its particular values’. These two positions can 
be reconciled by an appeal to the concept of ‘shared wrongs’.
54
 It is through the suffering of 
the individual that society, in this case the Member State’s society, is wronged. Through 
common membership, the public as a whole shares the wrong arising from the harm suffered 
directly by the individual; by harming one in such a serious and wrongful manner the moral 
outrage is felt by all. This is different from a generalised threat of harm to the population but 
it does render the private harm a public wrong.  
 
These three points – defining public security in terms of the fundamental interest of society; 
defining seriousness in terms of the blameworthiness of the act and allowing the derogation 
to be used in instances where the harm is to an individual rather than society – all point to a 
view of public security and the criminal law that is normative and defined in terms of values. 
It is not the harm or threat of harm caused to the state, its institutions or indeed the general 
population that is at stake. What is at stake is the offence caused by the perpetrator towards 
the host society by his wrongful acts and through the individual harm society as a whole is 
offended. It therefore appears to mark a shift from the previous conceptions of threats to 




The consequence of defining imperative reasons of public security in such terms is clear: the 
acts of the individual are seen as an offence against the community and a violation of its 
particular normative code as reflected in its criminal law. As a result that citizen can be 
expelled, or to use a more emotive language more appropriate to citizenship, exiled or 
banished. That exile is only understandable by placing this understanding of crime within the 
concept of social integration. Implicit in the judgment, and explicit in the Opinion of AG Bot 
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in PI, is a new understanding of the relationship between integration and criminal acts. The 
threat posed by the individual is no longer weighed against his or her integration as two 
competing but separate interests such that one balances out the other as is implied by the 
previous caselaw of the Court of Justice and of the ECrHR. There is a closer, more causal 
relationship between integration and criminal activity rather than a mere accounting 
exercise. The implication is that his or her criminal acts evidence a failure to integrate in the 
first place or indeed undoes any integration that may have been achieved. If the individual’s 
membership status is regulated according to his degree of integration then by breaching the 
particular society’s moral code and offending the host society, he or she demonstrates an 
attitude inimical to social integration. In the words of AG Bot: ‘Mr I’s conduct, which 
constitutes a serious disturbance of public policy, shows a total lack of desire to integrate 
into the society in which he finds himself and some of whose fundamental values he so 
conscientiously disregarded for years.’
56
 While the Court does not go so far as to draw that 
conclusion explicitly, its insistence on basing public security on the values of the host 
society and measuring seriousness in terms of blameworthiness reaches the same result. 
Rather than precluding a culpable individual from acquiring the status as proposed by the 
AG, it simply allows his blameworthiness to overcome the protection that status supposedly 
offers. 
 
Wrong-Doing and Integration: Residence Rights 
 
What was implicit in PI becomes explicit in cases dealing with the acquisition of residence 
rights by migrant Union citizens and in particular the effect of periods of imprisonment on 
the calculation of qualifying periods for permanent residence and the heightened protection 
found in Article 28(3) of the Citizenship Directive. In Onuekwere the Nigerian husband of a 
migrant Union citizen sought permanent residence in order to benefit from the intermediate 
level of protection from expulsion contained in Article 28(2) of the Citizenship Directive. 
National authorities however refused his application on the grounds that periods he spent in 
prison not only did not count towards the qualifying period of five years for permanent 
residence,
57
 but in fact broke the continuity of any such period.
58
 In MG, decided on the 
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same day, the Court made a similar finding in relation to a Union citizen seeking the 
heightened protection stemming from a ten year residence period and relying on the 
reasoning of Onuekwere. Mrs MG, having spent time in prison for the physical abuse of her 
children, was found not to be automatically eligible for the protection of Article 28(3) of the 
Citizenship Directive despite residence of more than ten years.
59
 In both judgments, in a 
rather strident tone, the Court explicitly adopted a view of the criminal law as both 
normative (a code of values) and as communitarian (of the host society). Combining this 
with an understanding of the rights of Union citizenship as a reward for a prior experience of 
integration, allowed the Court to come to the conclusion that criminal acts resulting in 
imprisonment either demonstrated a failure to integrate or undid or cancelled out any 




Prompted by a strong opinion from AG Bot, the Court in Onuekwere adopts an 
unambiguously normative view of the criminal law. The criminal law is seen as reflecting 
core values of a particular society and indicating the imperative rules of conduct individuals 
are to adopt in relation to each other and the community at large. There is no attempt to 
conceptualise the criminal law in term of harm or risk posed by an individual. Indeed, the 
normative basis of criminal law informs not only the basis of criminalisation but also the 
justification for punishment – both retributive and rehabilitation goals reinforce each other 
within a normative paradigm of crime and punishment. For AG Bot, imprisonment is ‘a 
period spent atoning for the crime committed’,
61
 a language remarkably close to Duff’s 
account of punishment as ‘secular penance’.
62
 Rehabilitation is necessary precisely because 
the individual has disregarded the value system of the host society (and hence failed to 





This view of the criminal law is not only normative but it is communitarian. The criminal 
law is a public law and it is one given by the community to itself; a ‘common law’ in the 
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literal sense of the word.
64
 For the Court it represents ‘the values expressed by the society of 
the host Member State’.
65
 In the eyes of AG Bot the criminal law ‘reflects the laws and 
values of…society.’
66
 Moreover it is linked to the notion of citizenship in particular: [n]eed 
it be recalled…that citizenship is for the citizen a guarantee of belonging to a political 
community under the rule of law?’
67
 Criminal law reflects duties that individuals owe to 
each other as members of a political community governed by law, the content of which  
arises from shared values; a clear endorsement of Duff’s view of the criminal law.   
 
This then is combined with a particular reading of Union citizenship and the role of 
integration in the acquisition of rights under the Citizenship Directive. On the one hand the 
‘qualitative dimension’ of integration is emphasised. On the other hand the causal 
relationship between integration and rights is reversed. Integration is seen as not merely 
temporal and geographical – ie mere presence in the host Member State for a certain period 
of time – but as also having ‘qualitative elements’.
68
 The term is borrowed from 
jurisprudence dealing with requirements of economic activity or self-sufficiency and 
arguably originally conceived of in the context of balancing the right migrant Union citizens 
to equal treatment with the hosts Member State interest in them not becoming an 
‘unreasonable burden’.
69
 What Onukwere does is take this material condition of economic 
contribution and transform it into a normative condition of respect for the values of the host 
society. There is also a shift in the relationship between integration and rights; whereas 
previously rights were seen as forming the basis for integration – allowing the migrant to 
participate fully in the life of the host Member State and hence become integrated – now 
rights, and in particular the rights associated with permanent residence, are seen as the 
reward for previously achieved integration; its acquisition is ‘subject to the integration of the 




The final piece of the reasoning of the Court is the link between integration and crime. 
Crime is seen as inimical to the values of the host society and represents a repudiation of its 
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moral code: ‘a transgression of the societal norms of the host Member State’.
 71 
In making 
this point, is important to highlight that it is not the period of imprisonment that concerns the 
Court or the Advocate General but the underlying crime ie the blameworthy act. The Court 
could very easily have decided that imprisonment amounted to a form of ‘internal exile’, a 
place socially and to an extent geographically removed from society, literally a place apart, 
and in which normal links with the broader society would be undermined or fail to form. 
Indeed this is the solution that was suggested implicitly by the German government who 
proposed that periods of imprisonment be treated analogously to periods spent abroad when 
deciding whether they break the continuous nature of the residence of an individual.
72
 The 
Court rejected that suggestion and indeed the Advocate General went even further, indicating 
that sentences of a quasi-custodial nature, such as partial release or supervision orders, 
should similarly be considered as breaking the integration links and hence preventing an 
individual from acquiring permanent residence.
73
 It is not therefore the absence of the 
individual that is at stake, rather it is the underlying wrongful act and hence responsibility as 
a moral actor in his or her dealings with the community. Furthermore, not only does criminal 
activity prevent integration taking place but in fact works to undo integration. This is 
evidenced by the finding that not only does criminal activity not count towards periods of 
residence but in fact breaks the continuity of any such periods; in the word of AG Bot any 




The conclusion from these premises – rights are the reward for integration; integration 
requires respect for values; crime represents a disrespect for values – is that criminal 
activities preclude an individual from acquiring rights under the Directive, either permanent 
residence in the case of Onuekwere or heightened protection in the case of MG.
75
 There is an 
impact on membership and duties and the relationship between them. Permanent residence 
in particular ‘goes beyond the mere right to reside and move within the territory of the 
European Union. It can create, for Union citizens, a feeling of being fully part of the society 
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of the host Member State’.
76
 That ‘being fully part of society’ however is conditioned on a 
normative commitment, one that requires acceptance and respect for the values of that 
society, an identification with the morals of the host society and a sharing of their worldview 
– or at least those elements that are reflected in their criminal law.
77
 Failure to respect those 
values results in exclusion, in a rejection of the membership promised by permanent 
residence and the maintenance of otherness. This exclusion of those deemed criminally 
deviant from membership in the community is not unique to Union law,
78
 although perhaps 
the explicit, rather than implicit, manner in which it operates is.
79
 What it represents is the 
appropriation of a certain tendency and a view of criminal law, exclusion and the 
community, and imports it within the workings of Union citizenship through the use of a 
normative view of criminal law within the operation of the social integration paradigm. 
 
Conclusion 
A Supranational Duty of Respect towards National Communities 
 
From these series of cases the Court has in fact used the concept of social integration 
inherent in Union citizenship and combined it with a normative and communitarian view of 
the criminal law to establish a set of duties for migrant Union citizens. However, while it 
may appear that the duty is of a passive and national character, it is in fact a more active, 
positive duty and one that is rooted in supranational law. There is therefore a combination of 
the transnational and supranational in constructing duties for Union citizens in this area. It is 
through national criminal law that the Union constructs a supranational duty which in turn is 
a duty of respect towards national communities. 
National Communities 
 
The content of the duties is to be found in national law and reflects national values. In both 
sets of cases the Court is at pains to emphasise that it is national criminal law that is at stake. 
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In Onuekwere there is no attempt on the part of either the Court or the Advocate General to 
impose any conditions flowing from Union law on what counts and what does not count as a 
‘wrong’ for the purposes of deciding whether an individual has failed to integrate or 
otherwise.
80
 In fact it is very clear that the criminal law is a code that reflects the national 
society’s set of values: [t]he imposition of a prison sentence by the national court is such as 
to show the non-compliance by the person concerned with the values expressed by the 
society of the host Member State in its criminal law’.
81
 Its wrongful character arises from the 
fact that it has been classified as such under national criminal law. The jurisprudence in the 
expulsion cases is also clear in emphasising the role of Member States in defining public 
policy and public security. These are seen as derogations from Treaty obligations and 
exceptions that reflect particular national interests and values.
82
 It is the ‘fundamental 
interests of the host society’ that may ‘vary from one country to another and from one period 
to another’.
83
 ‘Member States essentially retain the freedom to determine the requirements of 
public policy and public security’ and ‘European Union law does not impose on Member 
States a uniform scale of values as regards the assessment of conduct which may be 
considered to be contrary to public security’.
84
 This is particularly striking in the definition 
of public security, a concept one would imagine would be objective and unchanging between 
societies. 
 
Not only does the content of the duty of respect arise from national law but the target of the 
duty is also the national community. A crime is not a blameworthy act in a vacuum; it is 
committed against someone or something – it is a relational concept. Responsibility implies 
that we are answerable to someone for our actions.
85
 In the cases analysed it is a crime 
committed against the national community. It is the relationship between the individual and 
the host society that is at stake; the transnational relationship that stems from the primarily 
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transnational character of Union citizenship. This is why it is perfectly logical to expel or 
exile an individual from one Member State to another for an act, such as rape or a drug 
offence, despite the fact that these acts may be criminalised throughout the Union. A risk or 
harm based assessment would not allow for this; the individual is a danger no matter where 
he or she may reside within the Union. Similarly, from a supranational perspective expulsion 
is also problematic; if the act is a wrong against the Union the exact location of the 
individual is of little relevance.
86
 The expulsion only makes sense by conceiving of the crime 




However, these national values and the particular normative choices made by the Member 
States are increasingly framed by a supranational law. While there is no mention of Union 
law in cases dealing with the residence rights, in both Tsakouridis and in PI the Court does 
make reference to Union instruments that have been adopted in the areas of drug trafficking 
and the sexual exploitation of children.
88
 In a sense Union law and particular Union 
normative choices, are employed to validate the national choices made by Member States 
and to leave open the possibility of using those particular values and normative choices to 
clarify the duty of respect imposed on Union citizens. This is not quite the same thing as a 
Union value system, subsuming national determinations and replacing a national public 
policy with a Union public policy. It remains the national choice as reflected in national law, 
but there is a supranational presence in the field, not only in relation to controlling in a 
negative sense the discretion afforded Member States, but also in positively validating their 
choices, endorsing them on a Union level. The interaction between the national and 
supranational spheres in this area can be seen as a dialectic whereby national choices are 
reflected in Union instruments that in turn validate national choices, all the while leading to 
a greater convergence between individual, national communities while retaining those 
communities as distinct sites of self-determination and seen as autonomous moral entities 
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 It does not involve the gradual disappearance of a distinct national 
ground of public policy and hence the rationale for the exception in the first place.
90
 In fact, 
once one accepts that the ‘threat to public policy’ is in fact a wrong committed against a 
distinct national community, there is no reason why Member States cannot share the same 
concept of public policy and the normative choices that go with it, and retain an ability to 
expel a Union citizen for a breach of the duty of respect, the target of the duty being as 
important as the content. 
 
On its face this may seem as simply a negative duty to refrain from committing crimes. 
Nonetheless, one gets the impression from the Court’s language in the expulsion and 
residence rights judgments that there is in fact a more positive, albeit rather inchoate, duty 
imposed on the citizen. It concerns the appropriate attitude the migrant citizen is expected to 
adopt vis-à-vis the host Member State. This approach of seeing integration as partially a 
process of adopting a particular attitude is echoed in another area of the Court’s caselaw, in 
particular the imposition of integration requirements on third country nationals.
91
 To meet 
such requirements it is necessary that the individual in question ‘make an effort’ rather than 
meet some predefined linguistic or knowledge based standard. What is important is the 
attitude the individual adopts towards the host society, their willingness to integrate. As 
guests seeking membership of the community they are expected to reorientate their values in 
order to adopt the normative commitments of the host society. It is perhaps implicit and tacit 
but there is a positive requirement on the individual to at least demonstrate a certain attitude 
towards the host society. It is a deeper, thicker, normative and more social sense of 
integration.
92
 Such a conclusion is implicit in the relationship between crime and integration 
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discussed, particularly in the AG Bot’s Opinions in both PI and Onukwere and the judgment 
in Onukwere. The invocation of ‘qualitative elements’, drawing on the analogy of economic 
contributions from Dias,
93
 appears to set up a positive and active dimension in the 
integration process on the part of the Union citizen, apparently in opposition to the rather 




A Supranational Duty 
 
At the same time, this is a specifically European duty contained in Union citizenship and in 
particular Union citizenship as a status of integration. While the specific content of the duty 
is determined by reference to national criminal law and nationals are indeed subject to the 
same obligations, the nature of the duty and the consequences are different. For nationals it 
simply represents the duties co-citizens owe to each other in the context of a community of 
law, expressing particular moral choices, especially regarding appropriate mutual conduct.
95
 
In addition to the general duty under national law, it also represents a qualitative dimension 
to the integration process that they are subject to qua Union citizens. It is intimately linked 
to the integration process that itself is an integral part of Union citizenship. It is a duty 
imposed by Union law and with consequences in Union law, namely the temporary loss of 
rights of Union citizenship, in addition to whatever consequences may flow from national 
law. Furthermore, the Union, by endorsing the expulsion of criminal citizens and validating 
Member State’s normative choices in the area, can be said to be recognising the wrong done 
that national community and indirectly ‘punishing’ it through imposing consequences under 
Union law. It comes close to a supranational sharing of the national wrong, explored further 




What emerges from these cases is a duty of respect towards the values of the host society 
peculiar to Union citizenship reflecting both a re-balancing of the relationship of integration 
between the host-society and the individual, placing more emphasis on the role of the 
individual, and also a shift in the quality of that integration from an economic to a normative 
or indeed moral plane. Duties can be said to exist in Union citizenship, but operate at a 
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transnational level. Transnational obligations imposed by supranational law. It is through 
national criminal law that supranational duties are imposed on Union citizens and it is 
through transnational processes that common normative choices are affirmed at the level of 




An Area of Justice 
 
Shared Enforcement and Shared Recognition of National Wrongs 
 
The second transnational dimension of Union citizenship has been termed autonomy. It 
might be useful to add the addendum ‘in a single legal space’. For that is what is at stake in 
the concept of autonomy in the context of Union citizenship. On one level it is an exercise in 
quasi-mutual recognition, simply obliging Member States, through the use of the principle of 
free movement in particular, to recognise legal situations that arise in other Member States 
even where they differ from how those situations are regulated under their own legal 
regimes. The implication however is somewhat broader. As recognised by AG Sharpston, it 
enables individuals to passport legal situations throughout the Union; to enjoy a single legal 
status, composed of rights acquired under different national legal orders, throughout the 
Union.
1
 It generates a broader legal space, composed of different national legal orders, 
within which individuals can move. They do not remain tied to a particular national 
community but rather can travel throughout the territory of the Union. Their legal status is 
understood with reference to the wider Union as a whole. 
 
Thus while primarily transnational in character it does generates a supranational reference 
point; the totality of the Member States’ territory, that together form the Union territory. 
Indeed a link between this transnational aspect of Union citizenship and the supranational 
status constructed by the Court in Zambrano can be discerned. Though autonomy Union 
citizens can be said to occupy and share the ‘territory of the Union as a whole’, a phrase that 
is particularly prominent in the Court’s judgment in Zambrano and in subsequent cases.
2
 
Indeed, occupying this composite, plural legal space amounts in the Court’s eyes to the 
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‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by Union citizenship’ that 




Just as citizenship can be said to operate in a broader space of movement, criminal law has 
also been the subject of various efforts to create a single legal space. If anything the effort as 
creating a single ‘area of justice’ is even more explicit in the area of criminal law. Through 
the use of mutual recognition, a technique developed in the internal market and since 
exported (with various criticisms)
4
 to the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’,
5
 the 
Union has attempted to ensure that crime, or more precisely, criminal enforcement, too 
operates with reference to the territory of the Union as a whole. 
 
Two complementary aspects of this ‘area of justice’ are analysed in the following two 
chapters; the transnational enforcement of criminal law, in particular the operation of the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD)
6
 and the recognition of final 
judgments, most notably the operation of Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (CISA).
7
 Combined they are designed to create a single area of justice 
for the enforcement and recognition of crime within the Union. While the construction of the 
Area of Justice involves a far larger suite of mutual recognition instruments,
8
 this thesis 
concentrates on these two as the most prominent examples that have been analysed by both 
judicial and academic writing,
9
 those that are most closely connected with the free 
movement of persons
10
 and finally as two complementary instruments; both are designed to 
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ensure that an individual is called to account (and if necessary punished) for wrongs 
committed at least once within the Union, but only once.
11
 They are two sides of the same 
coin of an area of justice; justice for the community in ensuring that an individual is 
punished; justice for the individual in ensuring that that punishment only takes place once. 
 
The construction of this Area of Justice reinforces and complements Union citizenship. On 
the one hand, the free movement rights of Union citizens are directly reinforced by the 
existence of Article 54 CISA, a provision that is designed explicitly to maximise the 
opportunities of individuals to move throughout the Union. Indeed, this objective has been 
the main consideration to inform the interpretation of that provision by the Court of Justice. 
On the other hand, the EAW FD is a complement to Union citizenship. It is a shared 
enforcement mechanism for national criminal law and criminal judgments, that complements 
the free movement of responsibilities incurred under national criminal law with the free 
movement of rights associated with Union citizenship. A combination of these two 
instruments ensures that an individual’s status under criminal law, just as under civil law, is 
carried throughout the Union. Just as citizenship, crime is understood with reference to a 
broader legal space. 
 
This shared space is however a composite legal space, composed of the various Member 
States and the national communities they represent. It is national criminal law and national 
judgments that travel throughout the Union. It is similarly clear that it is against the 
individual Member State that the individual is deemed to have offended, who judges that 
individual and to which he or she must return to be judged in the case of the EAW FD. 
 
However, just as with the development of ‘autonomy’ within Union citizenship, the 
development of the single area of justice gives rise, in an even more explicit fashion to 
broader supranational phenomena that focus around the idea of a shared space.
12
 In the Area 
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of Justice this shared space has been overlain with normative content that has arisen directly 
from transnational processes. Certain common rights have developed for use in transnational 
enforcement, a common citizenship justifies it and common understandings of wrongful 
conduct, ie crimes, are also assumed by the EAW FD in particular. But the supranational 
phenomenon goes further; by participating in a system of shared enforcement and by 
creating a system of shared recognition of national calling to account, Union law has 
implicitly assumed a shared supranational community.  
 
In light of the national and transnational dimensions, it is argued here that that shared 
community is best understood as a composite community, whereby the wrong experienced 
by one Member State is shared by all and that the calling to account before one Member 
State counts as being called to account before all Member States. Crime, wrongful conduct 






An Area of Justice I: 
The European Arrest Warrant: 





Criminal law has long been considered one of the prerogatives of the sovereign state and is 
intimately to the concept of territorial control and the legitimate use of force.
1
 This nexus - 
between the legitimate use of force, territory and control - lies at the heart of the modern 
Weberian concept of the state and is one of the fundamental aspects of statehood that is 
being challenged by the development of the former third pillar and now Title V of the TFEU. 
A particular lighting-rod for attention and no little criticism has been the ‘flagship’ 
instrument of mutual recognition in criminal law matters; the European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision (EAW FD).
2
 It has been accused of prejudicing the rights of 
individuals
3
 and being based on a false analogy with the free movement of goods.
4
 The use 
of mutual recognition - a governance technique developed in the internal market for the free 
movement of goods - in the area of freedom, security and justice and especially in the area of 
judicial decisions in criminal matters has been viewed as generating instances of extra-
territoriality in the area of criminal law and the use of force, a development that threatens 
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territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Member States, the principle of legality and the 
fundamental rights of individuals. It has been subject to a number of challenges and 
resistances by national constitutional courts.
5
 Overall, it has been said to challenge the 




It does challenge this traditional nexus, however not in a manner one might immediately 
assume. It is wrong to assume that there is a simple extension of territorial jurisdiction 
beyond the state,
7
 allowing a Member State to exercise jurisdiction outside its own territory, 
imposing its law in the territory of other Member States, and hence raising problems of 
legality in particular. The territorial jurisdiction exercised by states in their criminal law is a 
part of criminal law that is defined for the most part by national law.
8
 This is generally 
defined in accordance with the territory of the state but there are circumstances when the 
state seeks to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction, largely based on personal jurisdiction.
9
 
Member States already claim extra-territorial jurisdiction in criminal law and the EAW FD 
does not change this in any way. It is certainly true that there is increasing change in 
traditional notions of territoriality in the context of national criminal law, linked to inter-
related social, economic and technological developments
10
 and that the EAW FD is an 
element in the response to the globalisation of crime. However, the EAW FD does not, in 
and of itself, alter national territorial jurisdiction. 
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Indeed, the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision is at pains to ensure that Member 
States retain priority regarding over the prosecution of crimes committed on their territory. 
Article 7(a) EAW FD provides that a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) can be refused in 
cases where the crime took place principally in the territory of the executing Member 
State.
11
 A requirement of reciprocity may also be imposed, allowing Member States to refuse 
to surrender where they do not themselves exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in similar 
cases.
12
 Similar provisions are found in other mutual recognition instruments such as the 
European Evidence Warrant (EEW).
13
 The question of extra-territorial jurisdiction is a 
sensitive one and treated as such by the EAW FD. Member States are quite simply not 
obliged under the mutual recognition instruments to accept the jurisdiction of other Member 
States over acts committed on their territory. While not denying the existence of extra-
territorial forms of jurisdiction it nonetheless prioritises the claims of the Member State on 
whose territory a particular criminal act took place.  
 
However, while EU mutual recognition instruments do not change the territorial jurisdiction 
of Member States’ criminal law, there is a truth in the idea that traditional concepts of 
territoriality and sovereignty are disrupted and that this development has had implications 
for the legitimacy of the EAW system. The mutual recognition instruments do imply a 
certain loss of control. But that loss of control is not over territorial jurisdiction per se; it 
does not imply that Member States are obliged to accept the jurisdiction of other Member 
States over their territory. What it does imply is a loss of control over how individuals on 
their territory are treated and the extent to which they are subject to the criminal justice 
system of other Member States. It is not extra-territorial jurisdiction that is at stake - indeed 
there are express provisions to prevent this occurring - but extra-territorial enforcement. The 
EAW FD creates a single area of enforcement for national criminal law under which 
Member States are obliged to participate in the enforcement of other Member State’s 
criminal law on their own territory. The result is that criminal enforcement now takes place 
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with reference to the combined territories of the Member States, with reference to the Union 
as a whole.   
 
However, in being obliged to enforce other Member State’s criminal law on their territory, 
Member States’ traditional controls over how the principles of legality and of fundamental 
rights are applied on their territory are undermined. The controls that normally ensure the 
legitimacy of the use of force on a particular territory are compromised; the transnational 
system of enforcement detaches legitimacy from territory. This is the real question raised by 
the EAW FD – how a system of transnational enforcement generating a single area of 
enforcement with multiple legal orders can function in a legitimate fashion when legitimacy 
is traditionally ensured by a national legal order imposing its particular controls on a 
particular territory.  
 
The answer lies in the supranational dimension to the area of justice. From a national 
perspective the EAW FD system does indeed raise serious questions regarding the 
sovereignty of states and the legitimate use of force. However, the legitimacy that is 
disrupted at a transnational level is reasserted at a supranational level though the 
development of common rights and norms regarding wrongful conduct. Moreover, Union 
citizenship, as a shared status that relates to precisely this single area of movement, also 
plays a role in ensuring the legitimacy of the EAW system. In doing so, it can even be said to 
imply a Union-wide community at a supranational level.  
 
Legitimising Punishment: Three Requirements 
 
The EAW FD challenges the legitimacy of criminal law enforcement in three ways in 
particular. The legitimacy of a particular community holding an individual to account and 
potentially punishing him for wrongdoing depends on identifying a particular moral standing 
of that community vis-à-vis that individual.
14
 For Duff this moral standing is assured through 
the status of citizenship and the link this creates between the individual and broader political 
community.
15
 This relationship of citizenship (or ‘guests’ for non-citizens)
16
 is a necessary 
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but not a sufficient condition for the legitimacy of that community’s actions in punishing an 
individual. Additionally, the wrong must be a public one - one that is of concern to the 
public. In other words it must be considered criminal by the community.
17
 Finally, the 
community must ensure that by affording certain rights and complying with certain 
standards of procedural justice it does not forfeit its right to call individuals to account and 
potentially punish them; it owes basic duties in its conduct towards others in order not to 




All three elements are challenged by the operation of the EAW system. Firstly, the EAW 
obliges Member States to recognise the authority of other Member States to punish their 
nationals. Secondly, the EAW has (partly) abolished the rule against double criminality. The 
purpose of the double criminality rule was to ensure that states, when participating in the 
enforcement of criminal law, would only cooperate in instances where they too considered 
the act to be a crime or a public wrong. Thirdly and finally, the EAW system prevents 
Member States from imposing any fundamental rights control on the process of surrender.  
 
It is true that from a national and transnational perspective the legitimacy of the EAW 
system is worrying.
19
 However, those elements of legitimacy that are disrupted at a national 
level – citizenship, legality and fundamental rights – are present in the operation of the EAW 
system, but at a supranational level. It is this supranational perspective that is essential to 
understand the legitimacy of the EAW and its implications on citizenship and on the 
structure of the Union’s political community. Citizenship, legality and fundamental rights, 
separated from national territory are relocated within a supranational space. It is in response 
to a process of transnational enforcement of national law that supranational values and 
ultimately a supranational community emerges. 
 
Legitimising Shared Enforcement I 
Shared Citizenship 
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Abolition of the Nationality Exemption 
 
Perhaps the most judicially contested aspect of the EAW system was the abolition of the 
nationality exemption. The nationality exemption was typically applied by states within the 
civil law tradition to shield their nationals from extradition to other States. Its justifications 
are many and varied and include a special relationship between the citizen and ‘his’ 
homeland, a general distrust of foreign jurisdictions, perceived biases against ‘foreigners’, a 
need to be judged by ones ‘natural peers’ or simply the practical difficulties that an 
individual might face in navigating a foreign legal system, often in a language he or she does 
not understand.
20
 It does not necessarily imply that the state does not believe the individual 
should be punished for wrongful behaviour. Indeed, states frequently undertook to ‘surrender 
or prosecute’ in the context of extradition clauses if they exercised a nationality exception 
and the exercise of personal extra-territorial jurisdiction by these states facilitated such an 
obligation.
21
 Within Duff’s theory it can perhaps be understood as a claim by the state of 
nationality that it is the most appropriate entity to try and punish a particular individual. 
 
As described in chapter 3 in more detail, the nationality exemption was not carried forward 
within the European Arrest Warrant system. Instead it was replaced by a modified principle 
allowing Member States to refuse surrender or impose a guarantee that an individual, be it a 
national or resident, can serve their sentence in the executing Member State.
22
 However, 
importantly, the individual remains subject to the issuing Member State’s law and is still 
called to account before that Member State, the only difference being that the sentence is 
carried out closer to home. The calling to account in the form of a trial still takes place 
before the issuing Member State; it is the punishment that is carried out by the executing 
Member State.
23
 Secondly, and as explored further in chapter 4, the entire rationale and logic 
of the new article is based not on nationality but rather on the principle of social integration 
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The abolition of this exemption was subject to a significant degree of resistance from 
national constitutional courts. The German, Polish, Czech and Cypriot constitutional courts 
were all seized with constitutional challenges to the national implementing legislation, with 
all but the Czech Court finding it in breach of national constitutional provisions preventing a 
national from being extradited. Characteristically, it was the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht or BvfG) that provided the most trenchant criticism for the 
Framework Decision and in doing so emphasised the special bond between the citizen and 
the state reflected in the prohibition on extradition. In its decision the BvfG highlighted the 
link between the nationality exception, the sovereign community and the individual. To be 
excluded from the state and subject to foreign laws was tantamount to an abrogation of the 
protection offered by the legal system of the state to a citizen when present on its territory. 
Indeed, such a procedure was equated to denationalisation or stripping an individual of rights 
inherent in citizenship and an analogy was drawn with the treatment of the Jewish 
community under National Socialism.
25
 Despite its perhaps (melo)dramatic rhetoric the 
BvfG in its remedy showed itself more concerned with territorial effect of the EAW and the 
risk of foreign law being applied on German territory.
26
 It therefore ordered the German 
Government to implement the territorial exception in order to render the implementing 
legislation constitutional.  
 
Union Citizenship and a Single Area of Justice 
 
The result of the creation of a system of shared enforcement is an altered relationship 
between the individual and both the executing and issuing Member States. The executing 
Member State must recognise the legitimate claims of other Member States over individuals 
located on its territory. The result is a certain weakening of the relationship between the 
executing Member State and its citizens. Conversely, the relationship between the issuing 
Member State and the community it represents (and potentially all Member States in the 
Union) and the individual is also affected. Any individual may now be called to account 
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anywhere in the Union for an offense committed against that Member State. These national 
responsibilities attach to an individual and may be enforced within a wider geographical 
area. Just as rights attach to individuals and are transported or passported throughout the 
Union, responsibilities are similarly placed in a broader space of movement and are 
enforceable anywhere in the Union.  
 
There is a certain correspondence between the transnational rights associated with free 
movement and the transnational responsibilities, which is rooted in the status of Union 
citizenship. Both rights and responsibilities operate in a similar fashion of mutual 
recognition and both are justified by a similar membership structure based on transnational 
movement and multiple, potential membership in a plural set of communities that together 
form a broader space of movement. Just as autonomy and choice lie at the heart of mutual 
recognition of rights associated with free movement, that same freedom and choice can be 
seen as legitimising responsibilities incurred in other Member States through a process of 
consent.
27
 Individuals are given the opportunity to move to other Member States and there 
enjoy certain rights as part of a broader status and in doing so subject themselves to 
responsibilities.   
 
In opposition to the BvfG, this view of Union citizenship and the correlation between with 
free movement and responsibilities, has been noted by the Czech Constitutional Court. For 
the BvfG Union citizenship is a status that merely supplements national citizenship with a 
set of extra rights, and does not change it in any fundamental way. It is simply an extension, 
a set of rights added on without affecting the nature of national citizenship itself and without 
changing the relationship with the state of nationality and the guarantees that go with it and 
in particular does not justify the setting aside of the traditional protection from extradition 
contained in the German Basic Law.
28
 The Czech Constitutional Court on the other hand 
took a more organic view of the relationship between Union citizenship and national 
citizenship. Not only is Union citizenship a set of additional rights – an extension of national 
                                                 
27
 Richard Bellamy, ‘A Duty-Free Europe? What's Wrong with Kochenov's Account of EU Citizenship Rights’ 
(2015) 21 ELJ 558, 564-6. Bellamy is not speaking specifically of responsibilities incurred through criminal law 
(in Duff’s terms the responsibility to answer for wrongdoing) but rather civic responsibilities in the abstract. 
Nonetheless there is no reason such a reasoning cannot be applied in the current case. There are of course classic 
problems associated with legitimacy through consent and the contract tradition from which it emerges, a 
discussion of which is outside the scope of this thesis. See Dudley Knowles, Political Obligation: A Critical 
Introduction (Routledge 2010) chs 7-8. 
28
 Re Constitutionality of German Law Implementing the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant (n 




citizenship rights – but it alters and changes certain aspects of national citizenship, in 
particular by recognising responsibilities to other Member States. The link between free 
movement, Union citizenship and responsibilities is recognised by the Czech Constitutional 
Court for whom Union citizenship introduces ‘[a] qualitatively new situation...Citizens of 
the Member States enjoyed, in addition to rights arising from citizenship in their own State, 
also rights arising from EU citizenship, which guaranteed, among other things, free 
movement within the province of the entire Union….If Czech citizens enjoyed certain 





It is important to note that in the Czech Constitutional Court’s judgment it is not the rights 
per se that ground the responsibility in a form of quid pro quo but the status of citizenship 
and the broader transnational membership relationship that is established by virtue of Union 
citizenship. While rights and responsibilities form the content of the membership status, 
there is no implication that an individual must have exercised or indeed be capable of 
exercising rights in order to hold responsibilities. It is the status rather than the enjoyment of 
specific rights that is important and that legitimises the imposition of responsibilities. Union 
citizens stand in a particular form of moral and political relationship to other Member States 
of the Union; a relationship that for the Czech Constitutional Court legitimises their being 
directly subject to the criminal law of those states and justifies the removal of protections 
that states typically offered individuals that fell within their jurisdiction.
30
 Union citizenship 
is an integral part of national citizenship and changes the meaning of national citizenship. By 
virtue of being Czech one must also accept responsibilities towards France, Estonia etc. This 
is why the exercise of some form of special protection vis-à-vis other states in the Union is 
no longer justified.  
 
This link with the status of citizenship is important in Duff’s account for founding authority 
to punish and goes some way towards legitimising the more controversial aspects of the 
EAW FD. In order for a particular body to have the right to punish an individual it must have 
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a particular the moral standing vis-à-vis that individual.
31
 That moral standing is based on a 
relationship of belonging to a particular community that generates a network of interactions 
and ties, and ultimately rights and responsibilities. Due to the special bonds formed by 
Union citizenship, Member States have the requisite moral standing in order to legitimately 
call individuals to account regardless of where they are located within the Union. And 
importantly, other Member States may not intervene to prevent that occurring. Just as 
Member States must respect the rights granted by other Member States, they must respect 
the responsibilities owed those Member States and the right of other Member States to 
enforce those responsibilities. 
 
There is however a different structure in the enforcement of these responsibilities compared 
to rights acquired under Union law that emphasises the enduring national character of the 
wrong committed by an individual. The individual citizen typically acquires rights in a 
particular Member State, moves to another Member State and it is that, second, Member 
State that is under an obligation to enforce or respect those rights. The rights acquire a free-
floating character. Thus an individual may move to Ireland, there be joined by his or her 
family members and subsequently move to France. France under those circumstances is 
obliged to recognise the right to family unification in these circumstances and take 
appropriate measures, such as the issuing of residence permits. Under the EAW system and 
the system of the free movement of responsibilities there is an additional stage involved, 
returning the individual to the original Member State, thereby rendering the process more 
circular. The responsibility is owed to the first Member State and remains owed to the first 
Member State, the obligation placed on the second Member State is merely transitory; to 
detain and surrender an individual and return him or her to the original Member State. 
Unlike rights, responsibilities created under national criminal law remain clearly linked to a 
particular Member State. Not only are they created under a particular Member State’s 
national law but they are owed, and remain owed to that particular Member State; they do 
not detach from a particular community and float throughout the territory of the Union in the 
same manner as rights. 
 
Responsibilities therefore play out in a broader space, which shifts between supranational, or 
Union-wide, and national. Union citizens occupy a broader space of movement in which a 
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political status involving rights and responsibilities is established with a number of separate 
national communities. It is a single space of movement within which national 
responsibilities are enforced. The image of a single area of justice is not simply rhetorical 
but refers to a very real space with reference to which Union citizenship operates including 
both rights and responsibilities. And it is on this single, supranational space that the issues of 
legality and rights, detached from national territory re-emerge. 
 
Legitimising Shared Enforcement II 
Shared Wrongs 
 
This moral standing between the issuing Member State and the individual established 
through Union citizenship explains to some extent the obligation placed on the executing 
Member State to participate in a system of shared enforcement. However, it is not sufficient. 
For Duff, the justification for punishment emerges not just from the status of citizenship but 
also from the determination of conduct as publically wrongful in the eyes of the community. 
It must be a wrong that concerns the public and moreover it must concern that particular 
public or community.
32
 Thus, while the wrongs we are concerned with in the system of 
shared enforcement remain fundamentally (trans)national that is not to say that there is not a 
certain shared dimension to them, both in conception and experience, that justifies shared 
enforcement and implies a broader supranational community. 
Abolition of Double Criminality 
 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision 
was the abolition of the double criminality rule. The EAW FD in principle abolishes the rule 
of double criminality, it may be reintroduced by Member States as an optional ground for 
refusal but this exception will not apply to a set list of thirty two categories of core crimes, 
such as murder, rape and theft and certain cross-border crimes subject to the Union’s 
approximation competence under Article 83(2) TFEU.
33
 It therefore abolishes a strict rule of 
double criminality for potentially all crimes, and certainly for a list of thirty-two categories 
of core crimes. Furthermore, the criminal nature and classification of the act is determined 
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by the requesting Member State, a determination that must be accepted by the Member State 
of execution. 
  
The rule of double criminality has frequently been described as a specific application of the 
general principle of legality in criminal law, that an act should not be punishable unless it is 
forbidden by sufficiently clear and validly adopted law or more specifically the principle of 
nullum poena sine lege (no punishment without law), the argument being that to arrest and 
detain an individual in a particular state for an act that that state does not in fact consider 
criminal, would amount to an illegal deprivation of liberty in the absence of a crime and a 
violation of his or her right to liberty. It has therefore been linked to both general legal 
principles and the fundamental rights of individuals. In this view legality is strictly tied to 
territoriality; in order for any steps in enforcement to take place the act must be considered a 
crime by the legal order that operates on that particular territory.  
 
The EAW FD does not abolish the principle of legality but rather separates it from strict 
considerations of territory. The crime the specific act for which the accused individual is 
being sought, is a crime as defined by law. Indeed, it is defined as such by the most 
appropriate law, that where the act was committed or by the community whose interests 
were adversely affected. Crimes as wrongs are relational acts and take place with reference 
to a particular community; it is by reference to the law of that community that the legality or 
otherwise of the crime should be assessed.
34
 This is precisely the position that has been 
adopted by the Court of Justice. In Advocaten voor de Wereld the plaintiffs, a Belgian NGO, 
raised a complaint based on the violation of fundamental rights, including the principle of 
legality.
35
 The Court in its answer pointed out that the European Arrest Warrant Framework 
Decision does not classify an act as criminal or otherwise; that is for the national law of the 
issuing Member State. The EAW FD is merely an instrument of mutual recognition of a 
national act. The act is therefore validly classified as a crime under the appropriate national 
law, in this case the law of the requesting Member State.
36
 It replaces national legality with a 
form of transnational legality.  
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What is really at stake is the participation of the executing Member State in the enforcement 
of another Member State’s criminal law and how it reconciles this with its particular 
normative choices regarding what acts should be classified as criminal. Through the rule of 
double criminality the requested state insists that any use of force on its territory complies 
with its own understanding of what acts should attract criminal liability. For Peers ‘[s]ince 
sovereign States are free to take different views as to what should be criminalized and to 
what extent, and these differences are rooted deeply in different cultures and national 
identities and represent different choices resulting from the democratic process in each State, 
why should States in principle be obliged to assist another State to apply its criminal law 
where the two States differ on whether the relevant act should be criminalized?’
37
 What is at 
stake is the extent to which a Member State can be obliged to enforce on its territory the 
normative choices made by another Member State. 
 
Shared Conception of a Wrong  
 
However, in truth the EAW FD does not entirely abolish the double criminality rule; it 
establishes a presumption that it would be met in all relevant cases. The implication is that 
there is a shared conception of the wrongful character of certain actions throughout the 
Union. It will be recalled that the requirement of double criminality is abolished definitively 
for a list of 32 categories of crimes. This list is not random. The Court of Justice has claimed 
that the ‘serious’ character of these crimes justifies their placement on the list.
38
 That may be 
somewhat misleading. There is a relationship with ‘seriousness’, as indicated by the de 
minimis rule contained in art 1(3) EAW FD limiting the use of the EAW FD to offences that 
carry a certain minimum sentence.
39
 However, the ‘seriousness’ here is a label for their 
centrality to a common understanding of the core elements of a criminal justice system 
                                                 
37
 Peers (n 4) 24-25. Indeed, originally the double criminality rule was an expression of the rule of reciprocity in 
relation to criminal norms and only later came to be considered as an individual right. See Lech Gardocki, 
‘Double Criminality in Extradition Law’ (1993) 27 Israel L Rev 288, 289 
38
 Advocaten voor de Wereld (n 35) para 57.  
39
 The question of proportionality has also been used by some national courts as a reason to refuse surrender, 
considering detention and surrender for a minor offence would be a disproportionate interference with a suspects 
rights (particularly if a family life is involved) see Minister for Justice and Equality v Jaroslaw Ostrowski 
[2012] IEHC 57. Although note this ruling was reversed on appeal to the Irish Supreme Court. The Commission 
for its part does believe proportionality should play some role in the EAW system but is a matter to be assessed 
by the issuing Member State; the role of the executing Member State remains a formal one. See European 
Commission, Report from the Commission on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 




rather than any heightened level of harm or other moral transgression. After all minor thefts 
that may fall within the scope of the EAW FD can hardly be considered ‘serious’ in terms of 
harm caused or inherent moral blameworthiness. Rather it is the centrality to a system of 
criminal law that protects the person and property that marks it as serious. These are acts 
against the person and against property that form the core of any system of criminal law 
concerned with protecting the liberty and interests of individuals. Indeed, they would 
generally be seen as falling within the category of mala in se – acts whose wrongful 
character arises independent of legal regulation and form the basis of a shared common 
denominator regarding acts that should be criminal.  
 
It might be argued that some of the areas of crime contained in article 2(2) EAW FD do not 
fall into the category of mala in se or classic crimes against the person or property such as 
corruption, counterfeiting and computer related crime. Yet again there is an assumption that 
all Member States share the wrongful conception of these crimes, not through some shared 
heritage of the criminal law, but this time through a shared understanding expressed through 
both primary and secondary Union law. These crimes tend to be precisely those for which 
the Union has competence to enact approximation measures and which have a cross-border 
dimension.
40
 The presumption is that by regulating such matters at a Union level a certain 
equivalence is assured. The double criminality rule is not disapplied; it is simply presumed 
to have been met through a shared supranational framework. 
 
It is therefore the shared judgement of their wrongful character and the appropriateness of 
their criminalisation amongst Member States that justifies the abolition of a formal condition 
of double criminal in these instances. The abolition of the double criminality rule does not 
mean that it is no longer necessary for these acts to be classified as criminal in all Member 
States. On the contrary, it is precisely because these acts are considered criminal by all 
Member States – either through their historical centrality to a criminal justice system or 
through approximation measures at a Union level - that there is no need to apply a rule of 
double criminality. These are acts that in the view of all Member States are wrongful and 
properly concern the public. This is precisely the understanding of AG Ruiz-Jarabo in 
Advocaten voor de Wereld when dismissing the requirement of double criminality. Such a 
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requirement would be ‘outmoded since the participants in the procedure (Member States) 
both regard the conduct which gives rise to the request as criminal…for the reasons stated, 




Shared Experience of a Wrong? 
 
However, in order for its punishment to be justified, a particular act must not only be 
considered a public wrong in the abstract by a particular community but it must concern that 
particular community; it must be a wrong against that community.
42
 Does this shared 
conception of a wrong translate into something deeper – a shared experience of the wrong 
and hence the reflection of a wider supranational community capable of being wronged in 
this sense?  
 
For Lööf the EAW system assumes a single social contract throughout the Union.
43
 The 
social contract is established as a mechanism for regulating relations between individuals 
inter se and in the field of criminal law amounts to a mutual commitment to restrict freedom 
for the promotion of liberty. The legitimacy of state action and the use of force arises from 
this network of horizontal relations established between citizens through the social contract 
and the implicit consent that goes with it.
44
 In order for the EAW system to be considered 
legitimate the system of shared enforcement it involves implies that political relations are 
established not simply within a particular Member State but amongst individuals throughout 
the Union; that the Union represents a single social contract. 
 
The truth is perhaps somewhat more nuanced. The legal provisions and the responsibilities 
they establish imply not a single social contract, or rather not a single homogenous and 
undivided social contract between Union citizens but a plural, differentiated social contract 
mediated by national political communities. Within the operation of the EAW system the 
crime remains (trans)national and is directly experienced by national communities. It is in 
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accordance with national criminal law that the act is considered wrongful and its seriousness 
is likewise assessed according to national criminal law. More importantly, as described 
above, in contrast to the enjoyment of rights, in the enforcement of transnational 
responsibilities the role of the executing Member State is transitory. The individual is 
returned to the issuing Member State to stand trial or to serve punishment. The calling to 
account and the secular penance is served vis-à-vis the issuing Member State – the Member 
State against whom the wrong has been committed.
45
 The executing Member State acts 
merely as an agent for the issuing Member State in a specific, intermediate role – that of 
detaining and returning the individual. The wrong is still considered primarily against the 
issuing Member State. And the direct victim of the offence is the political community it 
represents; it remains a (trans)national rather than a supranational wrong. 
 
However, that is not to say that in addition to the wrong to the national community, there is 
no supranational wrong. The concept of a shared wrong, developed by Duff and Marshall in 
the national context in relations between individual citizens, may be applied by analogy.
46
 
For Duff and Marshall a wrong directly experienced by an individual becomes a matter of 
public concern not (simply) because of its potential effect on public order and the need to 
secure a law abiding environment within which individuals can enjoy their rights.
47
 The 
‘publicness’ of the wrong is more fundamental. It is because of the direct victim’s standing 
as a member of the community that the wrong is in fact shared by the community as a whole. 
It is because an individual has harmed one that he harms all; it is through the harm and 
suffering of the individual that the community is harmed vicariously.
48
 The same logic could 
be applied as between Member States who are members of the same meta-community; 
because you have directly wronged one community, you have indirectly wronged all 
communities. There is therefore a supplementary, indirect and vicarious supranational 
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dimension to the wrong that involves the entire Union. The wronging of one national 
community is of public concern for the Union as a whole. It is through the commission of a 
national wrong that the supranational interest is engaged and hence the participation of all 
Member States in a system of shared enforcement is justified. This reconciles the undeniable 
national character of criminal wrongs - as seen not only by the structure of enforcement but 
also in the interaction of the principle of social integration with criminal law
49
 - with the role 
of all other Member States in the enforcement of that wrong. 
 
The wrong is now assessed with reference to the Union as a whole, it is in a sense 
experienced throughout the Union and the Member States collectively share a conception of 
the wrong. The act is considered wrongful and criminal throughout the territory of the 
Union. The national normative judgment regarding what acts are criminal that is detached 
from national territory through transnational enforcement re-emerges at a supranational 
level. The principle of legality is met in a two-fold transnational and supranational sense; on 
the one hand the formal legality of the criminal prohibition is assessed under the law of the 
issuing Member State through a transnational form of legality; it is under this law that the act 
is formally designated as criminal and the individual punished. However, that is 
supplemented by a supranational endorsement that implies a shared understanding of the 
wrongful character of the act throughout the Union and that justifies the executing Member 
State’s participation in the enforcement of that law. The common supranational conception 
and experience of the wrong supports the claim of transnational legality and underpins the 
transnational enforcement. 
 
There is therefore a complementarity between the operation of the EAW FD and the shared 
system of enforcement it creates and the operation of the ne bis in idem principle found in 
Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA).
50
 As described 
in further detail in Chapter 6, through an interpretation of the principle contained in Article 
54 CISA motivated by the need to secure the free movement of individuals, the Court of 
Justice has been led to construct a single status for individuals with reference to a single 
territory. This in turn implies that an individual’s wrongful conduct is considered with 
reference to the Union as a whole and that by being called to account before a single 
Member State he is called to account indirectly for the Union as a whole.  
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Legitimising Shared Enforcement III 
Supranational Rights  
Legitimacy and Rights 
 
The final element in the legitimacy of criminal enforcement and punishment relates not to 
the relationship of the community with the individual or the individual’s actions but with its 
own conduct. Legitimacy is a function of the belief a particular actor has that power is 
exercised in conformity with accepted norms.
51
 The legitimacy of the EAW system therefore 
must also rest on a shared belief in the justice of the underlying criminal procedures. In order 
to participate in the system of shared enforcement Member States and individual actors – 
judges, prosecutors and perhaps above all suspects - should be confident in this element of 
the legitimacy of punishment – that of competence in protecting the rights of the accused 
and ensuring a just outcome;
52
 because they are being asked to participate in the enforcement 
of another Member State’s criminal justice system, their belief in its compliance with certain 
norms is also of relevance. It is this third element of legitimacy that has given rise to the 
problem that is mutual trust.  
 
Mutual trust and its relationship with mutual recognition present a paradox; the greater the 
absence of equivalent measures the greater the need of mutual trust, but it is precisely the 
absence of equivalence that renders the existence of trust less likely.
53
 Mutual trust - either in 
the internal market or in the area of freedom, security and justice - requires a certain degree 
of equivalence.
54
 Commentators have deplored the lack of equivalence in the operation of 
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the EAW FD and hold this up as the underlying basis for an absence of mutual trust and 
hence the problems of legitimacy associated with the EAW FD.
55
 The accusation is that 
executing Member States are being obliged to participate in the enforcement of the issuing 
Member State’s criminal law but in the absence of any guarantees that the issuing Member 
State’s procedures comply to the same extent with basic norms of procedural justice. 
However, while it is true that there has, until recently, been an absence of any explicit 
harmonised regime in the area of criminal justice in the area of rights, that situation is - 
albeit slowly - changing, as the Treaty of Lisbon introduces a legal basis for procedural 
harmonisation and the Union legislature responds to the criticisms levelled by scholars and 
practitioners. Furthermore, this ignores the presence of certain common standards of 
fundamental rights present at a Union level that emerges from the caselaw of the Court of 
Justice. 
 
Abolition of National Fundamental Rights Control 
 
States may refuse to cooperate in extradition proceedings where they fear an individual’s 
fundamental rights might be prejudiced.
56
 The reasoning behind this is clear: the extradition 
of an individual to a state where he or she would be subject to violations of his or her 
fundamental rights would amount to complicity in a breach of the very standards that the 
extraditing state undertakes to uphold. It would in effect be co-responsible for a violation of 
fundamental rights, an act that according to its own legal order is forbidden. Again the link 
between the norms of a particular legal order and the territory of the state is clear; any use of 
force on the territory of the state must be in accordance with fundamental rights guarantees 
of that particular legal order.  
 
Upon the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision it was unclear 
whether Member States could still impose a control based on fundamental rights, or, to put it 
another way, whether a potential breach of fundamental rights would constitute a valid 
reason for refusing to surrender an individual. Some authors claimed that Member States 
were indeed still subject to fundamental rights obligations and that consequently a possible 
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breach could form a valid exception.
57
 They pointed in particular to obligations held by the 
Member States by virtue of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)
58
 on the right to a fair trial. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
held that Contracting Parties are prohibited under Article 6 ECHR from extraditing an 
individual where there would be a real risk that his or her rights under Article 3 ECHR on 
the prohibition on torture or degrading treatment would be violated.
59
 The strength of this 
argument would appear to be reinforced by Recital 12 of the EAW FD itself, which affirms 
the framework decision’s compatibility with fundamental rights and Article 6 TEU and the 
Charter of Fundamental Right (CFR) in particular and Article 1(3) EAW FD stating that the 
Framework decision shall not modify fundamental rights obligations under Article 6 TEU.
60
 
On this basis, when implementing the EAW FD into national law, some Member States 
included an express provision allowing or requiring refusal to surrender an individual where 




However, the general rule of the framework decision is that mutual recognition and 
surrender should be automatic. The only grounds for refusal are the mandatory and optional 
grounds listed in Articles 3 and 4. These grounds are exhaustive. While there are guarantees 
and protections for specific violations of fundamental rights, for example for in absentia 
trials, there are no grounds for refusal on a general fundamental rights ground. Recital 12 
could be read simply as a reference to the general principle that all Union acts must comply 
with the fundamental rights standards of the Union in their operation, rather than founding a 
specific grounds for refusal to surrender. Indeed, in assessing the Member State’s 
implementation of the framework decision, the Commission has argued that there is no right 
to refuse to surrender based on fundamental rights.
62
 Furthermore, recital 12 of the EAW FD 
stresses the principle of mutual trust in the operation of the framework decision and that its 
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suspension may only take place after a determination by the Council that a serious and 
persistent breach of the ECHR has taken place with respect to a particular Member State.
63
 
The Court has confirmed that Member States may not refuse to surrender based on a 
fundamental right found in the national legal order based on the principles of effectiveness 
and primacy.
64
 Thus Member States are not entitled to subject their participation in the EAW 
system to fundamental guarantees typically contained in the national legal order. However, 
that is not to say that there is no fundamental rights protection. Instead, the fundamental 
rights that are set aside at a national level are replaced by a common, supranational 
conception of fundamental rights.
65
 Furthermore, the Union legislature has, in recent years 
been active in developing a common set of supranational procedural rights. 
 
Supranational Procedural Rights 
 
The elaboration of EU criminal law and mutual recognition instruments in particular enjoyed 
a major boost following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011.
66
 Like much criminal law 
of the period, EU criminal law was security driven and focused on effective enforcement.
67
 
The recently created AFSJ was accused of being heavy on security and light on freedom and 
justice
68
 with security being the key term in the discursive chain linking freedom, security 
and justice.
69
 The tide began to turn somewhat with the coming into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the introduction of the Stockholm Programme in 2014.
70
 A new focus on 
procedural rights emerged to compensate for the perceived security bias. A procedural rights 
roadmap was adopted in which the institutions undertook to adopt measures in four key 
areas;
71
 translation and interpretation; information regarding rights of accused persons; legal 
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advice and the right to communicate with lawyers and third persons and finally specific 
measures regarding particularly vulnerable accused persons. In addition, the Roadmap 
promised a green paper on the issue of pre-trial detention. Legislation has been adopted with 
respect to three of these measures; rights to interpretation and translation;
72
 rights to 
information
73




These measures are an explicit effort to strengthen mutual trust within the context of mutual 
recognition. As with substantive criminal law competence under Article 83(2) TFEU,
75
 there 
is no autonomous competence to develop a body of procedural rights for individuals; it is 
seen merely as an ancillary mechanism of underpinning the operation of mutual recognition 
instruments through reinforcing mutual trust. This ancillary function is stressed by the 
instruments themselves, all of which directly reference the problem of mutual trust in the 
context of the free movement of judicial decisions in their recitals.
76
 The link with the 
problem of mutual recognition and the EAW FD in particular is further underlined by the 




However, despite their ancillary nature, these measures nonetheless do both create and 
presume a certain common standard and even common content of procedural rights across 
the Union. On the one hand they do create certain justiciable procedural rights under Union 
law, enforceable before the courts of Member States in a variety of key areas, most notably 
the right to a lawyer.
78
 Moreover, all these instruments refer to rights contained in the ECHR 
and in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and the CFR and therefore considered common to the 
Member States. Furthermore, although concerned with information to rights and access to 
resources such as legal advice and translation, leaving the exact content of those rights to be 
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determined by national law, in some areas these directives assume a common core of 
substantive rights. Thus in the Directive on the Right to Information Member States are 
obliged to inform suspects regarding rights to access a lawyer and the right to remain 
silent.
79
 Suspects are subsequently to be provided with a Letter of Rights outlining rights to 
access the materials of the case and the length they can be detained before being brought 
before a judicial authority, implying those rights do in fact exist under national law.
80
 
Similarly, the Access to a Lawyer Directive references not only the right to be able to access 
a lawyer, but also the consequences of not having access to a lawyer on legal proceedings 
and the admissibility of evidence obtained under such circumstances,
81
 again assuming a 
certain common standard regarding circumstances under which evidence may be excluded in 
criminal proceedings. 
 
While perhaps arriving somewhat late in the day and advancing in a piecemeal fashion, a 
common set of procedural rights is emerging through Union law as a direct consequence of 
mutual recognition instruments. This is occurring both directly – as certain core rights, such 
as the right to access a lawyer are codified by Union law – and indirectly, as underlying 
rights of information and access contain assumptions regarding a common procedural 
tradition. It is through the need to legitimise a transnational system of shared enforcement of 
national law that certain supranational rights are emerging. 
 
Supranational Fundamental Rights 
 
The references of these procedural instruments to common standards of rights based in the 
ECHR and the CFR are not by accident and refer to the broader constitutional context of 





 the Court of Justice has not found that concerns regarding 
fundamental rights must be swept aside entirely in the interests of primacy and effectiveness 
of EU criminal law. What it has unequivocally held is that Member States may not refuse to 
surrender an individual based on national standards of fundamental rights where to do so 
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would compromise the operation of an EAW. Instead, it has replaced these domestic 
standards with common Union-wide standards, used to police a certain presumption of 
compliance by Member States. Again it is transnational system of shared enforcement 
implying a shared supranational framework of rights protections. 
 
Primacy, effectiveness and the unity of EU law
84
 have always been linked to the 
development of fundamental rights in the Union and it would be naïve to assume that this 
dynamic would not operate in the field of AFSJ mutual recognition instruments. According 
to received wisdom, fundamental rights were developed at a supranational level in order to 
allay the fears of national constitutional courts and head off any challenge from that quarter 
to the continued primacy of EU law.
85
 What mutual recognition regimes in the AFSJ have 
brought to this equation is the additional element of a presumption of horizontal compliance 
between Member States with common standards of fundamental rights when operating 
within mutual recognition regimes. Whether such presumptions are justified may be 
arguable and the extent to which they are compatible with ECHR obligations remains an 
open question
86
 but it is undoubtedly the case that they are linked to the question of primacy 
and deemed necessary by the Court of Justice for the effective operation of these mutual 
recognition systems.
87
 This point has more recently been underlined in the recent Opinion 
2/13 on the accession of the EU to the ECHR.
88
 What this entails, in the area of criminal law, 
is a presumption of common standards of fundamental rights.  
 
In Radu the Court of Justice found that Romania could not refuse to surrender one of its 
nationals to Germany on the basis that he was not informed of the German procedures 
issuing the EAWs. In its reference the referring court raised a series of general questions 
regarding the status of fundamental rights in the Union legal order and in the operation of the 
                                                 
84
 For a discussion of this new conceptual trinity that appeared in Melloni (n 64) see Besselink (n 65), 543.  
85
 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (3 edn, CUP 2014) 252. See also 
Jason Coppel and Aidan O'Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 29 CML 
Rev 669. Although for an alternative reading of the development of fundamental rights in the EU see Gráinne de 
Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105 AJIL 649.  
86
 See Alexander Kornezov, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Light of the EU Accession to the 
ECHR - Is the Break-up inevitable?’ (2012-2013) 15 CYELS 227. See also recent jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice in Case C-394/12 Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt EU:C:2013:813 and the ECtHR in Tarakhel v 
Switzerland App no 29217/12 (ECHR 4 November 2014) in the area of the transfer of asylum applications under 
the Dublin system. 
87
 See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS v Secretary of State for the Home Dept EU:C:2011:865, [2011] 
ECR I-13905. Indeed, the Court claimed that to allow suspension of mutual recognition regimes on a case-by-
case basis would call into question the raison d’être of the EU itself and the creation of an AFSJ (ibid para 83). 
88




EAW FD in particular. Avoiding the general questions, the Court in its reply limited itself 
strictly to the situation in hand, and found that a refusal to notify an individual when issuing 
EAWs was not a breach of their fundamental rights. While some commentators read Radu as 
an implicit rejection by the Court of Justice of fundamental rights as a grounds for refusal,
89
 
in truth the ratio of the judgment is much narrower, simply refusing to find a breach in the 
circumstances of the case, and leaving open the broader question of the status of 




What became clear however in Melloni is that Member States may not refuse to surrender an 
individual based on their own, domestic standards of fundamental rights; at least where to do 
so would frustrate the effective application of the EAW, an almost inevitable outcome if the 
consequence of such an application would be the refusal to surrender an individual.
91
 In 
Melloni an Italian national skipped bail and was convicted of fraud in absentia. He was later 
arrested in Spain and was subject to surrender proceedings based on an Italian EAW. Due to 
the fact that he was aware of his trial and was represented at all stages of the process he 
would not be granted a retrial upon return to Italy. The Spanish Constitution prohibited 
extradition in such circumstances, considering to do so would breach the fundamental right 
to a fair trial. Article 53 CFR states that ‘nothing in this charter shall be interpreted as 
adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their 
respective fields…by the Member States’ constitutions.’
92
 The Spanish Constitutional Court 
therefore referred a question to the Court of Justice, seeking in particular to know whether 
Article 53 CFR allowed the application of the Spanish constitution in this case.  In its reply 
the Court rejected the possibility that the Spanish Court could apply its own constitutional 
provisions and refuse to surrender Mr Melloni. The Court of Justice based its argument on 
the principle of primacy and found that to allow the application of national provisions would 
allow Member States to disapply Union law and undermine its effectiveness.  
 
While some might read Melloni as a disappointment and further evidence of the lack of 
fundamental rights protection in criminal justice matters,
93
 a careful reading of both Radu 
and Melloni does not exclude any form of fundamental rights control. Rather, Radu is silent 
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on the general issue, merely finding that a breach of fundamental rights did not take place, 
and Melloni on the contrary does subject the EAW system to a fundamental rights control 
but one based on Union provisions of fundamental rights, in particular the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Melloni makes two findings. Firstly, it finds that surrendering Mr 
Melloni in the circumstances of the case, namely where there was a verdict handed down in 
absentia but the accused appointed representatives who did in fact represent him throughout 
the trial, does not amount to a breach the right to a fair trial found in Article 47 CFR.
94
 This 
is particularly the case in light of the adoption of Framework Decision 2009/299/EU 
amending the EAW FD to provide greater protection in the case of in absentia trials ie a 
harmonisation of the conditions in which the right to trial is compromised by the absence of 
the accused.
95
 The Court does assess the compliance of the EAW FD with fundamental 
rights but it is an assessment of a Union law instrument in light of Union fundamental rights. 
Secondly, it found that Spain may not apply its constitutional provisions where to do so 
would undermine the effectiveness of the EAW FD. But note that the Spanish Court’s 
‘interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter would undermine the principle of the primacy of 
EU law inasmuch as it would allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are 
fully in compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed 
by that State’s constitution.’ (emphasis added).
96
 Similarly, in the subsequent case of Jeremy 
F the Court was at pains to point out that the system of mutual trust on which the EAW 
system is based is founded on compliance by the Member States with ‘fundamental rights 




There is an implication that where Member States are not in compliance with the Charter, 
there is a possibility that the execution of an EAW may be refused. The exact circumstances 
where this might happen still need to be determined. It is entirely possible that the Court will 
draw inspiration from its judgement of NS in the area of the transfer of asylum seekers under 
the Dublin System
98
 and find that it would be necessary to find a systematic, serious and 
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persistent breach of fundamental rights to rebut the presumption, based on mutual trust, that 
Member States comply with fundamental rights obligations as found in the CFR and other 
Union sources of fundamental rights and the ECHR.
99
 It is noteworthy that the new 
European Investigation Order Directive contains precisely such a control, allowing Member 




Thus, while the Court has not yet explicitly decided on the question of fundamental rights as 
a ground for refusal it is likely that surrender may be refused based on a potential violation 
of fundamental rights, but only where there is evidence of a persistent and systematic breach 
and only by reference to Union standards of fundamental rights. However, in such a situation 
the Member State would no longer be exercising an autonomous normative control, applying 
its own standards to prevent an individual from being surrendered, but would rather be 
acting as an agent under Union law. It would be applying Union law and Union fundamental 
rights in order to maintain the integrity of the Union legal order and in particular the system 
of shared enforcement established by the EAW FD. 
 
Conclusion 
Transnational Enforcement in a Supranational Space 
 
Criminal law is intimately linked to the concept of territorial control and the legitimate use 
of force. The establishment of a transnational system of enforcement and the subsequent loss 
of control by Member States over how individuals on their territory are treated has 
significantly disrupted traditional understandings of citizenship, fundamental rights, 
questions of legality and ultimately their relationship with the legal order and the territory of 
a particular Member State. It has above all called into question the traditional national 
framework for assuring the legitimate use of force on a particular territory. 
 
The EAW is above all a transnational system of enforcing national wrongs. As the Court of 
Justice stated in Advocaten voor de Wereld, the EAW does not itself define or create crimes. 
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Those crimes are defined by particular national communities and it is before those 
communities that individuals return to be called to account or to serve punishment. Indeed, 
the essentially national nature of crimes is in some respects strengthened by the EAW 
system; unlike extradition systems with their rule of double criminality it is exclusively 
under the law of the issuing Member State and at the discretion of the issuing Member State 
that an individual’s conduct is assessed. It is a transnational system of enforcement, of 
calling citizens to account before national communities for national wrongs. 
 
However, it is only by framing national norms and values within the single supranational 
space occupied by Union citizens that an effective system of transnational enforcement can 
be justified and legitimised. Union citizenship has given rise to a broader space of movement 
and set of political relations between individuals and Member States throughout the Union. 
Above all it has emplaced individuals in a broader space of rights and now responsibilities. 
This transnational space of movement and enforcement necessarily generates tensions 
regarding territory, norms and rights. However, these norms, that are displaced at a national 
level, re-emerge at a supranational level. The wider geographic space of movement 
generated by Union citizenship corresponds with a single area of justice, not simply in 
allowing the ‘free movement of judgments’ or contributing to a more effective law 
enforcement, but in generating certain, overarching, norms both in terms of the publically 
wrongful nature of certain acts and fundamental rights and procedural guarantees. Indeed, 
not only are there certain supranational norms emerging through the EAW but a 





An Area of Justice II:  
A Transnational Ne Bis in Idem Principle 
 
Introduction: 
Interpretation in Light of Free Movement 
 
A German assaults a woman in Belgium, is apprehended and charged by authorities in Bonn 
and settles the case by agreeing to pay a fine. Meanwhile, in Belgium the victim brings 
proceedings before the local criminal court. Can the Belgian prosecutor order the assailant to 
appear before the criminal court in Belgium?
1
 In 1960 a German member of the French 
foreign legion attacks and kills a fellow German during the Algerian conflict and flees to the 
German Democratic Republic. He is convicted under French military law but the sentence is 
later set aside under a general amnesty for acts committed in the Algerian conflict and in any 
case is time-barred. Later, after the fall of the Berlin wall, Germany seeks to prosecute the by 
now aged ex-Legionnaire. Are German authorities prevented by the French amnesty and 
time-limits?
2
 A Belgian is convicted and imprisoned in Norway for importing cannabis and 
other narcotics. He is later released and returned to Belgium where he is in turn prosecuted 
for exporting the same substances. Has he already paid his due to society? Is importing drugs 
the same act as exporting?
3
 A woman receives the proceeds of crime in the Netherlands and 
later exchanges the same funds in a bureau d’échange in Belgium. Is the woman guilty of 




                                                 
1
 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Criminal proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus Brügge 
EU:C:2003:87, [2003] ECR I-1345.  
2
 Case C-297/07 Klaus Bourquain EU:C:2008:708, [2008] ECR I-9425.  
3
 Case C-436/04 Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck EU:C:2006:165, [2006] ECR I-
2333.  
4




The principle of ne bis in idem is a principle of law common to most legal systems and 
enjoying a long history.
5
 Its principle purpose is to prevent an individual from being 
prosecuted twice for the same act or crime. In general it is designed to secure the rights of 
the individual vis-à-vis the state. However as the above examples illustrate, in a single area 
characterised by multiple criminal justice systems, individuals can face prosecution from 
more than one state. Criminal acts are no longer limited by borders, if indeed they ever were, 
and Member States claim jurisdiction in different and sometimes overlapping ways. The 
possibility of multiple prosecutions in different parts of the Union represents a major 
hindrance for anyone seeking to exercise their freedom of movement. In the EU legal order 
the primary function of the ne bis in idem principle is therefore different from simply 
protecting the individual from a single abusive state: it is to secure the free movement of 
individuals, removing obstacles that may exist through the existence of multiple legal orders. 
In interpreting the principle in light of this particular goal the Court of Justice has 
constructed a single status for individuals within a single area of justice, a development that 
in turn reflects a new understanding of the relationship between the individual and other 
Member States and indeed the Union as a whole.  
 
The principle of ne bis in idem is on its face a relatively simple rule with a straightforward 
rationale. It is designed to ensure that an individual is not prosecuted more than once for the 
same crime: its ultimate purpose is to ensure that the outcome of a criminal case is final. The 
reasons are clear. Firstly, it protects the individual from the possibility of vexatious 
prosecution, from being constantly hounded by vindictive or simply over-zealous officers of 
the state. To allow continuous attempts at prosecution would place the individual in a 
persistent state of risk and fear of prosecution: a burdensome existence fraught with 
uncertainty. Secondly, it ensures balance in the criminal justice process between the two 
sides, the famed ‘equality of arms’ principle. It prevents the state from returning to court in 
an attempt to prosecute, a possibility that would give it multiple chances to amend and 
improve its case, an opportunity that is unavailable to the accused.
6
 Finally, while for the 
most part the principle can be seen as protecting the rights of individuals’ vis-à-vis the state, 
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there is also a broader public interest in securing finality in criminal judgments. It therefore 




At the same time the criminal justice process, in addition to protecting the rights and 
interests of the innocent and providing legal certainty, is also concerned with ensuring that 
wrongful acts are prosecuted and punished in an appropriate manner that reflects the gravity 
of the offense. There is an interest in ensuring that the state has an adequate opportunity to 
call the individual to account and in a manner that reflects all the wrongful aspects of the act. 
There is a need to ensure that cases can be reopened if further evidence comes to light, that 
all crimes that a particular act might represent are prosecuted and to ensure that an individual 
does not escape through a dismissal of his or her case on a technical matter without a proper 
assessment of the crime. 
 
It is these counter-veiling needs of the criminal justice system – those of the individual and 
those of the state – that render the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle, so simple in 
theory, extraordinarily complicated in practice, with different jurisdictions interpreting what 
is ostensibly the same rule in diametrically opposed ways and with widely differing results 




The principle has two dimensions both of which have given rise to interpretative difficulties. 
Firstly, the definition of finality: whether a particular case can be said to be finally settled or 
otherwise. While some cases can clearly be considered to be finally settled - such as a 
judgment acquitting an individual following a full trial and deliberation that is no longer 
subject to appeal - there are other cases that fall short of a full trial of all aspects of the case, 
such as plea bargains. The application of the rule in these cases is less clear. A guiding 
principle that may be employed is that there should be a substantive assessment of the merits 
of the case.
9
 However judgments can vary as to what precisely a substantive assessment 
might entail and the test is not always simple to apply in practice. The second dimension of 
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the principle relates to determining precisely for what an individual is not to be prosecuted 
twice (the sameness criteria).
10
 The debate here tends to focus on whether an individual is to 
be protected from multiple prosecutions for the same act or series of acts or whether it is 
multiple prosecutions for the same crime that is at stake ie whether sameness refers to crimes 
or to acts. 
 
The ne bis in idem principle appears in the EU legal order in various provisions. It has long 
been a feature of the Court’s jurisprudence in competition law sanctions. More recently it 
has appeared in Article 54 of the Convention on the Implementation of the Schengen 
Agreement (CISA), Article 3(2) of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW 
FD), Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and is also contained in Article 
4 of Protocol 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
The current chapter focuses on Article 54 CISA for two reasons. Firstly, there has been a 
clear convergence between the interpretation of the different legal provisions that contain the 
ne bis in idem principle in the European legal space both between the ECHR and the EU 
legal orders and the vertical and horizontal application of the principle. In both instances of 
convergence this has tended to use the interpretation developed in the context of Article 54 
CISA. In Zolotukhin the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) resolved the significant 
uncertainty and divergence that previously existed in its jurisprudence on the interpretation 
of Article 4, Protocol 7 ECHR by effectively adopting the solution developed in the context 
of Article 54 CISA.
11
 In Mantello the Court of Justice noted the shared objective of Article 
3(2) EAW FD and Article 54 CISA and interpreted Article 3(2) EAW FD in the light of its 
jurisprudence based on Article 54 CISA.
12
 In M the Court found that Article 54 CISA was 
merely a specific expression of the general principle found in Article 50 CFR, which itself is 
to be interpreted in light of Article 4, Protocol 7 ECHR.
13
 Thus, through various chains of 
interpretation there appears to be a general convergence within the EU legal order between 
Article 54 CISA, Article 3(2) EAW FD, Article 50 CFR and Article 4, Protocol 7 ECHR - all 
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based primarily on the jurisprudence developed under Article 54 CISA. The result is a 
uniform application of the principle in transnational, national and supranational situations 
that fall within the scope of the Union legal order,
 14
 corresponding to the protection found in 
the ECHR. 
 
Secondly, this chapter is concerned with the relationship between individual citizens, free 
movement and crime within what has been termed the single area of justice. It is therefore 
primarily concerned with the impact of multiple prosecutions from different jurisdictions on 
the movement of individuals within the Union. It deals with what has been termed 
‘horizontal’ and geographic rather than a ‘vertical’ or temporal application of the principle ie 
between legal orders in different places rather than within a single legal order over time.
15
 
Article 54 CISA is specifically a transnational and horizontal principle. Article 4, Protocol 7 
ECHR and Article 50 CFR are primarily concerned with a vertical application of the 
principle. The use of the principle in the context of competition law proceedings follows 
very different principles and operates in a very different legal context characterised by its 
quasi-administrative/criminal nature and the structure of the European Competition Network 





On one level Article 54 CISA reads like any version of the ne bis in idem principle: ‘a person 
that has been finally judged may not be prosecuted … for the same offences.’ However, there 
is a crucial distinction relating to the scope of the CISA that differentiates it from other 
versions of the principle found in national and indeed international texts. The full article 
reads: 
 
‘A person who has been finally judged by a Contracting Party may not be prosecuted 
by another Contracting Party for the same offences provided that, where he is 
sentenced, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or can no longer 
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In contrast to traditional conceptions of the ne bis in idem principle, Article 54 CISA is not 
designed to protect the individual against multiple prosecutions within a single state. Rather 
it is designed to protect the individual against prosecutions from other states and in other 




Not only is the scope of Article 54 CISA as a transnational principle different from other 
manifestations of the ne bis in idem principle, but its rationale is also different. Indeed the 
different scope of Article 54 CISA quite logically flows from the different purpose of Article 
54 CISA. Its purpose lies in the underlying goal of the Schengen Agreement itself, designed 
to secure free movement of individuals. The Schengen acquis is a body of law with a 
complicated history. Originally developed outside the scope of Union law amongst a select 
number of Member States it has since been incorporated within the Treaties
19
 and its scope 
has been extended, albeit on a phased-basis, to most Member States. The UK and Ireland, 
reluctant to cede control over their borders have retained opt-outs of the acquis, exercised on 
a case-by-case basis, but have opted into Article 54 CISA.
20
 Thus, when the Court of Justice 
refers to free movement in several Member States in the context of Article 54 CISA or 
indeed the European Union it can be taken as referring to the Union as a whole. Nonetheless, 
the persistence of opt-outs in this area in particular does underline the continuing fragility of 
notions of Union territoriality and a single space of movement in a Union of variable 
geometry. 
 
The Court of Justice has been very clear that the objective of ‘Article 54 is ‘to ensure that no 
one is prosecuted on the same facts in several Member States on account of his having 
exercised his right to freedom of movement.’
21
 The primary purpose of Article 54 CISA is 
therefore not the protection of the individual from vexatious prosecution and to ensure legal 
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certainty. That is not to say that Article 54 CISA does not protect individuals and ensure 
legal certainty; it does achieve these things. But it does so in the service of securing another 
goal: the free movement of individuals throughout the Schengen area. Legal certainty for the 
individual is necessary because it is necessary for free movement. The traditional rationale 
for the ne bis in idem principle is rendered instrumental to the telos of free movement.  
 
If the scope of Article 54 CISA as a transnational principle reflects its telos as a measure 
designed to secure free movement, that same underlying goal has informed the interpretation 
of Article 54 CISA. As stated above, the ne bis in idem principle is notoriously difficult to 
apply and lends itself to various interpretations depending on the definition of sameness or 
finality. In the context of Article 54 CISA however, the various interpretative choices, 
normally available to a court when interpreting the principle of ne bis in idem, are 
conditioned and shaped by the underlying goal to secure free movement in a context of 
multiple jurisdictions. The interpretation of Article 54 CISA flows directly from the principle 
of free movement of persons. As with much in EU law
22
 this teleological perspective is key 
to understanding the reasoning of the Court. 
 
If the technique has been teleological reasoning based on free movement, the consequence 
has been a re-shaping the relationship between individuals and other Member States in the 
field of criminal law and indeed between individuals, Member States and the Union as a 
whole. Directed by the need to secure free movement for individuals, the Court has been 
lead to fashion a single status for individuals vis-à-vis the Union as a whole. Under this new 
regime, individuals are called to account by a single Member State but in the name of the 
Union as a whole. The result is that a crime against a Member State becomes a crime against 
the Union as a whole: that individual is called to account before the Union through the 
criminal justice of a single Member State. It is through the transnational process of the ne bis 
in idem that individuals are called to account in a plural, multi-levelled political community. 
 
Interpretation of Finality in Light of Free Movement: 
A Single Status 
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Strict Application of Mutual Recognition 
 
The difficulty faced by the Court of Justice in interpreting the concept of finality in Article 
54 CISA arises from unique situation of its application across different criminal justice 
systems with different and not always compatible means of settling cases. The solution is 
one frequently employed by EU law when faced with obstacles to free movement caused by 
differences in law between jurisdictions: that of mutual recognition.
23
 It is the decision of the 
first Member State that determines the status of the individual and it is this decision that 
must be accepted by all other Member States. However, the principle of mutual recognition 
is not homogenous in its application across the legal order of the Union. It varies in the 
degree to which other States are required to accept the decision of the original Member 
States, which legal order is to govern the particular decision and perhaps most importantly if 
the second Member State is capable of exercising any controls, either regarding the validity 
of the original decision or in providing for exceptions including the requirement of a 
sufficient degree of equivalence between the laws of the original Member State and its own 
laws. Through a desire to secure the maximum free movement for individuals and hence the 
maximum degree of certainty for such individuals, the Court of Justice in its elaboration of 
the principle of mutual recognition in Article 54 CISA has been led to adopt a particularly 
strict version of the principle of mutual recognition. 
 
Firstly, the Court of Justice has insisted that the ne bis in idem principle operates in the 
absence of any equivalence. That a decision of a single Member State is to be applied in 
another Member State is not particular novel.
24
 In fact this structure forms the definitional 
core of the principle of mutual recognition and lies at the heart of Cassis de Dijon.
25
 
However, unlike with other instances of the mutual recognition principle, in particular those 
found in both the caselaw and legislation of the internal market, Member States are not 
entitled to subject their acceptance of a decision of another Member State to the condition 
that there exists a certain degree of similarity or functional equivalence between the laws of 
the respective Member States. There is no principle of ‘mandatory requirements’
26
 or ‘public 
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policy’ derogations or equivalence test
27
 that a Member State can invoke to prevent the 
operation of a decision to convict or acquit an individual, simply because in its own legal 
order it does not recognise similar decisions. Article 54 CISA implies that each Member 
State ‘recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the 
outcome would be different if its own national law was applied…The application by one 
Member State of the ne bis in idem principle as set out in Article 54 of the CISA, to 
procedures whereby further prosecution is barred, which have taken place in another 
Member State without a court being involved, cannot be made subject to a condition that the 
first State’s legal system does not require such judicial involvement either.’
28
 At stake in 
Gözütock and Brügge was the question of settlement decisions. Precisely the same logic has 









The strict version of mutual recognition in the context of the ne bis in idem principle was not 
uncontroversial and indeed prompted a response from certain Member States. Greece in 
particular tabled a proposal that, while not directly challenging the Court’s judgment in 
Gözütock and Brügge, did include exceptions allowing a Member State to prosecute in 
certain situations namely where the security or other ‘equally essential interests’ of the 
Member State was threatened, even where another Member State had already done so.
32
 That 
proposal never gained sufficient support to make it as a legislative instrument into the 
official journal but it does underline the fact that alternatives existed to the interpretation of 
the Court of Justice’s in Gözütock and Brügge. Instead, the Court set aside the potential 
concerns of Member States in having some form of equivalence check and insisted on an 
interpretation that maximised the free movement of individuals. 
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In a complementary move the Court of Justice has found that not only must the decision of 
the authorities of the first Member State be recognised as valid, even in the absence of 
equivalence, but that for the purposes of the application of Article 54 CISA, the effect of that 
decision, and in particular whether it is considered final or otherwise, in the legal order of 
the second Member State, is to be determined solely by the law of the first Member State. In 
what can be called the Turanský principle the Court held that ‘in order to assess whether a 
decision is “final” for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, it is necessary first of all to 
ascertain…that the decision in question is considered under the law of the Contracting state 
which adopted it to be final and binding, and to verify that it leads, in that State, to the 
protection granted by the ne bis in idem principle’.
33
 It is by reference to the law of the 
issuing Member State that the effect of the decision is to be ascertained. Not only is the 
decision to acquit or convict to be adopted by the first Member State but also the question of 
its finality, its ultimate effect in definitively regulating the status of the individual, is 
likewise to be determined by the law of the issuing Member State. Thus in Turanksý whether 
the decision of a Czech police officer discontinuing an investigation was final or not was to 
be determined according to Czech law. The outcome of that assessment under Czech law 
determined whether Austrian authorities could proceed with their own investigations and 
possible prosecution in Austria. The same formula has been employed by the Court in the 
subsequent cases of Bourquain
34
 to the situation of general amnesties, and in M
35
 to the 
situation of non-lieu, or dismissal for lack of grounds.  
 
The result of both of the above inter-related rules - the acceptance of the decision in the 
absence of equivalence and ensuring that it is the law of the first Member State that 
determines the finality of the decision - is to grant maximum certainty to the individual. In 
other areas of mutual recognition the legal position of an individual can be the result of a 
combination of the decision of the initial legal order and how that decision is accepted and 
applied in the second legal order. Thus in the area of the mutual recognition of diplomas the 
ability of the individual to practice a profession in a second Member State depends on a 
combination of the decision of the first Member State to grant a diploma and the conditions 
applied by the second Member State to the recognition of that diploma.
36
 The precise status 
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of the individual is therefore the result of the combined interaction of rules originating in 
two legal orders. The outcome is of course variable depending on precisely which two 
Member States are in question, although harmonising measures can reduce situations of 
legal uncertainty for individuals. The consequence is firstly greater or lesser free movement 
between those jurisdictions depending on the precise differences and secondly a degree of 
variation in the extent of the freedom of movement throughout the Union. With Article 54 
CISA however the Court is at pains to ensure the maximum degree of free movement for 
individuals, both between particular Member States but also across the Union as a whole. To 
secure such a result the decision of one Member State and only one Member State must be 
made applicable throughout the Union in the same manner. It is logical and necessary that 
this be the Member State that adopted the initial decision.
37
 The result is a particularly strict 
interpretation of mutual recognition in Article 54 CISA. It aims at maximum recognition in 
an effort to achieve maximum free movement for individuals across all Member States.
38
 As 
a result, the legal situation of an individual, the status of an individual with respect to a 
particular crime, is governed not by various combinations of two or even more Member 
States interacting but by the law of a single Member State and only that Member State. The 
outcome of this determination is in turn applicable in all other Member States in the exactly 
same fashion. Both the validity of a decision and its finality is determined by the law of one 
state and only one state. 
 
A substantive assessment of the merits of the case 
 
If a desire to secure maximum recognition of the individual’s free movement is the principle 
goal of the Court of Justice in the interpretation of Article 54 CISA, this is not its only goal 
or concern. The Court is aware of the underlying tension in the ne bis in idem principle 
namely to ensure that an individual is called to account properly for his actions once and 
only once but that he should in fact be properly called to account. In line with jurisprudence 
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and pronouncements in the area of mutual recognition of judgements and in particular the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD),
39
 the Court wishes to ensure that 
the EU remains or indeed becomes, an area of justice, meaning that individuals should face 
justice for their wrongful actions and that they be properly called to account before a Court. 
Article 54 CISA should not therefore be used as a mechanism to evade justice. 
 
The Court has accordingly insisted there be a ‘substantive assessment of the merits of the 
case.’
40
 The Court does not elaborate precisely what this entails but it can be assumed that 
there must occur in one Member State an assessment of the actions of an individual in light 
of all the relevant facts either during a trial or by a competent authority in relation to a 
decision whether to try or not. Thus a case discontinued for the simple reason that another 
Member State, better situated, commenced an investigation, cannot be considered finally 
disposed of for the purposes of Article 54 CISA.
41
 In Miraglia, in which Dutch authorities 
suspended their investigation because the Italian authorities had begun their own 
investigation, there was simply ‘no assessment whatsoever of the unlawful conduct with 
which the defendant was charged’.
42
 The Italian authorities were not therefore prevented 
from prosecuting. A decision ‘where no determination has been made as to the merits of the 
case, cannot constitute a decision finally disposing of the case against that person within the 
meaning of Article 54 of the CISA.’
43
 Similarly in Spasic the fact that an individual had only 
served the pecuniary and not the custodial element of his sentence had the result that his 
sentence was not in the process of being enforced within the meaning of Article 54 CISA. To 




One consequence of this concern to ensure that an individual be properly tried has been that 
Article 54 CISA can only operate to benefit the individual who has in fact been judged or his 
case determined: it cannot benefit those who while involved in the same situation, were not 
so judged. Its result cannot be applied as a precedent or by analogy to other similar cases. 
Unlike the operation of mutual recognition in regulatory matters, mutual recognition in the 
criminal law operates as an individualised principle – applicable only to the individual 
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whose case has been dealt with. In Gasparini while the discontinuation of a case for being 
time-barred was in fact considered a decision that finally disposed of a case,
45
 the decision 





The result of interpreting the concept of finality in light of both the principle of free 
movement and the need to secure justice has been the creation of a single status for 
individuals. Through an especially strict application of the principle of mutual recognition, 
applicable in the absence of equivalence and governed solely by the law of the issuing 
Member State, the Court has been at pains to maximise certainty for the individual, this has 
been achieved by ensuring that his legal status vis-à-vis that crime is identical throughout the 
Union. At the same time, as indicated by Gasparini in particular, the Court is anxious to 
ensure that individuals do in fact face justice and that the principle of ne bis in idem does not 
operate to allow individuals to evade either being tried or serving their sentence. The result 
is that a substantive decision relative to that individual must be made. It is an individualised 
principle. The combination of these two moves has been the creation of a single, individual 
legal status attaching to individuals.  
 
Interpretation of Sameness in Light of Free Movement  
A Single Space 
 
A single individual status, but in relation to what? If the use of a teleological interpretation 
of the notion of finality in Article 54 CISA has resulted in the creation of a unique legal 
status for individuals, not governed by multiple legal orders, a similar use of the same 
teleological interpretation focusing on free movement in defining sameness has resulted in 
the construction of a single space. It is again the existence of multiple legal orders combined 
with the need to secure free movement of persons that has determined the choice of the 
Court of Justice in its interpretation of the principle. In particular it has forced the Court to 
opt for an interpretation of sameness based on the facts rather than the offense. Sameness for 
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the purposes of Article 54 CISA is to be determined by the essential unity in space and time 
of the acts of an individual. At the same time, the Court has insisted that this essential unity 
of factual elements is applied throughout the Union; it is not a concept that operates within a 
single Member State but extends across the borders of the Union.  
 
A crime is the legal classification of a set of facts, generally the actions combined with the 
mental state of individuals. It exists by virtue of the law and the existence of a particular 
crime is the creation of a particular legal system. In other words, a crime is a legal 
construction of a particular legal system that enters into existence when a set of facts obtain. 
The ne bis in idem principle has long struggled with this essential duality between law and 
facts, in defining sameness. On the one hand a legal system might take the view that 
sameness is defined by reference to the offence: thus a single act may give rise to multiple 
offenses
47
 and the ne bis in idem principle does not prevent the state from prosecuting an 
individual for one of those offenses despite a case having been heard and disposed of in 
relation to another. An alternative approach is to focus not on the definition of the offenses 
but rather on the facts of the case. Under this approach an individual can only be prosecuted 
once for any action that resulted in wrong-doing. In this understanding sameness refers to 




In a national legal system, or an international legal principle that is applied in a national 
contexts such as the ECHR, the choice of which approach to adopt is open and will depend 
on the policy decisions and values contained in that particular legal order. In the context of a 
transnational legal order, one containing a transnational ne bis in idem principle concerned 
with maximising free movement in a space of multiple legal orders, that choice is quite 
simply not available. If the legal order wishes that rule to be effective in securing free 
movement, it must define sameness in terms of facts and not offenses. The reason is clear: a 
crime is a creature of a legal order and the definition of crimes varies across legal orders. To 
require that a crime be defined in the same way across Member States in order for the 
principle to operate (and hence to ensure that individual’s enjoy free movement) would be to 
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radically reduce its application, if not to render it practically inoperable. In the words of the 
Court ‘[b]ecause there is no harmonisation of national criminal laws, a criterion based on the 
legal classification of the acts or on the protected legal interest might create as many barriers 





In the place of a definition based on legal classification, the Court has formulated a test 
based on the ‘identity of the material acts, understood in the sense of the existence of a set of 
concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together.’
50
 The ‘material acts at issue 
[must] constitute a set of facts that are inextricably linked together in time, in space and by 
their subject matter.’
51
 Thus the legal classification of the offense is irrelevant, to hold 
otherwise, as indicated in the above quote from Van Straaten, would be to render the right of 
free movement nugatory.
52
 The legal interest adversely affected by the crime is similarly 
irrelevant.
53
 Finally, the assessment of ‘sameness’ is an objective rather than a subjective test 
– in determining whether acts are the same for the purposes of Article 54 CISA the 
subjective intention of the accused in relation to the various acts is not to be relied upon, 




Not only has the Court of Justice found that it is the facts, and not the legal classification of 
those facts, that is at stake in defining sameness under Article 54 CISA but as a consequence 
of focusing on the facts, the principle can apply to cross-border acts, a possibility that would 
be excluded by a reliance on the legal classification of the acts. Thus a series of facts that 
involve the transporting of drugs between Member States are not to be conceived of as two 
separate offenses of firstly exporting and secondly importing illegal substances but rather 
may be seen as ‘inextricably linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter’ 
and the same act for the purposes of Article 54 CISA.
55
 This unity in time and space can 
even operate where there are variations in certain non-essential facts, such as the precise 
identity of persons involved and quantities of drugs at stake.
56
 What is important is that the 
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essential unity of the accused’s individual act is maintained. Similarly, and even more 
tellingly, the mere presence of borders and different jurisdictions does not render a single act 
into multiple acts: an individual convicted of transporting contraband materials across 
various internal borders of the Schengen area does not as a consequence commit several 
crimes.
57
 It is an objective assessment of the fact seen in their essential unity, extending 
across the territory of various Member States, that is relevant, not the differing legal interests 




The result of interpreting the sameness criteria in light of the need to secure free movement 
is therefore twofold. By disregarding the legal classification the Court can ensure that it is 
the act itself that is at stake and while laws vary across legal orders, facts do not. A single 
wrongful act can therefore be considered as such across the entire Union. It allows the 
possibility of understanding a particular wrongful act in unified way across the various 
Member States of the Union. By focusing on acts rather than offenses the Court has ensured 
that there is a commonality in terms of the subject matter of the principle: Member States are 
in effect considering the same thing. Secondly, in concentrating on the facts and in particular 
ensuring that when considering the essential unity of time and space Member States are not 
to be limited to the territory of a single Member State, the Court has ensured that the ne bis 
in idem principle, and the wrongful act of the individual, is one that extends beyond Member 
States. Borders are irrelevant either in establishing separate crimes of importing and 
exporting in Van Straaten,
59
 or in establishing multiple instances of the same crime, such as 
smuggling in Kreitzinger.
60
 The point of reference is not the territory of individual Member 
States rather the act is to be understood by reference to the Union territory as a whole. It 
ensures the essential territorial unity of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
 
Conclusion 
A Multi-Levelled Calling to Account 
 
We have seen how a strict application of the mutual recognition principle has led to a single 
status for individuals. Equally the effect of the decision is determined by a single Member 
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State, by necessity the Member State that adopted the decision. The result is a maximisation 
of the free movement of individuals; not simply between two individual Member States but 
throughout the Union as a whole: an individual can be convicted in one Member State and 
move to a second Member State, a third and fourth and so on, secure in the knowledge that 
the determination of his case by the original Member State will follow him throughout the 
Union. It mirrors the operation of mutual recognition in citizenship cases securing the 
autonomy of individuals throughout the Union.
61
 Similarly and in a related fashion the 
wrongful act of which an individual stands accused is defined according to objective criteria 
(facts) that are equally applicable throughout the Union. Not only is the subject matter of the 
trial identical but it is one that operates by reference to the territory of the Union as a whole. 
 
At the same time the Court is anxious to ensure that individuals do in fact face justice. This 
is evident from Gasparini in which individuals accused of participating in the same crime as 
Mr Gasparaini were not entitled to rely on the decision to dismiss in his case in order to face 
justice. In Spasic, interpreting Article 54 CISA in light of the principle contained in Article 
52 CFR,
62
 the Court found that the need to ensure that individuals do not evade justice 
rendered the requirement that sentences actually be enforced contained in Article 54 CISA a 
legitimate exception to the general rule that individuals do not face trial twice. The 
‘enforced’ requirement in Article 54 CISA is therefore a legitimate exception to the right 
contained in Article 50 CFR. Thus because Mr Spasic had not in fact served the custodial 
element to his punishment received in Italy, he was liable to face trial for the same acts in 
Germany.
63
 ‘The execution condition laid down in Article 54 CISA is…intended…to 
prevent, in the area of freedom, security and justice, the impunity of persons definitively 
convicted and sentences in an EU Member State.’
64
 Not to apply the execution condition in 
this case would mean Article 54 CISA ‘would not be sufficient to prevent the impunity of 
persons definitively convicted and sentenced in the European Union.’
65
 Note the interesting 
shift from the Member States of the European Union to the European Union itself. A 
combination of these two points – that individuals enjoy a unique status with reference to the 
EU as a whole and that that individuals do in fact face justice is that individuals enjoy a 
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unique status applicable throughout the Union with respect to a particular criminal act. To 
put it in the words of Duff individuals are properly called to account for their wrongful 
actions in the European Union. 
 
In a national context the concern is to ensure that an individual is called to account before 
the national community. It is the national community that one has offended, that has 
established through its criminal law the particular actions it deems wrongful in light of its 
own normative code. Indeed as we have seen in cases dealing with expulsion and periods of 
imprisonment the Court of Justice has subscribed to this communitarian and normative view 
of crime.
66
 A crime, beyond its immediate victim, is an offence against the community of 
citizens as a social collective
67
 and it is on the authority of that community that an individual 
is called to account, tried and indeed punished. Another state punishing an individual for a 
particular act quite simply does not suffice to answer for the wrong done that community. It 
is precisely this reason that has made the establishment of a transnational ne bis in idem 
principle so difficult to achieve and why the taking into account of punishments 
administered by other states is seen as discretionary.  
 
The relationship between the operation of the ne bis in idem principle and the community of 
citizens is well illustrated by its operation in federal systems. How a federation deals with 
the question of ne bis in idem reflects precisely how it envisages the relationship between the 
different communities of which it is composed. The United States has long operated a 
doctrine of ‘dual sovereignty’ when it comes to the application of its double jeopardy rule. 
Prosecution and indeed punishment for a particular act or crime by a state does not prevent 
prosecution by the federal authorities. A federal crime is a different thing from a state crime, 
even if it results from the same act.
68
 An individual is accordingly not protected from being 
prosecuted separately by federal and state authorities. The ability to punish individuals is a 
reflection of the sovereign power. ‘We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from 
different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject–matter within the same 
territory . . . Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and 
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dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.’
69 
This power has different 
origins and is exercised separately by different sovereigns; the state on the one hand and the 
federation on the other.  However, given the division of competences between the two levels 
of government one might assume that in most cases a direct overlap, thereby creating the 
possibility of two crimes in two legal orders from one act, would not arise very frequently. 
Indeed, the dual sovereignty rule could be justified on the basis that the different legal orders 




This ‘interest based’ theory is however disproved by considering that dual sovereignty 
doctrine applies equally between states, ie on a horizontal level. In such a case both states 
are exercising the same competence within their respective spheres. An application of the 
dual sovereignty rule in this context implies that where an individual is tried and convicted 
in one State he can be tried and convicted for precisely the same act in a second State. Just as 
the federal and state levels reflect different sovereigns, each state represents a different 
sovereign. ‘A State’s interest in vindicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of 
its laws by definition can never be satisfied by another State’s enforcement of its own 
laws…In recognition of this fact, the [US Supreme] Court consistently has endorsed the 
principle that a single act constitutes an offence against each sovereign who’s laws are 
violated by that act.’
71
 While phrased in terms of sovereignty the language of the Supreme 
Court could easily be translated into Duffian terms. Each sovereign in effect represents a 
separate community, each of which has the authority to both define what it deems wrongful 
conduct and to punish individuals accordingly. Two communities, each of which is wronged, 
reflect two crimes, both of which can be punished. The United States in its understanding of 
the application of the double jeopardy rule between states thereby reflects a particular view 
of crime and of the communities that make up its federation. 
 
The exact opposite situation obtains in the European Union with opposite implications for 
our understanding of its respective communities. Prosecution and punishment in one 
Member State means prosecution and punishment is impossible in another Member State. 
An individual is called to account before a national court and, if convicted, is punished by 
the sovereign power of that Member State. It is certainly an act of wrong-doing against that 
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Member State and against the community that Member State embodies. However, the effect 
of that calling to account is Union-wide, it is valid and applicable throughout the Union vis-
à-vis all Member States.  
 
The result is that where two or more Member States claim jurisdiction, a race to prosecute 
can arise.
72
 In an attempt to avoid the practical difficulties associated with parallel 
proceedings, the Union has attempted to institute rules for the coordination of criminal 
jurisdiction,
73
 in effect formalising the delegation of the calling to account to a single 
Member State.
74
 However, reflecting the inherent national nature of the process and the 
sovereign power contained in the right to punish, the Framework Decision on Conflicts of 
Criminal Jurisdiction merely contains an obligation for consultation between national 
authorities. It does not establish binding rules allocating jurisdiction. The contrast with the 
ideas raised by the Commission in its Green Paper on the matter is notable. The Commission 
proposed certain objective criteria for allocation and even floated the idea of a Union body 
to eventually resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between national prosecutors, while noting 
such a move would ‘complex questions’.
75
 Such an institution was not created in the final 
instruments and in fact it was underlined that Member State’s would not be obliged to 
relinquish jurisdiction.
76
 National communities jealously retain the authority to define 
wrongful behaviour, define when they consider themselves to be wronged and more 




Yet once judged, all other Member States are prevented from prosecuting the same 
individual for the same act. The result is that crime has been punished, the wrong-doing 
expunged. It is by implication a single act of wrong-doing with reference to the Union as a 
whole that has been accounted for. No other acts of wrong-doing against other Member 
States remain to be punished. The individual Member State is, in addition to acting on its 
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own interests, in a sense, acting on behalf of the Union as a whole. For Lööf this represents a 
‘regulatory principle’ for the system of shared enforcement of criminal law established under 
the European Arrest Warrant, a system that in turn can only be justified by assuming the 
Union represents a single social contract as described in chapter 5.
78
 In Duff’s words, the 
Union could be said to be a single community of citizens.  
 
However, the supranational community that emerges is distinctly multi-levelled and indeed 
paradoxical. It is not quite so simple as assuming a single, supranational social contract as 
described by Lööf. It is through the wronging of the national community that an individual 
wrongs the supranational community and it is through the punishment by the national 
community that the wrong is accounted for. In one sense the crime remains an offense 
against the national community; it is defined by national law. It is in some sense difficult 
thus to speak of it as a crime against the whole Union, especially if the act does not represent 
a crime in all parts of the Union. Yet this is precisely the implication of the transnational ne 
bis in idem principle. This supranational community has emerged through, and relies on 
transnational (and therefore ultimately national) process and principles. It is through 
wronging a national community that one wrongs the supranational community - as it is 
composed of other communities - and it is through being called to account on a national 
level that one is called to account supranationally. This national calling to account is 
transformed through the transnational ne bis in idem principle, interpreted in light of free 
movement into a supranational calling to account, that in turn reflects a ultimately composite 
supranational community of citizens.
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There are a number of reasons why a community might wish to criminalise certain behaviour 
and hence deem it wrongful. Firstly, the criminal law can be used to protect and promote a 
variety of interests, each of different social worth. Criminal law can be seen as a means of 
maintaining public order in society and in particular maintaining freedom in conditions of 
security by minimising harmful or risky conduct between individuals. Classic offences 
against the person, such as assault and murder might be said to fall into this category. 
Secondly, the criminal law can be seen as a means of expressing the values of a particular 
society: as an on-going and reflexive process by which society makes manifest and 
reinforces its collective identity by proscribing conduct that offends against these values. 
Thirdly, the criminal law may also be used to protect distinctly public goods: collective 
goods that bring benefit to society as a whole or that are seen as an aspect of the society’s 
collective historical, economic or environmental patrimony, such as the environment, 
cultural heritage or a proper functioning market. These reasons for criminalisation are 




Following Duff’s account, the unifying characteristic of crimes is that they are public 
wrongs. They are wrongs shared by the community as a whole and that are experienced by 
the community, alongside and often through the wrong suffered by the individual citizen. 
What constitutes wrongful conduct and publically wrongful conduct is an open category, 
defined by the particular society in which the criminal law operates. It can therefore 
accommodate all of the above reasons for criminalisation, depending on the context specific 
definition of wrongness. Acts may be deemed wrongful simply for breaching the shared-
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 Serious harm to individuals may be considered wrongful, made 
public by its shared quality in which the group is offended on behalf of the individual.
3
 
Damage to certain public goods, shared by the community and seen as particularly valuable 
for intrinsic or instrumental purposes, can be seen as publically wrongful. And while these 
can also been seen as manifesting a harm principle it is because that harm is deemed a wrong 




Up to now we have been considering the case of the treatment of criminal law in 
transnational processes; the social integration of citizens in other member states and the 
construction of a single area of justice through mutual recognition instruments. These 
processes, while giving rise to supranational norms and indeed indirectly reflecting a 
supranational community, have been based on national substantive criminal law. It is 
national criminal law that justifies expulsion and national criminal offences that are at stake 
in both the operation of the EAW FD
5
 and Article 54 CISA. It is the classification of certain 
acts as wrongful by national communities and offences against those communities that have 
been at stake. This chapter explores the extent to which EU criminal law is capable of 
articulating public wrongs on behalf of the Union as a whole and of communicating the 
wrongful character of those actions (or omissions) to individual citizens. It therefore consists 
of an analysis as to the capacity of the Union to reflect a supranational community that 
stands in an independent relationship to individual Union citizens. As crimes are wrongs 
classified as such by virtue of the particular values and nature of the community, they imply 
the existence of such a community of shared values. The EU’s competence to criminalise, to 
identify conduct that attracts punishment, has been steadily growing over the past two 
decades, reaching a certain apogee in the Treaty of Lisbon. Can we therefore say that the EU 
now has the ability though its criminal law competence, to identify common values and 
interests and to label them wrongful? Are there such things as European public wrongs and 
therefore a tentative European community expressed through its criminal law and that calls 
individual citizens to account for wrongs done to the community and fellow citizens? 
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Structural Limitations on an EU Supranational Community:  
 
The EU is not a state; its competences are limited in various ways and are exercised in a 
multi-levelled framework. The first point to be made is that there are key differences 
between the manner in which the EU exercises its competence to criminalise behaviour and 
a state’s ability to criminalise behaviour. Limitations on the EU’s ability to articulate a 
common supranational definition of wrongful conduct flow from its limited competences 
and the manner they are exercised. It is a complementary legal order, operating according to 
a principle of attributed competences and for the most part sharing those competences with 
Member States. Its authority to act is limited in scope and in its decision making structures, 
implementation and enforcement it relies on the political processes and legal systems of 
Member States to complete its work.
6
 This is especially true in the area of criminal law.
7
 
These limitations frustrate the ability of the Union to both articulate and especially to 
communicate the publically wrongful character of particular conduct.  
 
Articulation of Public Wrongs - Limited Scope for EU Criminalisation 
 
Post-Lisbon the EU has two express legal bases for criminalisation: Article 83(1) TFEU 
which replaces the old ‘third pillar’ competence of approximation and Article 83(2) TFEU 
allowing harmonisation of criminal law in order to better enforce other areas of law that 
have already been the subject of harmonising legislation at a European level.
8
 In different 
ways they are restricted in their ability to identify conduct as wrongful; they are limited, 
ancillary and functional.  
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The EU’s competence to criminalise is first and foremost an unusually limited competence. 
This does not necessarily prevent the EU articulating common European public interest but 
it does limit its potential scope. Article 83(1) TFEU is limited both in the existence of certain 
preconditions and it is further limited by the establishment of a closed list of areas in which 
the EU may legislate. It provides for legislation only in the case of ‘particularly serious 
crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or 
from a special need to combat them on a special basis’.
9
 It is a limited and distinctly 
complementary role for the European Union dealing with transnational criminal 
phenomena.
10
 Not content to limit the Union’s competence by establishing pre-conditions, 
the drafters of the Treaty also identified the particular areas that do in fact meet those 
conditions; in addition to the requirements of transnationality and seriousness, Union action 
is limited to a closed list of ten areas. The list may be expanded but only by a unanimous 
decision by Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, the rather 
burdensome legislative procedure limiting the scope for independent action on behalf of the 
Union legislator to identify conduct worthy of criminalisation. The competence contained in 
Article 83(2) TFEU on the other hand is not limited to a closed list of certain areas but is 
indirectly limited by the precondition of harmonisation in another EU policy area and the 




Not only is Article 83(1) TFEU a limited competence, it was traditionally seen as an 
ancillary competence. Approximation in criminal law was historically justified by the need 
to secure confidence in a common area of movement. It was thought that diversity in 
criminal regimes would lead to criminals locating in more lenient jurisdictions, particularly 
when committing crimes from a distance, such as organised crime or cyber-crime. Such 
measures were first presented as mere flanking measures, designed to deal with negative 
side-effects of free movement.
12
 Approximation was seen as a means of preventing ‘forum 
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shopping’ amongst criminals in a new borderless area.
13
 With perhaps more foundation, 
approximation was also seen as facilitating cooperation between judicial and police agencies 
in criminal matters. Dealing with common definitions and common offences made joint 
police investigations and cooperation generally easier. The approximation of criminal law 
facilitated judicial cooperation by dealing with problems of dual criminality and by helping 
to establish trust between judiciaries. Indeed, as the criminal law competence of the EU 
developed, the competence of approximation became distinctly subservient to that of mutual 
recognition instruments. Mutual recognition began to attract real attention in the Hague 
Programme
14
 leading to the rolling out of a comprehensive suite of mutual recognition 
instruments in the following years, beginning with European Arrest Warrant Framework 
Decision.
15
 Mutual recognition took prime place in the new system of competences in the 
Treaty of Lisbon while in the Stockholm Programme the hierarchy between mutual 
recognition and approximation was made explicit: ‘[t]he approximation, where necessary, of 
substantive and procedural law should facilitate mutual recognition.’
16
 Thus the competence 
granted the EU under Article 83(1) TFEU was not originally envisaged as forming the basis 
for the Union to assert any autonomous notion of public wrong. It was traditionally viewed 
as ancillary and subservient to the goal of mutual recognition of national criminal law. 
 
If the Article 83(1) competence is ancillary, the Article 83(2) TFEU contains a distinctly 
functional criminal competence. While not limited in the same way as Article 83(1) TFEU to 
a closed list of measures, it is intended above all to be an effective enforcement tool rather 
than expressive of a wrongful determination by the Union. This distinctly regulatory 
function of Article 83(2) TFEU crimes can be seen in their evolution. The competence now 
contained in Article 83(2) TFEU is directly descended from a doctrine designed to ensure the 
correct implementation of Union law in the context of national procedures. The 
characterisation of penalties as needing to be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ in 
Greek Maize,
17
 the forerunner of Environmental Crimes,
18
 is linked to the need for Member 
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States to ensure that ‘infringements of Community law are penalised under conditions, both 
procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of 
national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’
19
 As Baker has noted,
20
 this test substantially 
mirrors the principle of equivalent and effectiveness applied in order to frame the procedural 
autonomy of Member States when EU law is at stake before national courts.
21
 As with the 
general doctrines of equivalence and effectiveness in the area of remedies, the reasoning of 
the Court in Greek Maize is similarly based on the principle of sincere cooperation now 
contained in Article 4(2) TEU.
22
 And as with remedies, it is above all a question of 
effectiveness of EU law in the context of national legal systems. 
 
That functional character is now enshrined in the wording of Article 83(2) TFEU which 
explicitly links its exercise to situations where ‘the approximation of criminal laws and 
regulations of the member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a 
Union policy in an area that has been subject to harmonisation measures…’ It is not a stand-
alone competence but rather is something that complements for the purposes of enforcement 
another Union policy and goal, be it environmental, financial regulation etc. It is 
quintessentially regulatory criminal law. 
 
This functional character can also be seen in the operation of the Article 83(2) TFEU 
competence as discussed by commentators and policymakers. Much discussion on Article 
83(2) TFEU has centred on the criteria of necessity and effectiveness as limits to the 
competence of the Union.
23
 These criteria, vague as they may be,
24
 are seen as expressing 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the field of criminal law, essentially 
regulating the relations and division of powers between the Union and the Member States. 
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However, in addition to the competence question, in their understanding of these criteria, 
policy makers and commentators have adopted, both implicitly and explicitly, a distinctly 
functional and moreover utilitarian vision of the criminal law competence contained in 
Article 83(2) TFEU. It is seen as a policy tool designed to reduce and combat undesirable 
behaviour through its capacity to deter actual and potential criminals. Deterrence provides 
the exclusive prism for understanding the criteria contained in Article 83(2) TFEU. And it is 
deterrence not in furtherance of any independent or intrinsic reason for criminalisation but to 
enforce an additional, principal, goal. EU action in the field and the adoption of criminal law 
measures are only deemed to be ‘effective’ if it ensures compliance with the underlying 
policy by creating costs for individuals when engaging in the conduct deemed to be 
prejudicial to the underlying policy. Similarly, they meet the ‘necessity’ criteria only if other, 
less onerous forms of sanctioning, such as administrative sanctions, would be incapable of 
achieving the same result.
25
 It is a utilitarian vision of the criminal law designed, through the 
application of sanctions and costs for individuals, to reduce harmful activities or promote 
particular behaviours amongst individuals in order to secure other goals or benefits. It is 
consequentialist in that it seeks to achieve another aim and is utilitarian in that it does so by 




Even the capacity of the criminal law to express social disapproval, an aspect which one 
imagines would be more closely linked to the forging of a Union wide perspective on 
wrongfulness and the expressive dimension of criminal law, when it is acknowledged, is 
framed by the Commission and commentators in terms of its usefulness in deterring 
individuals; the connotations of social disapproval that come with designating a particular 
conduct as criminal are primarily seen as another ‘cost’ imposed on individuals in an attempt 
to dissuade them from a particular activity. ‘[C]riminal law sanctions may be chosen when it 
is considered important to stress strong disapproval in order to ensure deterrence. The 
entering of convictions in criminal records can have a particular deterrent character.’ 
(emphasis in original)
27
 It is viewing the expressive dimension of the criminal law through 
purely utilitarian lens. The underlying goal of Article 83(2) TFEU, even when social 
disapproval is invoked, is not primarily to express social disapproval but to ensure better 
regulatory compliance for another Union policy through the imposition of costs. 
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The EU’s competence to criminalise as found in Articles 83(1) and 83(2) TFEU appears 
limited in its ability to express the values and hence communal identity of a Union-wide 
supranational normative community. Article 83(1) TFEU is exceptionally limited and 
ancillary, limited to so-called ‘serious transnational crimes’ that necessarily engage a cross-
border interest. It is ancillary to national enforcement and has been justified primarily as a 
side-effect of free movement. To a large extent it could be seen as an institutionalised 
outgrowth of transnational processes of cross-border movement. Article 83(2) TFEU on the 
other hand is framed explicitly as a functional competence, parasitic on other Union wide 
competences. It would appear to exclude the identification of wrongs. Both of these legal 
bases are limited and linked, in different ways, to other Union activities. Neither allows for a 
wide ranging ability on the part of the Union to articulate conduct it deems to be wrongful in 
and of itself, independent of other concerns. And tellingly the question of the EU legislating 
in the core area of criminal law, those crimes deemed mala in se, has never even been raised; 
it being accepted uncritically as an area exclusively for  the Member States. 
 
Communication of Public Wrongs: EU Criminal Law as Multi-Levelled 
 
Much of the commentary on the limitations on the EU’s competence to criminalise, 
particularly those contained in Article 83(2) TFEU, has focused on the adequacy or 
otherwise of those limitations from the point of the constitutional balance between Member 
States and the Union.
28
 Indeed there appears to be an insistence (no doubt linked to concerns 
regarding sovereignty)
29
 on the need to retain a distinctly limited role for the Union in this 
area and a continued focus on the primacy of national actors in the field of criminal justice, 
not least of all national legislatures and governments. While relevant, the institutional 
concerns and constitutional balance of powers between the Union and the Member States are 
not the focus of this chapter. However, they do point to another feature of criminal law in the 
Union: the necessity of Union criminal law to be mediated by national law. This in turn 
inhibits the communicative capacity of Union criminal law; to directly communicate to 
individuals through prohibition of conduct and enforcement of the law, the wrongful 
character of certain acts and omissions. This is manifested in two points in particular: firstly 
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the inability of EU criminal law to directly establish criminal liability for individuals and 
secondly, the persistent absence of an EU criminal justice system. 
 
The Union cannot directly impose criminal liability 
 
The Union cannot itself impose criminal liability and is only capable of adopting directives 
in order to indirectly criminalise behaviour.
30
 The directive is a multi-levelled instrument par 
excellence and necessitates implementation by national law. Directives are binding on 
Member States but cannot bind individuals with the result that the enactment of national law 
is required before individuals are subject to any obligations. This fact is well known and has 
been applied in the case of criminal law for some decades now. In Pretore di Salo the Court 
stated that the directive in question ‘cannot, of itself and independently of a national law 
adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of determining or 
aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the 
provisions of that directive.’
31
 This reasoning was explicitly based on the Court’s prior 
jurisprudence on the absence of direct effect of directives.
32
 The subsequent evolution of the 
caselaw on the imposition of criminal liability by the Union has revealed a fundamental 
inability on the part of the Union to by itself create criminal liability. 
 
The straightforward application of the inability of directives to directly impose liability on 
individuals has evolved into a general principle that Union law cannot aggravate the criminal 
liability of individuals. Unlike in other areas of law, the indirect effect of directives has been 
explicitly set aside in the area of criminal liability. Thus in Kolpinghuis the Court accepted 
that the principle of sincere cooperation would normally imply a duty of conform 
interpretation and an obligation to interpret national law in light of Union law. However, if 
the fulfilment of such a duty led to the aggravation of criminal liability, its application would 
have to be set aside.
33
 In contrast to Pretore di Salo, the judgment in Kolpinghuis was based 
not only on the nature of directives, but also from the general principles of Union law and in 
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particular the principle of legality and non-retroactivity of criminal law. This move from an 
argument based on the lack of direct effect to one based on general principles allowed the 
Court subsequently to extend the principle to regulations, at least those requiring some 
degree of national implementing measures. In X the Court accepted that while the principle 
of conform interpretation would apply to create possible civil remedies (and by implication 





That the Union legal order recognises the principle of legality is not in and of itself 
particularly controversial and indeed is to be welcomed. However, the real question at stake 
in the caselaw is not whether criminal liability should be laid down in a legal instrument 
validly adopted - i.e. that it should enjoy the quality of ‘legality’ - but rather which level of a 
multi-levelled legal order is competent to do so - i.e. the question is whose legality. 
 
The implicit answer flowing from the jurisprudence that the principle of legality operates at 
the national level.
35
 Mere adoption by the Union of measures criminalising conduct is not 
sufficient to meet the requisite standard of legality. Union law in the criminal field quite 
simply does not enjoy that quality. This deficiency is revealed by the contrasting reasoning 
and conclusions reached by the Advocate General and the Court in Berlusconi.
36
 Advocate 
General Kokott found that the offending piece of national legislation rendered a situation 
that was previously in compliance with Union law into a situation that breached Union law 
and should therefore be set aside, leaving the original, more stringent, regime in place. 
According to the Advocate General, the principle of the retroactive application of the more 
lenient criminal sanction or regime was not relevant. That principle applied in order to allow 
an individual to benefit from an altered assessment of the conduct on the part of the 
legislature. However, in the Advocate General’s opinion the legislature had not in fact 
altered its opinion because the relevant legislature was the Union legislature.
37
 The Court on 
the other hand, applied the principle of the application of the more lenient sanction. The 
subsequent national measure did breach Union law, but was not set aside as in normal 
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circumstances it should be. The Court’s reasoning was largely based on the nature of the 
directive and its inability to bind individuals or impose obligations. In this sense it marks an 
interesting return to the classic ‘direct effect’ reasoning of Pretore di Salo.
38
 But considering 
it in light of the AG’s reasoning, implicit in the Court’s rather technical judgment is the fact 
that it is not the Union legislature that ultimately imposes criminal liability. It is an 
affirmation of the multi-levelled nature of the process of criminalisation in the Union legal 
order and the inability of the Union legislature to identify offending conduct that would bind 





The principle of legality retains a place in Union law but it is an indirect legality mediated 
by national law. In fact, the concern of the Union that when criminalising conduct as a 
consequence of Union law the principle of legality is respected, is reflected in a preference 
for legislation, rather than regulations or other administrative measures, at a national level 
when criminal sanctions are at stake.
40
 The principle of institutional autonomy that might 
otherwise apply is attenuated to some extent by the general principles of Union law and in 
particular the principle of legality. Legality does exist and is to a certain extent mandated by 
the Union legal order, but at the national level.  
 
The general principle that appears to have emerged, that Union law cannot aggravate 
criminal liability is true, but is not the whole truth. The truth is that Union law cannot even 
create criminal liability for individuals. Criminal law must enjoy a certain quality of 
‘legality’, adopted by a competent and legitimate legislature, in a sufficiently clear manner 
and enjoy such legality at the time of the offending conduct. But that process, by which an 
offence acquires that quality of legality, takes place at a national level; not at the Union 
level. Thus the accusations sometimes levelled at Union instruments for being too vague
41
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and hence breaching the principle of legality miss the mark. The Union instrument is not the 
legal instrument that renders the conduct criminal. It is the national implementing legislation 





Operating within national criminal justice systems 
 
The systemic nature of the criminal justice system is one that is often raised both in general 
discussions on criminal law.
43
 Criminal justice involves a variety of actors and institutions, 
at different stages of the process and with varying levels of discretion.
44
 Putative criminal 
acts need to be defined, detected, enforced, judged and sanctions applied, all in a context that 
respects the rights of the accused and the need for an effective and fair process. The 
legislature, the police, prosecutors, the judiciary, prison services and probationary bodies are 
all involved. Various aspects of the system interact, complementing and compensating for 
each other; obligations to prosecute may be alleviated by greater discretion in relation to 
conviction; a lesser degree of detection and prosecution may be compensated by a higher 
sanction and so on.  
 
There is no EU criminal justice system in the proper sense. EU criminal law is applied in the 
context of national criminal justice systems and must take account of their particular features 
and characteristics that are generally a product of divergent and distinct historical 
experiences. There is a distinct absence of an institutional structure for the enforcement of 
substantive EU criminal law. There are no EU prosecutors (to date), police, criminal courts 
or prisons. Eurojust and Europol perform coordinating roles amongst national and 
prosecutorial authorities in order to share information and facilitate cooperation and 
coordination in cross-border instances.
45
 The one example of a putative supranational 
criminal justice institution with competence to prosecute, the European Public Prosecutors 
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behaviour) but the obligations imposed on individuals at any given time.  
42
 Note that this is echoed in the Court’s pronouncement on the application of the principle of legality in the 
context of European Arrest Warrant proceedings; legality is assured not by the quality of the European Arrest 
Warrant Framework Decision but rather by the national legislation of the issuing Member State. See Advocaten 
voor de Wereld (n 35) para 52. See discussion in chapter 5.  
43
 For a treatment of the criminal justice system as such see Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (OUP 2004).  
44
 See a related discussion of the concept of effectiveness in the context of multiple national systems by 
Suominen (n 23).  
45




Office (EPPO), has met with significant resistance from national parliaments, with 
complaints raised in the context of the Early Warning Mechanism.
46
 Above all there is no 
EU trial. For Duff the trial was the central forum in which the individual was called to 
account before his or her fellow citizens. It was a public and communicative process 
involving a rule-governed and symbolically loaded dialogue between the different parties 
determining and assessing the wrong to the community and an opportunity for the accused to 
defend or justify his actions.
47
 It is the forum through which individuals as citizens answer 




Similarly EU law only specifies the punishment to a certain extent and certainly does not 
enforce the punishment of any individual, be it custodial, monetary or some form of 
alternative sanction. Under the old Environmental Crimes jurisprudence the competence to 
specify sanctions was explicitly denied the then Community
49
 whereas under the old third 
pillar sanctions were imposed but were of a minimum nature, typically providing for a 
minimum-maximum sentence (the so-called min-max solution) in order to facilitate the 
operation of mutual recognition instruments.
50
 While there have been some efforts at 
developing a sanctioning policy,
51
 sanctioning still remains to a large extent the purview of 
the national legal system and subject to their various systems and must operate within that 
system leading to potential variations in their elaboration and enforcement through prison 
and probation authorities.
52
 Of course, the Union generally lacks an enforcement capacity 
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and always relies on national agencies and institutions to ensure all Union law is applied. 
The Union is not a state and lacks core features of the state, including the ability to exercise 
force. For this it relies on the Member States.
53
 However, the enforcement of a particular 
sanction and the infliction of ‘hard treatment’ in the furtherance of expressing disapproval is 
particularly important in the context of criminal law. The very purpose of the criminal law as 
a communicative exercise is embodied in the application and the imposition of sanctions. 
Indeed, it is this feature that for some scholars defines criminal law.
54
 As with the trial, the 
sanction is a vital component of the expressive dimension of the criminal law. It is through 
the sanction and in particular the imposition of ‘hard treatment’
55
 that the community 
communicates its moral disapprobation, underlines the wrong it considers has been done 
both to the individual victim and the community as a whole and facilitates the reform, 
reconciliation and repentance of the offender through a system of secular penance.
56
 As part 
of a multi-level system that is necessarily mediated by national law, Union law expressly 
(and for good reasons) does not have capacity to engage in a meaningful communicative 
activity with wrong-doers directly. For all the talk of the Commission of criminal sanctions 
demonstrating ‘social-disapproval’ this is only very weakly manifested and communicated to 
the accused and sentenced as social disapproval of a supranational community at Union 
level. The individual is not called to account within a European forum, instead it is before a 
national court, representing the national community that he or she is judged and censure 
pronounced.  
 
A number of points have been made thus far pointing out the limitations on the capacity for 
the Union through its criminal law to articulate and communicate public wrongs at a 
supranational level. Firstly, the competences of the Union are necessarily limited, thus 
limiting its scope. More importantly, these competences are limited in such as way such as to 
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restrict the expression of autonomously supranationally determined public wrongs. Article 
83(1) TFEU is an ancillary competence whereas Article 83(2) TFEU only provides for 
functional criminalisation. It would appear that the role of the European Union in specifying 
acts which it considers to be intrinsically wrong is limited. Secondly, it was pointed out that 
the multi-levelled nature of the EU criminal justice system militates against it representing 
for individuals an autonomous supranational disapproval of particular actions. Flowing 
originally from the nature of the directive but since relying on the principle of legality, it 
would appear that the Union for all its being a Union of peoples, quite simply cannot 
independently impose criminal liability on individuals. The prized feature of direct effect, 
creating a direct link with individuals, does not operate in the field of criminal law. In a 
related sense, the mediation of criminal law by national legal systems and institutions,
57
 
stymies the normal communicative function of the criminal law in expressing disapproval 
for particular conduct on behalf of the community through trial and punishment. 
 
Emergence of a Supranational Identity 
 
The competences of the EU in substantive criminal law are limited and instrumental. 
Nonetheless, one cannot deny that it is criminal law and necessarily performs an expressive 
function.
58
 EU criminal law is limited both in its scope and its structure in articulating public 
wrongs, but it is not entirely devoid of such a capacity. Behind the structural limitations 
imposed on the Union both in its regulatory competence, now found in Article 83(2) TFEU, 
and its ‘Eurocrimes’ competence found in Article 83(1) TFEU, lies an ability, limited and 
indirect, to identify certain acts or conduct deemed wrongful by the Union and hence to give 
expression to certain values and normative choices.  
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European Public Goods 
 
It is perfectly open to a society to consider respect and protection for certain public goods of 
the community as elements of its normative code, the breach of which constitutes not simply 
a harm but a wrong against the community (albeit it a wrong by virtue of the harm). Indeed 
for Duff ‘wrongful violations of public goods seem to be strong candidates for 
criminalisation’.
59
 This purpose, while linked, exists alongside the purely functional or 
instrumental view of the criminal law. Criminal law may be seen as a deterrent and perform 
an ancillary role of preventing and minimising harm to a collective good. However, that is 
not its primary goal and indeed other forms of regulatory law may more effective in this 
regard.
60
 Rather it is intended to express the moral condemnation of the community for the 
violation of a public good. It is to identify certain interests of the community, damage or 
harm to which constitutes a wrong against the community and to call individual citizens to 




EU law identifies a number of public goods the violation of which constitutes a crime and 
therefore a wrong. Most obviously in Environmental Crimes the Court of Justice highlighted 
the specificity of the environment as an objective of the EU as one that is particularly 
important and transversal: ‘[I]n the words of Article 6 EC “[e]nvironmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community 
policies and activities”, a provision which emphasises the fundamental nature of that 
objective and its extension across the range of those policies and activities’.
62
 The 
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specifically public and collective nature of the environment as a good was highlighted by 
AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer: ‘[t]here thus emerges a right to enjoy an acceptable environment, 
not so much on the part of the individual as such, but as a member of a group, in which the 
individual shares common social interests.’
63
 A number of other European public goods can 
be identified alongside the environment the violation of which constitutes a wrong. Baker 
has noted the internal market has been identified as a public good to be protected (at least 
implicitly) by criminal law.
64
 Unlike in the case of Greek Maize,
65
 in Spanish Strawberries
66
 
the Court was concerned not just with the rights of individuals but the collective interests of 
the then Community.
67
 The protests of farmers and the inaction of the state authorities was 
framed as a threat not simply to the importers directly concerned but as threatening the 
‘integrity’ of the market and its future availability to the Community as a whole to whom it 
belonged as ‘a collective asset’.
68
 Thus Member States were obliged to ensure, through their 
criminal justice system, that this collective asset was protected and preserved. Related to the 
internal market, the financial system is also a concern of EU criminal law with a recent 
Directive adopted mandating specific and tough sanctions for market abuse.
69





 the need to protect the ‘integrity’ of the financial 
system has been stressed and is now protected by criminal law. The financial resources of 
the Union is another public good protected by criminal law,
72
 complete with a proposed EU 
institution to prosecute such fraud.
73
 Currency, and in particular the Euro, is also a good 
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protected by supranational criminal law.
74
 Finally, the provision of security itself and the 
wide range of measures that have been adopted and in particular the constitution of the EU 
as a ‘secure space’
75




While there is no explicit pronouncement that definitively identifies the criteria the Union 
uses to identify public goods worthy of protection by criminal law it would appear that the 
examples identified above fall into two categories.
77
 On the one hand there is the simple 
category of classic public goods corresponding to policy domains that have (to varying 
extent) been appropriated by the Union either through a functionalist spill-over effect or in 
its quest to secure output legitimacy. Under these criteria a clean environment and public 
security would be considered public goods par excellence. In the language of economists 
they are non-excludable (individuals cannot be excluded from their enjoyment) and non-
rivalous (the use by one individual does not diminish its use by another).
78
 These qualities 
mean they typically will not be provided by private market operators and must therefore be 
provided by the public, in this case the European Union. In these areas the EU represents a 
typical public authority ensuring the protection of a classic public good. 
 
The other group of public goods identified above are similarly public goods in the economic 
sense of being non-excludable and non-rivalous but have an additional quality that appears 
to be linked more specifically to the nature of the Union itself as a polity and which explains 
the particular language used by the Court and the legislature in identifying them. Those other 
public goods appear to be more clearly associated with the Union’s traditional vocation of 
generating prosperity through creating market institutions at a European level; the internal 
market itself, the financial system and the currency. These are institutional facts constructed 
by Union law.
79
 These European-wide market institutions are systems of rules that govern 
market participation by individuals in such a way as to secure prosperity. Their protection 
lies specifically in the maintenance of the ‘integrity’ of the body of rules that constitute the 
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institutional fact. Similarly, in the case of currency counterfeiting the Union is specifically 
concerned with ensuring ‘trust in the genuine character’ of the currency.
80
 Hence the 
references to the systemic nature of these particular ‘public goods’ by both the legislation 
itself and the Court. 
 
The Union has not simply identified certain public goods worthy of protection but has, by 
insisting on the use of criminal rather than civil law, indicated that it views an attempt to 
undermine or cause harm to such goods as wrongful in a public sense i.e. an offense against 
the community. While much of the discussion on the use of the criminal law has focused on 
the utilitarian and instrumental purpose in enforcing EU objectives there are some 
indications that the Union institutions are aware of the condemnatory function of the 
criminal law and are anxious to use the criminal law for this precise purpose. Behind much 
of the struggle over competence in the Environmental Crimes saga lay the ability of the 
Community itself (now Union) to prescribe criminal law measures rather than rely on the 
traditional formula of ‘effective and equivalent’ measures and leave the decision to 
criminalise in the hands of Member State governments. While for the most part emphasising 
the instrumental nature of these measures as deterrents, the Commission has not been 
ignorant of the condemnation and social disapproval that is communicated via criminal law
81
 
and in its arguments before the Court in Ship Source Pollution it stressed the fact that the 
conduct concerned ‘must be regarded as reprehensible’ and hence requiring criminal rather 
than civil sanctions.
82
 Similarly, AG Mazak described the criminal law as ‘a barometer of the 




By insisting on the competence of the Union to criminalise such conduct EU law is by 
implication identifying certain public goods as European public goods, harm to which 
constitute a European public wrong.  In Ship Source Pollution the AG stressed the fact that 
‘[i]t must be recalled that upholding Community (now Union) law is the responsibility of the 
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Community (now Union) institutions….if the legal interests protected in such offences were 
one of the objectives of the Community (now Union), no one would dispute the ability of its 
law-making bodies to require the Member States to prosecute in criminal law.’
84
 In a 
somewhat different context in Åkerberg Fransson it was the Union’s interest in the 
protection of its own resources and the treaty obligation placed on Member States to ensure 
their protection that rendered it a matter of EU law thereby ensuring the application of the 




Behind the competence question and specifically the ability of the Union to prescribe 
criminal sanctions as a means of the effective enforcement of a Union objective or policy 
lies the ability of the Union itself to identify European public goods, harm to which 
constitutes a European public wrong and indirectly manifest a European community. For 
Duff the condition that a wrong be public before it be criminalised does not by itself provide 
the content of the criminal law. Rather it simply indicates that the precise content will vary 
depending on the community involved, its purpose, norms and values. What is public is 
therefore is context and norm specific.
86
 For the Union, threatening the integrity of market 
institutions would appear to be particularly strong candidates for public wrongs, indicating 
that for the Union at least, the market and its attendant rules and systems are a public good 
worthy of respect. By declaring an act criminal, the community is declaring what wrongs are 
considered public in accordance with its particular principles and values. By insisting that 
the Union declare such conduct criminal it is implying that the community for whom it is a 
public concern is the Union itself. 
 
European Public Values  
 
All law involves valuation; a judgement of how we stand in relation to acts, relationships 
and objects.
87
 The criminal law is the judgment of the community of certain acts, or in more 
limited cases omissions, it deems to be publically wrongful. It therefore involves an 
assessment of conduct according to its wrongfulness and necessarily involves a normative 
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valuation of that act. While Article 83(1) TFEU has been justified primarily in terms of its 
ancillary role in facilitating mutual recognition and police and judicial cooperation in a space 
of free movement, it cannot entirely efface the valuative or expressive character of declaring 
a particular act or activity criminal. Indeed, for some areas of activity it would appear to be 
the principal function of the Union’s legislative activity.  
 
Turner has described in detail the expressive nature of the Framework Decision on 
Combating Racism and Xenophobia.
88
 She has demonstrated conclusively that the ostensible 
justifications for the measure in harmonising national legislation to facilitate judicial 
cooperation are either not achieved or unnecessary, particularly following the abolition of 
double criminality requirements for the majority of mutual recognition instruments and in 
particular the EAW FD.
89
 The preparatory legislative documents contain various assertions 
of the particular values of the Union, in particular democracy, the rule of law and non-
discrimination, and how these in fact motivate and inform the legislation.
90
 These values 
make their way into the preamble of the framework decision that speaks of the principles of 
‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, 
principles upon which the European Union is founded and which are common to the 
Member States.’
91
 Indeed, given the failure to harmonise the most contentious aspect of 
racist speech - holocaust denial - and the failure to impose any requirements of enforcement 
and prosecution, its practical impact either as a harmonising instrument or an enforcement 
tool at a national level is likely to limited,
92
 leading to the conclusion that ‘the expressive 
value of the Framework Decision is greater than its practical impact...[and that]…the 
European Union is using the Framework Decision primarily to make a statement about the 




                                                 
88
 Jenia Iotcheva Turner, ‘The Expressive Dimension of EU Criminal Law’ (2012) 60 Am J Comp L 555. 
Although an alternative perspective would be that it is precisely because of the existence of a Union competence 
that the abolition of the double criminality rule is justified. See further chapter 5.  
89
 Ibid 572. 
90
 Ibid 571. 
91
 Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia 
by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/55 preamble point (1).  
92
 Turner (n 88) 572.  
93




Similar points can be made in relation to the Framework Decision to Combat Terrorism 
(FDTC).
94
 Enacted following the attacks on New York of 11 September 2011, the FDCT 
(alongside various other measures)
95
 is a reaction to a radically altered global environment 
involving a renewed affirmation of the principles of democracy and human rights and a 
rejection of violence as a means of political communication. The values of ‘human dignity, 
liberty, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’, 
alongside the principle of democracy are clear articulated in the preamble as values of the 
Union and its Member States as is the assertion that ‘terrorism constitutes one the most 
serious violations of those principles’.
96
 Its vague terms and inclusion of optional clauses 
point to its limited effectiveness as a harmonising tool and its use as a basis for cross-border 
cooperation is deemed superfluous. In terms of harmonisation what the FDCT does achieve 
is to introduce the so-called subjective element of terrorism. The objective acts that 
constitute terrorists acts were largely already criminalised under national law. What the 
Framework Decision does (in contradistinction to other international instruments) is render 
these specifically terrorist offences by virtue of the aim with which they are carried out; the 
subjective element. The purpose of the Framework Decision is therefore to articulate and 
alter the culpable dimension of the act; objectively it is the same act as other crimes but is 
rendered more culpable because it is carried out with a specific aim. In practice, what this 
has achieved is to apply a ‘pejorative’ label to certain acts, justifying further political and 
legal action by the Union and the Member States. As put by Murphy: ‘[t]he framework 
decision claims to approximate Member States’ criminal law and provide the basis for co-
operation and prevention. In reality it serves a less distinct and less distinguished purpose. It 
provides a legal mechanism by which to stigmatise a wide range of groups and individuals. 




Finally, attention should be drawn to a number of instruments that have been adopted that 
appear to display a particular concern with vulnerable individuals. EU criminal law appears 
to be particularly motivated by a desire to protect weak or vulnerable members of society 
and instruments adopted to achieve this appear to go well beyond minimal harmonisation 
measures. The Directive on the Sexual Exploitation of Children is a remarkable piece of 
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legislation and is notable for its breadth, comprehensiveness and its value laden language.
98
 
It offers a marked contrast to other harmonisation instruments, in particular the Framework 
Decisions, which tended to be terse and minimal in nature.
99
 Alongside the elements of 
various offences,
100









 and measures for the 
subsequent treatment of offenders both in terms of their rehabilitation but also criminal 
record and disqualification from various activities.
105
 In its application and in particular in 
aggravating sanctions for particularly vulnerable victims and for crimes that take place in the 
context of a relationship of responsibility
106
 it has a clear expressive and communicative 
function, articulating a particular judgment about the how to classify, not simply the harm, 
but the culpability and wrongfulness of particular acts. There is little or no attempt to justify 
the measure on the basis of a disparity between the legislation of Member States or the need 
to secure enhanced judicial cooperation and certainly no attempt to justify the 
comprehensive nature of the harmonisation effort on these grounds. There is no attempt to 
justify the replacement of the Framework Decision by the Directive. The sole reason for the 
new, much more comprehensive Directive is the question-begging assertion that ‘serious 
criminal offences such as the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography require a 
comprehensive approach.’
107
 While this is certainly true, it does not justify action by the 
European Union. Rather its depth, comprehensiveness and inclusion of key choices 
regarding the normative assessment and appropriate response to the phenomenon of the 
sexual exploitation of children can only be said to manifest a desire to appropriate a 
particular policy area, one that deals with particularly vulnerable individuals, and to express 
and give voice to a condemnation at a supranational level.
108
 According to the proposal the 
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legislation is aimed at combating acts that undermine ‘the core values of modern society 
relating to the special protection of children’ and are justified by the fact that ‘[n]ational 
legislation covers some of these problems, to varying degrees. However, it is not strong or 
consistent enough to provide a vigorous social response to this disturbing phenomenon’.
109
 
The justification for Union action is simply the fact that in the judgement of the Union 
legislature, or at least the proposing institution within that legislature, these are particularly 
serious wrongs and Member States do not do enough to identify and punish them as such. 
 
The Directive on the sexual exploitation of children is one example of the European Union 
intervening in a comprehensive fashion in order to criminalise harm to a particularly 
vulnerable class of individuals. Other examples of this concern with vulnerable victims can 
be seen in the Directive on Combating Human Trafficking.
110
 The Directive demonstrates a 
particular concern with the victims of human trafficking, mandating specific measures to 
ensure their protection in any investigation and proceedings
111
 and general assistance.
112
 
Again, especially vulnerable victims, especially children are protected
113
 and again, crimes 
against particularly vulnerable victims are to attract aggravated sanctions.
114
 A similar 
concern with vulnerable individuals can be seen in the Victims’ Rights Directive.
115
 Aside 
from a measure that is generally aimed at a vulnerable group of individuals, the Victims’ 





 It would appear that the European Union through various instruments has shown 
a particular concern for vulnerable groups of individuals and especially vulnerable victims of 
crime, either generally or through an intense interest in the protection of children. Through 
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its measures in this field it appears to be taking a principled stance and articulating a set of 
values it believes are, or should be, central to the identity of the European Union. 
 
Supranational Wrongs and Transnational Processes 
But perhaps to focus on the function of supranational approximation and harmonisation 
measures adopted by the Union as expressing an autonomous normative judgment at a 
supranational level is to miss an important role that this competence plays in the Union. The 
supranational competence to criminalise behaviour, as hinted above in the discussion of its 
ancillary nature, should be placed in the broader context of criminal law in the EU. It is in 
the interaction with national criminal law and transnational processes and by framing 
national criminal law that supranational criminal law reveals one of its major purposes. This 
is particularly relevant for the competence under Article 83(1) TFEU, the so-called 
‘Eurocrimes’, the ancillary nature of which has already been noted above. The absence of a 
capacity to create criminal liability or to communicate the wrongful character of an action 
directly to individuals is therefore not necessary. EU criminal law, in order to perform its 
function of complementing national law and providing a common supranational framework 
for the choices made at national level, does not and indeed should not have these 
characteristics. This use of supranational criminal law, as a means of endorsing national 
criminal law and facilitating transnational processes is evident actions by both the legislature 
and the Court. 
 
Weyembergh points out the relationship between double criminality and approximation of 
criminal law; approximation will result in a situation where the double criminality rule is 
automatically met.
118
 As we have seen in chapter 5, the abolition of the double criminality 
rule is premised on a shared conception of wrongs, that shared conception is assumed in the 
case of the list of 32 crimes for core crimes but also for crimes for which the Union has a 
approximating competence under Article 83(1) TFEU. By firstly attributing competence to 
the Union and then by enacting legislation, the Member States as drafters of the Treaty and 
as legislators in Council,
119
 have explicitly endorsed a certain shared vision of certain 
wrongful actions, particularly those that operate on a transnational level. This shared 
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conception of certain wrongs is then used to facilitate the operation of mutual recognition 
instruments and in particular the abolition of double criminality. 
 
Another, and certainly not inevitable, use of the supranational criminal law is by the Court in 




 the Court has 
used legislation adopted at a Union level to endorse and validate the choices made by 
Member States in exercising their prerogatives under the public policy exception. In the eyes 
of the Union, this conduct is similarly considered wrongful. This Union-level condemnation 
is now communicated to the individual concerned, albeit mediated by national criminal. It 
also serves to justify the notion that the expulsion of the Union citizen is not simply a 




All law is expressive to some extent and embodies an exercise in communal valuation. The 
criminal law is perhaps particularly explicit in this regard, identifying as it does wrongful 
conduct, communicated to the individual through a process of trial and judgment, often by 
peers, and the serving of a ‘penance’ in (aptly termed) penitentiaries. It therefore has an 
especially pertinent expressive function in articulating and communicating the community’s 
values to its individual members. 
 
EU criminal law is clearly limited in its capacity to articulate public wrongs. This is a 
function of its limited and attributed competence and the manner in which it is exercised. In 
its attributed nature it is by necessity limited to certain core areas, predefined by Member 
States on the one hand and by the action of the Union in other areas on the other. Moreover, 
its criminal competence does not even appear to have been created with an expressive 
function in mind. It is seen as ancillary and regulatory or functional. It is linked to either 
other criminal law measures, such as mutual recognition, other goals of the Union, such as 
free movement, or other policies and harmonisation measures of the Union. It is similarly 
limited in its ability to communicate disapproval or condemnation on the part of the 
supranational community. It is multi-levelled and requires transposition. Importantly, this 
necessarily excludes the ability to impose criminal liability, framed in terms of the direct 
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effect of directives and the principle of legality and revealing an important limitation on the 
part of the Union. Finally, it lacks the important institutional context for the communication 
of public wrongs in individual cases. The symbolism of the criminal law is intimately bound 
up with its institutional processes, a symbolism that the Union lacks. EU criminal law is 
therefore extremely limited in its ability to articulate and communicate public wrongs to its 
individual citizens on behalf of the supranational community. 
 
However, it remains the case that for all its limitations the Union does enjoy an explicit 
criminal competence and one that necessarily carries with it an independent expressive and 
evaluative function linked to the capacity to articulate public wrongs. It is limited and 
intervenes only in specific instances. While obscured by the technical and functional manner 
in which EU criminal law is discussed and justified by commentators and the institutions, its 
mere enactment and the values used to guide the choices, imply a certain set of supranational 
public wrongs, albeit at times ill-defined and implicit. This can be seen in two areas, linked 
on the one hand to the supposedly regulatory function of the law and on the other to the 
ancillary approximation competence contained in Article 83(1) TFEU. In employing the 
criminal law, EU law is implicitly classifying certain goods as European public goods, which 
engage a European public interest, violation of which constitutes not only material damage 
but a wrong to the European community. Thus the environment, the internal market, the 
financial system and the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ itself, can be viewed in this 
manner. The precise utility of the approximation measures adopted under the now Article 
83(1) TFEU in facilitating cross-border cooperation remains doubtful in a number of cases. 
Frequently, their main purpose appears to be to articulate a certain set of values or political 
principles on the part of the Union. This is particularly the case for Racism or Xenophobic 
crimes and the ‘stigmatising’ function of the framework decision on combating terrorism.  
 
Indeed, it is the interaction with national norms and in transnational processes that the 
approximating competence of the Union under Article 83(1) TFEU, reveals an important role 
in endorsing national criminal law. Both the legislature and the court have used 
supranational criminal law in this fashion. The legislature in using these instruments to 
justify a shared conception in national law of these wrongful conducts in the abolition of 
double criminality in mutual recognition instruments in the area of free movement; the Court 
in using these instruments to endorse national choices under the public policy exception in 




national criminal law and as a means of contributing to transnational processes, be they free 
movement and the creation of a single area of justice or social integration. Both ultimately 
reveal the multi-levelled and composite nature of the Union as a political community.   
 
Criminal law articulates public wrongs, a fact which points to another feature of the criminal 
law that has been stressed by commentators and indeed judicial authorities; the link between 
collective identity and the expressive dimension of the criminal law. Without necessarily 
subscribing to the extreme version of ontological identification between the moral code of a 
community and the community itself,
122
 it is the case that the political community is only a 
community through the relations it establishes between its constituent members, expressed 
by its norms and formally by its laws. Choice is a means of affirming identity, a fact as true 
in law as in other dimensions of human action.
123
 The criminal law as a set of laws is more 
normative than most, implying explicit valuations and viewing them as rules of imperative 
public conduct guiding behaviour between individuals. As an expression of social values, it 
can be said to some extent perform a constituent function for the political community, 
binding individuals together through shared conceptions of wrongfulness and playing a role 
in its self-determination. As put by the Bundesverfassungsgericht: ‘[b]y criminal law, a legal 
community gives itself a code of conduct that is anchored in its values and whose violation 
according to the shared convictions on law, is regarded as so grievous and unacceptable for 
social co-existence in the community that it requires punishment.’
124
 The European Union’s 
criminal law competence is certainly limited in its ability to make choices about ‘shared 
convictions’ and to communicate those choices directly to individuals. Nonetheless by 
necessity it does just that in a number of cases and if legislation like the Directive on the 
Sexual Exploitation of Children is any indication, will do so in an increasing manner in the 
future. Moreover, in its choices it interacts with the choices made by national political 
communities, reflecting and endorsing national criminal law. Mirroring the EU as a political 
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community generally, its criminal law competence and in particular its ability to articulate 
and communicate public wrongs is limited, multi-levelled and composite, restricted in scope 







Union Citizenship, Criminal Law and the Restructuring of Community 
 
In Answering for Crime and other writings
1
 Duff has elaborated a novel and comprehensive 
theory of criminal law that allows us to view the criminal law in a new light. By approaching 
the criminal law from a structural perspective based on a relational conception of 
responsibility and citizenship and community, he has provided us with a theory of the 
criminal law that is both analytical or explanatory and normative. His theory is analytical in 
that it allows us to make sense of the main features of the criminal law; the types and sources 
of criminal wrongs, the trial, defences, excuses and punishment. It is normative in providing 
a basis for the legitimacy of restricting the liberty of individuals and of inflicting 
punishment.  
 
Duff’s main purpose is to provide an adequate theory of criminal law and in doing so he 
relies on the concepts of citizenship and political community. However, conversely, Duff’s 
account of the criminal law can inform and enrich our understanding of citizenship. In 
particular it adds a new perspective to a status that in law is typically analysed in terms of 
rights and liberties, especially those related to migration issues,
2
 and political participation.
3
 
It provides a specific context to explore notions of duties, values and community and how 
they relate to citizenship. Following Duff’s account the criminal law is a basis for a set of 
duties that flow from the status of citizenship; it is as fellow members of the political 
community that we are called to account for our wrongful action. Similarly, the basis of a 
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wrong is the concept of a public wrong. It is variable and context specific and is rooted in 
the common understandings and values of the particular community. The criminal law 
therefore has an expressive quality, giving voice and meaning to certain norms of the 
community. Finally, through the institution of the criminal law the community is manifested 
in a very real way and directly relates to the individual as a collective. It is a public wrong; a 
wrong that concerns the community. The individual is called to account before the 
community through prosecution and trial in the name of ‘the people’. The criminal law can 
therefore add a new perspective on citizenship, bringing a more value-infused, duty-
orientated and community situated notion of citizenship to the fore.  
 
The present study is an attempt to bring this perspective to bear on Union citizenship. This is 
particularly appropriate for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is a timely exercise; both Union 
citizenship and in particular the role of the Union in criminal law matters has seen rapid 
growth over the past two decades. Secondly, these two areas have been increasingly 
associated in the policy language and rhetoric of the Union institutions; the activity of the 
EU in criminal law is increasingly phrased in terms of security, a public good that is then 
‘offered’ to Union citizens.
4
 Thirdly, an observation that occasionally surfaces in relation to 
Union citizenship is the lack of duties associated with the status,
5
 despite the Treaty’s 
assertion to the contrary.
6
 This study argues that there are in fact duties associated with 
Union citizenship and that at least some of them can be found in the criminal law. Fourthly, 
another complaint levelled at Union citizenship is its rootless, liberal conception of the 
individual, devoid of a meaningful sense of community and norms.
7
 While not denying that 
some truth may lie behind these sentiments, this study argues that the concept of community 
and norms may in fact be present in Union law, in the area of criminal law.  
 
Complementing Union Citizenship 
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Citizenship is a status that carries with it rights and duties and is located within a political 
community.
8
 The treatment of the criminal law in Union law contributes to all three aspects 




While the focus of this work has been how norms expressed in the criminal law, both 
national and supranational, can contribute towards the imposition of certain duties on Union 
citizens, a consideration of the interaction of Union citizenship and criminal law does reveal 





Rights associated with the social integration and with the free movement of Union citizens 
are extended and reinforced in the context of criminal law. While the criminal law has been 
used to restrict Union citizens’ residence rights in host Member States, certain aspects of 
criminal law, in particular the goal of rehabilitation has led to the further inclusion of Union 
citizens under certain circumstances. Thus the concept of rehabilitation has bolstered the 
right to equal treatment enjoyed by Union citizen in the context of the serving of sentences, 
both under the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD)
10
 and the 
Framework Decision on the Mutual Recognition of Custodial Sentences.
11
 Secondly, the 
right to free movement is clearly and directly reinforced by the operation of the transnational 
ne bis in idem principle located in Article 54 CISA. The interpretation of the Court of Justice 
has principally, if not exclusively, been focused on maximising the free movement of 
individuals and reducing burdens and its interpretative choices, imposing strict mutual 
recognition of the original Member State’s laws and developing a rule based on facts rather 
than crimes, have contributed a great deal to this effort. There is a parallel to be drawn 
between the manner in which a single civil status, such as a legal name, is created and 
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rendered portable throughout the Union and the manner in which a status under national 
criminal law is similarly rendered applicable Union-wide. 
 
Criminal law has also given the Union the opportunity to develop a set of supranational 
fundamental rights and procedural rights. Civil rights and fundamental rights are closely 
linked with the historic development of national citizenship.
12
 Additionally, in both their 
selection and the manner in which they are elaborated and applied, fundamental rights 
express the norms and political values of a political community.
13
 The development of a ne 
bis in idem principle, while primarily orientated at securing free movement, is nonetheless 
an important safeguard for the individual faced with the community’s sanctioning powers 
and is one clear example of a supranational fundamental right.
14
 More generally, through the 
imposition of a common space of movement and the consequential setting aside of national 
fundamental rights guarantees in certain areas, the Union has been obliged to further develop 
its own set of fundamental rights.
15
 Finally, the necessity to secure ‘mutual trust’ has resulted 
in a (perhaps belated) process of rolling out a pan-European set of procedural rights, which, 
while limited and reliant on national procedures, do form the nucleus of European criminal 
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When the question is considered, Union citizenship is generally considered bereft of duties.
17
 
It is certainly true that only rights figure in the list contained in Article 21 TFEU. 
Nonetheless, one of the arguments of this thesis is that duties of Union citizenship can be 
located in criminal law and operate in all three areas of Union citizenship: social integration; 
free movement or autonomy and the supranational. 
 
Firstly, through linking integration, crime and the status of the criminal offender in the host 
Member State and placing them in a communitarian account of both integration and crime, 
the Court of Justice has imposed a duty of respect for the norms of host societies on 
individual Union citizens as a condition for their continued enjoyment of membership in that 
community. This has occurred both in suspending rights of free movement and residence 
through the exercise of the public policy exception and in acquiring rights through the 
treatment of periods of imprisonment on the acquisition of rights under the Citizenship 
Directive.
18
 And while the object of such a duty of respect, in terms of values and norms, are 
provided by national law, the duty itself, it is suggested, is one that is imposed by Union law 
as an element of Union citizenship. 
 
However, the concept of duties of Union citizenship through criminal law goes beyond the 
dimension of social integration of Union citizens but is also found in the concept of a free 
area of movement. It is suggested that a duty to respect the laws of other Member States 
exists also in the area of justice and is represented by the system of shared enforcement 
established by the EAW FD in particular. Both of these developments – rights of free 
movement and the area of justice – are linked by the notion of a single space or area 
occupied by Union citizens and with reference to which wrongs are enforced. Free 
movement has established a relationship with various Member States carrying with it rights. 
That relationship also entails responsibilities, which likewise are enforced transnational 
through a Union-wide system of enforcement.  
 
Finally, the Union can be said to establish a number of duties at a supranational level, 
imposed on Union citizens. Here however, it should be pointed out that, aside from its 
limited and ancillary scope, in the multi-levelled context of the European Union legal 
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system, the capacity of the Union to directly bind individuals is distinctly limited. As 
Berlusconi
19
 in particular indicates, Union law cannot directly impose criminal liability on 
individuals and does not enjoy the quality of legality in the criminal law sense of being a 
validly adopted and binding act imposing criminal obligations on individuals. However, it is 
suggested that an important role for supranational criminal law is in justifying the use of 
national criminal law in a transnational setting. It therefore indirectly affects individuals 
through endorsing national criminal law in the restriction of Union citizens’ rights or in 




Finally, a word should be said regarding values. Values and norms are central to the identity 
of a particular political community, particularly one that is not modelled on a thick concept 
of the nation
20
 and can form an important aspect of the concept of belonging, which is 
frequently considered a constituent element of citizenship.
21
 The Union was originally 
designed as a technocratic institution, albeit one with a political vocation, and its values have 
frequently seemed distant and/or ill-formed.
22
 This thesis argues that regardless of what one 
may think concerning the desirability of the particular values and normative choices made in 
the context of EU criminal law,
23
 the fact remains that one of the principle functions of 
criminal law is to express certain norms and that one of the principle functions of 
punishment is to communicate the public condemnation for breach of those norms. While 
indirect and often phrased in terms of instrumental or technical goals of compliance, EU 
criminal law does have the capacity to express certain normative choices on behalf of the 
Union as a whole, either in designating certain goods, often those associated with market 
institutions, as public goods, harm to which constitutes a wrong against the Union as a whole 
or in more select areas expressing certain values and norms adopted by the Union as guiding 
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principles in criminalising certain conduct. More importantly perhaps is the endorsement 
function of supranational criminal law and its validation of national criminal law and the 





 are most striking in this regard but a similar operation be seen in the certain of 




The Restructuring of Political Community in the European Union 
Between National, Transnational and Supranational 
 
Duff’s account of the criminal law is intimately linked with the notion of community. 
Starting from the premise that criminal law is public law, he identifies a significant role for 
the political community in explaining and justifying criminal law. It is therefore a 
communitarian account of both criminal law and of citizenship.
27
 Crimes are public wrongs, 
wrongs that concern the public. There must therefore be a public capable of being 
concerned. At the same time it is the norms and values of the community collectively that 
determine the content of the non-derogable norms of conduct that comprise the criminal 
law.
28
 Similarly, while many acts that result in crimes might directly be harms or wrongs 
against individuals, crimes themselves are wrongs against the public, they are shared wrongs 
experienced vicariously by the community at large via the membership of the victim. 
Criminal law therefore necessarily presupposes a public, a community and is a legal context 
within which the relationship of the individual citizen to that community is played out. 
Viewing citizenship through the lens of the criminal law can therefore reveal certain aspects 
of the broader community.  
 
Much like the Union itself, the community that emerges from this study on the interaction 
between criminal law and Union citizenship is not simple or clear-cut but plays out in a 
complex interaction of the national, transnational and supranational in what is ultimately a 
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composite polity, a ‘community of communities’.
29
 To look for the emergence of a complete, 
distinct European supranational community through top-down efforts at harmonisation and 
integration is to look in the wrong place. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not the operation of a 
supranational competence of criminalisation that is the main engine behind the emergence of 
a supranational community. Rather, such an entity emerges in a more organic fashion 
through the transnational processes triggered by free movement and social integration and 
their interaction with the criminal law. Supranational norms certainly play a role, but are 
limited and ancillary. Of more immediate relevance is the manner in which they reinforce 
transnational processes, confirming and endorsing national criminal law as they do so.  
 
The Primacy of National Communities 
 
While recent times have seen a rapid growth in the role of the Union in criminal law, it 
remains an area of law tied to national sovereignty and largely in the hands of national 
legislators. This picture of the national community as the primary locus of the articulation, 
application and experiencing of crimes is similarly visible in instances where criminal law 
interacts with Union citizens.  
 
Crimes as wrongs are primarily articulated at a national level. The determination of what 
conduct should be subject to criminalisation takes place at a national level. The Union’s 
competence to criminalise through approximation measures is limited in scope by its 
functional nature in the context of Article 83(2) TFEU and the closed list contained in Article 
83(1) TFEU. Union law cannot directly create crimes but must rely on the mediating actions 
of Member States and only national criminal law enjoys the quality of legality.  The vast 
majority of substantive criminal law, including the core crimes known as mala in se, remains 
in the hands of the Member States, a situation that is unlikely to change in the near future.  
 
A similar privileging of the national is seen in transnational contexts. It is the fundamental 
interests and values of the host society that determine the content of public policy in 
expulsion cases. The element of national choice has been underlined by the Court of Justice 
for whom public policy and public security represent the fundamental interests of (the 
national) society. A similar privileging of the national community is identifiable in the 
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system for allocating individuals to particular Member States for the purposes of 
imprisonment. The principle of social integration only supplements, it does not replace, the 
principle of nationality. At the same time both the EAW FD and Article 54 CISA concern the 
mutual recognition of national crimes and national judgments, defined solely by reference to 
the issuing Member State or Member State of final judgment. 
 
Not only is the wrong articulated at a national level but the wrong is also experienced at a 
national level; it is the national community that experiences the wrong through the violation 
of its norms. Clearly, it is not the Union that holds individuals to account, arrests, prosecutes, 
tries and punishes individuals; all of these functions, so central to the criminal law and 
reflecting the response of the community that is wronged, are carried out by the institutions 
of the Member States. The recent controversy over the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
is testimony to the sensitivities of the matter, even in an area where the Union’s institutional 
interest is most directly implicated, namely its own financial resources. The national nature 
of the experience of the wrong is most clearly evident the case of expulsion and acquisition 
of residence rights treated in chapter 4. Crimes are wrongs against the national community 
that justify the limitation of rights vis-à-vis that community. However, even in matters of 
mutual recognition certain features of the legal practice serve to highlight the continued 
national nature of the wrong. In the operation of the EAW FD, while the executing Member 
State contributes to the enforcement of the crime, ultimately the individual is returned and 
tried by the issuing Member State, the community that experienced the wrong. Similarly, 
Member States are reluctant to cede the right to punish wrongs they see themselves as 
having experienced, as is evidenced by the absence of binding rules for allocating 
jurisdiction and the explicit insistence on inviolability of the national right to prosecute in 




National Wrongs in Transnational Processes 
 
However, those national wrongs are located within transnational processes closely linked to 
the operation of Union citizenship. The Court has made use of national criminal law to 
regulate the status of individual Union citizens in host Member States leading to their greater 
inclusion and greater exclusion, and has used national criminal law to impose a transnational 
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duty of respect. At the same time, national wrongs are now recognised and enforced 
transnationally. National criminal law now operates within a single ‘area of justice’ that 
corresponds to the area of movement offered Union citizens through rights of free 
movement; rights and responsibilities, generated from national law, are enjoyed with 
reference to a broader geographical space.  
 
Supranational Implications – Shared Rights, Shared Wrongs and Shared Punishment 
 
These transnational processes however, while respecting the essentially national nature of 
wrongs and the communities that experience them, necessarily engage Union law and give 
rise to a common framework or norms, wrongs and community.  
 
Firstly, there is much evidence to suggest that the treatment of criminal law within EU law 
gives rise to a shared conception of wrong-doing and hence a shared moral framework under 
which citizens’ duties towards each other within the broader community are evaluated. The 
EAW FD in its abolition of double criminality for certain core crimes presupposes a 
common characterisation of those acts as wrongful across the Union. Similarly, acts that 
form the object of an approximation competence by the Union are similarly presumed to be 
wrongful for all Member States. Under the operation of the public policy exception national 
criminal law and the wrongful characterisation they entail can be endorsed by Union law and 
the normative choices made by the supranational community. While the Union lacks any 
direct means of punishing and thus directly communicating its condemnation of individuals 
who breach certain norms, it may do so indirectly, not (only) through the implementation of 
substantive Union criminal law but also through endorsing national criminal law when it 
arises in transnational processes. 
 
Not only is there a common supranational conception of certain wrongs but there is evidence 
that a community exists at a supranational level capable of experiencing those wrongs.
31
 The 
legitimacy of the EAW system as a shared system of enforcement may be seen as reflecting a 
shared experience of the wrong by the Union as a whole. This is even more evident is the 
operation of the ne bis in idem principle; once called to account for wrong-doing in one 
Member State, the wrong is expunged vis-à-vis all Member States, the implication being that 
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only one such wrong exists. Even the scheme adopted through the EAW FD and the 
Framework Decision on the Transfer of Custodial Sentences
32
 could be seen in this light; 
there is an embryonic shared system of punishment, allowing Member States to collectively 
communicate condemnation to the individual.  
 
But note that those wrongs are experienced through the wrongs suffered by national 
communities. It is the wrong suffered by the national community that is enforced within the 
EAW system but the legitimacy of that system of shared enforcement is premised on the 
sharing of that wrong by the executing Member State and potentially by all Member States. 
Similarly, the individual is called to account before the national courts for a national wrong 
and that calling to account is valid Union-wide under Article 54 CISA. The paradox is that 
crime remains resolutely national and yet collectively the Member States participate in its 
enforcement and to recognise any subsequent calling to account for that crime. The answer it 
is submitted lies in the shared nature of the wrong.
33
 It is through wrongs done individual 
Member States that one wrongs the Union as a whole. 
 
The result is a composite, multi-levelled polity that operates along both a transnational and 
or horizontal axis and a supranational or vertical axis. However, the connections between 
national and supranational communities and the relationship between transnational and 
supranational processes are more complex than this simply vertical-horizontal picture would 
suggest. National, transnational and supranational processes interact and reinforce each 
other. The national remains privileged but operates in transnational contexts, these 
transnational contexts are facilitated by a supranational criminal law which in turn endorses 
national normative choices. Meanwhile, the assumptions behind transnational systems of 
enforcement and recognition manifest a supranational community. It is through transnational 
processes that supranational rights, wrongs and ultimately a community emerge.
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